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ARTICLES

Tax Treaties for Investment and Aid
to Sub-Saharan Africa
A CASE STUDY
Allison D. Christians †
I.

INTRODUCTION

The U.S. is committed to increasing trade and
investment to less developed countries (LDCs), 1 particularly
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1
There is no uniform convention for the designation of a country as “less
developed.” The term is generally used to reflect a country’s economic status or growth
potential. In the context of taxation, these labels may be used to distinguish “in a
general way between countries with highly developed, sophisticated tax systems and
those whose tax systems are at an earlier stage of development.” VICTOR THURONYI,
TAX LAW DESIGN AND DRAFTING, at xxvii n.1 (1996). In the United States, the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) delineates three categories in a hierarchy, consisting of 34
“developed countries,” 27 “former USSR/Eastern Europe,” and 172 “less developed
countries” (all other recognized countries, including all of Sub-Saharan Africa except
South Africa). See CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, THE
WORLD FACTBOOK 2005 (GPO 2005) [hereinafter WORLD FACTBOOK] (defining LDCs in
Appendix B) (An internet version of the WORLD FACTBOOK is available at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook. The internet version varies in format and
content from the print version and is updated frequently; this article references the
data found in the print version except where otherwise noted.) As a rough guide to
U.S. foreign policy, this article incorporates the CIA terms. For a discussion of the
arbitrary and often unyielding nature of these designations despite changes in a
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those in Sub-Saharan Africa, where poverty-related conditions
are extreme and foreign trade and investment minimal. 2 This
commitment is demonstrated in U.S. efforts to negotiate
agreements to eliminate trade barriers such as tariffs and
quotas with many of these countries. 3 U.S. officials also
consistently proclaim a commitment to enter into tax treaties
with LDCs, 4 on the theory that tax treaties can eliminate
particular country’s economic status or prospects, see What’s in a name?, ECONOMIST,
Jan. 17, 2004, at 11.
2
Since the late 1980s, increasing trade with and investment in LDCs has
become a preferred means of providing aid to such countries. See, e.g., PAUL B.
THOMPSON, THE ETHICS OF AID AND TRADE 2 (1992); see also Bruce Zagaris, The
Procedural Aspects of U.S. Tax Policy Towards Developing Countries: Too Many Sticks
and No Carrots?, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 331, 384 (2003) (stating that the “official
policies” of the U.S. “are to mobilize private capital rather than foreign aid.”). For an
overview of poverty conditions and foreign investment in African nations, see, for
example, U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Foreign Direct Investment in
Africa: Performance and Potential 1-2, 21 U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/Misc. 15 (1999)
[hereinafter UNCTAD] (stating that foreign investors typically associate Africa with
“pictures of civil unrest, starvation, deadly diseases and economic disorder,” and
foreign investment “inflows into Africa have increased only modestly” since the 1980s).
3
The main agreement is the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), a
trade preference agreement, discussed infra note 18. The U.S. is also currently
negotiating a free trade agreement with the South African Customs Union (comprised
of South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland). See United States
Trade Representative, Background Information on the U.S.-SACU FTA (2003),
available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Southern_Africa_FTA/
Background_Information_on_the_US-SACU_FTA.html.
4
See, e.g., The Japanese Tax Treaty (T. Doc. 108-14) and the Sri Lanka Tax
Protocol (T. Doc. 108-9); Hearing Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong.
29 (2004) (“[w]e are trying to expand the scope of these treaties to developing
countries.”); Joseph H. Guttentag, An Overview of International Tax Issues, 50 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 445, 450 (1996) (“[t]ax treaty expansion in this area is a high Treasury
priority.”); Press Release, U.S. Treasury Dep’t, Treasury Welcomes Entry into Force of
U.S.-Sri Lanka Income Tax Treaty (July 22, 2004), available at http://www.treas.gov/
press/releases/js1809.htm [hereinafter Treasury Press Rel. JS-1809] (“The Treasury
Department is committed to continuing to extend and broaden the U.S. tax treaty
network, including new agreements with emerging economies.”). The U.S. currently
has 16 tax treaties with LDCs: Barbados, China, Cyprus, Egypt, India, Indonesia,
Jamaica, Korea, Morocco, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Trinidad and
Tobago, Tunisia, and Venezuela. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and
the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Barb., Dec. 31,
1984, T.I.A.S. No. 11,090 [hereinafter U.S.-Barbados Treaty]; Agreement for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Tax Evasion with Respect to
Taxes on Income, U.S.-P.R.C., Apr. 30, 1984 T.I.A.S. No. 12065 [hereinafter U.S.-China
Treaty]; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Cyprus, Mar. 19, 1984, 35 U.S.T. 4737
[hereinafter U.S.-Cyprus Treaty]; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation
and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Egypt,
Aug. 24, 1980, 33 U.S.T. 1809 [hereinafter U.S.-Egypt Treaty]; Convention for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to
Taxes on Income, U.S.-India, Sept. 12, 1989, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 101-5 (1990)
[hereinafter U.S.-India Treaty]; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and
the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Indon., July
11, 1988, T.I.A.S. No. 11593 [hereinafter U.S.-Indonesia Treaty]; Convention for the
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excessive taxation and therefore help to increase trade and
investment between the partner countries. 5 As such, tax
treaties appear to be a perfect complement to trade agreements
in furthering U.S. efforts to increase trade and investment in
LDCs. Yet there are currently no tax treaties in force between
the U.S. and any of the LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa. 6
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to
Taxes on Income, U.S.-Jam., May 21, 1980, 33 U.S.T. 2865 [hereinafter U.S.-Jamaica
Treaty]; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and the Encouragement of International
Trade and Investment, U.S.-S. Korea, June 4, 1976, 30 U.S.T. 5253 [hereinafter U.S.Korea Treaty]; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of
Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Morocco, Aug. 1, 1977, 33 U.S.T.
2545 [hereinafter U.S.-Morocco Treaty]; Convention for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.Pak., July 1, 1957, 10 U.S.T. 984; Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.Phil., Oct. 1, 1976, 34 U.S.T. 1277 [hereinafter U.S.-Philippines Treaty]; Convention for
the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to
Taxes on Income, U.S.-Sri Lanka, Mar. 14, 1985, S. TREATY DOC. No. 99-10 (2004)
[hereinafter, U.S.-Sri Lanka Treaty]; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation
and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Thail.,
Nov. 26, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. No. 105-2 (1998) [hereinafter U.S.-Thailand Treaty];
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion
with Respect to Taxes on Income, and the Encouragement of International Trade and
Investment, U.S.-Trin. & Tobago, Jan. 9, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 164 [hereinafter U.S.- Trin.
& Tobago Treaty]; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Tunis., June 17,
1985, as amended by Prot., 29 I.L.M. 1580 [hereinafter U.S.-Tunisia Treaty];
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion
with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, U.S.-Venez., Jan. 25, 1999, 38 I.L.M.
1707 [hereinafter U.S.-Venezuela Treaty].
5
This theory has been officially propounded since the first independent
U.S.-LDC treaty was contemplated. See Letter from John F. Dulles to the President
(July 9, 1956), in STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF UNITED STATES TAX CONVENTIONS 1445 (1962) (proclaiming
that a treaty with Honduras would increase U.S. investment in that country because
“[b]y eliminating double taxation . . . [tax treaties] have contributed much to the trade
and investment flowing between [partner] countries and the United States”). For a
recent restatement of the theory, see The Japanese Tax Treaty (T. Doc. 108-14) and the
Sri Lanka Tax Protocol (T. Doc. 108-9): Hearing Before the Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 108th Cong. 11 (2004) (statement of Barbara M. Angus, International Tax
Council, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury) (in regards to a proposed treaty with Sri Lanka, “[t]he
goal of the tax treaty is to increase the amount and efficiency of economic activity”
between the partner countries).
6
The U.S. tax treaty network at one time included ten LDCs in SubSaharan Africa, pursuant to extensions of existing tax treaties with the U.K. and
Belgium. Press Release, U.S. Treasury Dep’t, Treasury Dep’t Announces Termination
of Extensions of Income Tax Conventions Between the U.S. and the U.K. and the U.S.
and Belgium to 18 Countries and Territories (July 1, 1983). All of these treaties were
subsequently terminated. Id. Today, the only Sub-Saharan African country with a
U.S. tax treaty is South Africa. Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and
the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains,
U.S.-S. Afr., Feb. 17, 1997, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-9 (1997). The United States
considers South Africa to be a developed country. See supra note 1. Ethiopia, Ghana,
and Liberia each have a treaty with the U.S. that deals solely with the taxation of
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The lack of tax treaties between the U.S. and the LDCs
of Sub-Saharan Africa cannot be explained by disinterest or
lack of support on the part of academics, practitioners, or
lawmakers: representatives from all of these sectors have
urged the importance of entering into these agreements. 7
Neither can the omission be attributed to disinterest on the
part of the LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa themselves. 8 Many of
these nations have long pursued tax treaties with the U.S., 9
and a few have gone so far as to formally and publicly express
their interest in commencing negotiations with the U.S. 10
income from shipping and aircraft activity. Agreement to Exempt from Income Tax, on
a Reciprocal Basis, Income Derived from the International Operation of Aircraft and
Ships, U.S.-Eth., Oct. 30-Nov. 12, 1998, STATE DEP’T. NO. 98-183; Agreement to
Exempt from Income Tax, on a Reciprocal Basis, Certain Income Derived from the
International Operation of a Ship or Ships and Aircraft, U.S.-Ghana, Nov. 12, 2001,
STATE DEP’T. NO. 02-01; Agreement for Reciprocal Relief from Double Taxation on
Earnings from Operation of Ships and Aircraft, U.S.-Liber., July 1-Aug. 11, 1982 34
U.S.T. 1553. However, these agreements are largely unnecessary due to parallel
provisions in U.S. domestic tax law. See I.R.C. § 883 (2005).
7
See, e.g., The U.S.-Africa Partnership: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Sen. Lugar) (supporting legislation
that “directs the Secretary of the Treasury to seek negotiations regarding tax treaties
with [AGOA] eligible countries”); Statement by Michael A. Samuels to the Subcomm.
on Trade Comm. on Ways and Means (July 16, 1996), available at 1996 WL 433282
(F.D.C.H.) (“Given the vital role that investment must play in the development of
African countries . . . the new policy must contain several key investment-related
priorities, including an emphasis on bilateral investment and tax treaties.”); Hon.
Charles B. Rangel, The State of Africa: The Benefits of The African Growth and
Opportunity Act—Next Steps (July 14, 2003), available at 149 CONG. REC. E1464-01
(stating that the U.S. should negotiate tax treaties with AGOA countries); Calvin J.
Allen, United States Should Expand Tax Treaty Network in Sub-Saharan Africa, 34
TAX NOTES INT’L 57, 58 (2004) (same); Karen B. Brown, Missing Africa: Should U.S.
International Tax Rules Accommodate Investment in Developing Countries?, 23 U. PA.
J. INT’L ECON. L. 45, 46, 69 (2002) (arguing for multilateral tax treaties between the
U.S. and countries in Sub-Saharan Africa).
8
All of the LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa are in urgent if not desperate need
for foreign capital, and most are responding to the need by implementing measures to
make their countries more attractive to foreign investors. See, e.g., James Gathii, A
Critical Appraisal of the NEPAD Agenda in Light of Africa’s Place in the World Trade
Regime in an Era of Market Centered Development, 13 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 179 (2003). Given the powers ascribed to tax treaties in increasing trade and
investment between partner countries, most LDCs would pursue the opportunity to
commence negotiations with the U.S. (provided that the concessions required to secure
such agreements are not too great).
9
For example, Nigeria began pursuing a tax treaty with the United States
in 1978, after Nigeria unilaterally withdrew from its coverage under an extension of
the 1945 tax treaty between the U.K. and the U.S. (as a former U.K. territory). Nigeria
to Terminate Tax Treaty with U.S., Seek Renegotiated One, WALL ST. J., Aug. 24, 1978,
at 23; see supra note 6 (discussing the treaty extension); I.R.S. Announcement 78-147,
1978-41 I.R.B. 20 (Oct. 10, 1978) (terminating the treaty). Although the tax treaty was
apparently negotiated at length, it was never completed.
10
Calvin J. Allen, Botswana, Burundi Wish to Negotiate Tax Treaties with
United States, 26 TAX NOTES INT’L 1264 (2002). This announcement is a rather
unusual event, since tax treaties are generally commenced and negotiated in secret.
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Finally, the lack of tax treaties cannot be charged to a
lack of commitment on the part of the U.S. to conclude
agreements that will increase trade and investment to assist in
the economic growth of the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. 11
The U.S. has demonstrated its commitment by making
significant concessions in the context of trade and aid
agreements, in the form of direct aid as well as reduced
tariffs. 12
That the lack of tax treaties cannot be explained by a
lack of support or commitment on the part of scholars,
policymakers, or governments suggests that there must be
some other reason or reasons that tax treaties have not been
concluded between the U.S. and the LDCs of Sub-Saharan
Africa.
This article explores many of these reasons by
presenting as a case study a hypothetical tax treaty between
the U.S. and Ghana, one of the LDCs of Sub-Saharan Africa. 13
Hypothesizing the structure and operation of a tax treaty
between these two countries provides a vehicle for measuring
the potential effect of such a treaty on international commerce.
While there has been some discussion among scholars and
policymakers regarding the paucity and inefficacy of tax
treaties between the U.S. and LDCs, much of the discussion
has focused on abstract principles of international tax law. By
examining the effects a U.S. treaty with Ghana might have on
Their existence is usually made public after negotiations have concluded and the treaty
has been signed by the respective countries, pending ratification. RICHARD E.
ANDERSEN & PETER H. BLESSING, ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAX TREATIES ¶
1.04[1][a][i], [ii] (2005). Thus, countries don’t usually issue public proclamations
regarding their desire to enter into tax treaties. Similarly, since there is little public
disclosure regarding progress in treaty-making by the U.S. Treasury Department,
there is little means to determine the reaction, if any, that the Treasury has had to
these or other requests to initiate negotiations.
11
See Richard Mitchell, United States-Brazil Bilateral Income Tax Treaty
Negotiations, 21 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 209, 225 (1997) (“[t]he United States
displays eagerness to enter into tax treaties with developing nations”); Miranda
Stewart, Global Trajectories of Tax Reform: The Discourse of Tax Reform in Developing
and Transition Countries, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 139, 148-49 (2003) (pointing to the
number of U.S. treaties with other emerging economies as evidence that “the lack of
U.S. treaty-making with [LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa] cannot be explained solely by a
general reluctance to enter into tax treaties with less developed or non-capitalist
countries.”).
12
The main agreements are the African Growth and Opportunity Act
(AGOA), a preferential trade regime, discussed infra note 18, and the recently
introduced Millennium Challenge Act, an aid package tied to countries’ demonstrated
commitment to growth through investment and trade, discussed infra note 19.
13
Ghana was chosen as a subject for this case study for several reasons,
including its existing commercial ties to the U.S. These reasons are described infra
Part III.A.
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investors, this article analyzes these legal principles in the
context of current global tax conditions for investment in LDCs.
This case study demonstrates that in today’s global tax climate,
a typical tax treaty would not provide significant tax benefits to
current or potential investors. Consequently, there is little
incentive for these investors to pressure the U.S. government
to conclude tax treaties with many LDCs.
There are of course any number of other reasons why
tax treaties may not be concluded between the U.S. and the
LDCs of Sub-Saharan Africa, including competing priorities for
the U.S. government, either for tax treaties with other
countries or for other domestic or international tax matters.
Undoubtedly, socio-political factors play an important role as
well. 14 However, this article argues that since tax treaties with
LDCs like Ghana would not provide major tax benefits to the
private sector, even if concluded, these treaties would not have
a significant impact on cross-border investment and trade.
Accordingly, the main justification so consistently proclaimed
to support the pursuit of tax treaties between the U.S. and
LDCs is misguided. If the U.S. is truly committed to increasing
investment and trade to the LDCs of Sub-Saharan Africa, an
examination of how the global tax climate has changed since
tax treaties were first implemented is in order. We must
acknowledge that tax treaties cannot deliver the promised
benefits, and examine the factors that prevent them from so
doing.
An overview of the background and function of tax
treaties and their proclaimed benefits is discussed in Part II of
this article. Part III presents the case study of a hypothetical
tax treaty between the U.S. and Ghana and shows that such a
treaty would produce few tax benefits to current or potential
investors and would therefore be largely ineffective in
stimulating trade and investment between these two countries.
Part IV concludes that after decades of adherence to the
promise of tax treaties, we must acknowledge their failure to
14
For example, there may be national interests at stake, such as security,
defense, or energy supply issues, that may contribute to the prioritization of concluding
tax treaties with LDCs in other areas of the world, such as Sri Lanka (concluded in
2004) and Bangladesh (currently pending ratification). See John Venuti et al., Current
Status of U.S. Tax Treaties and International Agreements, 34 TAX MGMT INT’L J. 653
(2005) (updating on a monthly basis the status of current U.S. tax treaties and
international agreements). The various foreign policy goals that motivate the agenda
for treaty-making is a subject that deserves much attention, but is beyond the scope of
this article.
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deliver, and search for alternative ways to achieve the goal of
promoting aid through the vehicles of investment and trade.
II.

BACKGROUND: TAX TREATIES, INVESTMENT, AND TRADE

This Part provides the context for a discussion of the
role of tax treaties in delivering investment and aid to LDCs.
Section A describes some of the strategies employed by the U.S.
to assist LDCs, and how tax treaties comport with these
strategies. Section B explains the role tax treaties play as the
locus of international tax law by outlining the purposes and
goals surrounding the origin and evolution of these
agreements. Section C discusses the limitations that arise
because international tax law concepts are embodied in a
network of overlapping, varying, and mostly bilateral
agreements between select nations. This section introduces
some of the problems faced by the LDCs of Sub-Saharan Africa,
which operate largely outside of this network.
A.

U.S. Strategy for Assistance to LDCs

The U.S. has adopted a foreign aid strategy towards
Sub-Saharan Africa that centers on the idea that creating
investment and trade opportunities for LDCs will most
effectively boost economic growth in these countries, thereby
lifting them out of poverty through commercial interaction with
the global community. 15 A key component of this foreign aid
strategy is the identification and elimination of barriers to
trade and investment. Among the most significant potential
barriers are double taxation, which occurs when two countries
impose similar taxes on the same taxpayer in respect to the
same item of income, regulatory barriers, such as currency
exchange and other market controls, and tariffs.
These
barriers have historically been addressed in very different
ways.
Regulatory barriers and tariffs have been addressed by
most countries in a generally uniform manner through regional
The main multilateral
and global trade agreements. 16
agreement is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), to which 147 countries are signatories through the
15

See supra note 2.
Regulatory barriers are also addressed, to a lesser extent, in bilateral
investment treaties (BITs), as discussed infra Part IV.E.
16
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World Trade Organization (WTO). 17 Additional tariff and
regulatory barrier reduction between the U.S. and SubSaharan Africa has been accomplished through the African
Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), an agreement that seeks
to increase growth and alleviate poverty through the
elimination of tariffs and quotas for selected imports from
designated Sub-Saharan African nations. 18 Another barrier
reduction device is the Millennium Challenge Act of 2003
(MCA), a new official direct assistance initiative that will direct
foreign aid only to countries demonstrating a commitment to
poverty reduction through economic growth. 19
According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD), 20 the harmful effects of double
17
Thirty-seven of the forty-seven LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa are members
of the WTO. See the GATT agreement and accompanying agreements, available at
Understanding the World Trade Organization, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/
whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2006).
18
The Trade and Development Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-200, 114 Stat.
251. (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 3721 (2000)) (more commonly known as the
African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA I)), amended by Trade Act of 2002 Pub. L.
No. 107-210 §3108, 116 Stat. 933, 1038-1040 (AGOA II), amended by AGOA
Acceleration Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-274, 118 Stat. 820 (AGOA III) [hereinafter
referring to the three acts collectively as AGOA]. AGOA eliminates “competitive need
limitations” (quotas) and tariffs on over 1,800 items that would otherwise be subject to
such constraints under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (unless
otherwise exempt under a free trade agreement). See AGOA § 103(2) (2004); see also
U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States 67-68
(2004), available at http://www.usitc.gov; AGOA Faq, http://www.agoa.gov/faq/faq.html
(last visited Oct. 9, 2005). AGOA is a preferential trade regime, rather than a free
trade agreement. For a discussion of AGOA and other trade and aid initiatives entered
into with Sub-Saharan Africa over the past several years up to 2002, see Brown, supra
note 7, at 49-51. As of March, 2005, 36 of the 47 LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa were
eligible for AGOA benefits. For a list of currently-eligible countries, see the AGOA,
Country Eligibility, http://www.agoa.gov/eligibility/country_eligibility.html (last visited
Oct. 9, 2005).
19
Millennium Challenge Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-199, 118 Stat. 3, 211226; see S. Res. 571, 108th Cong. (2003) (enacted). For information on the MCA, see
the MCA website, http://www.mca.gov; see also Colin Powell, Welcome Message from
the Honorable Colin L. Powell, http://www.mca.gov (last visited Oct. 9, 2005) (stating
that the MCA “reflects a new international consensus that development aid produces
the best results when it goes to countries that adopt pro-growth strategies for meeting
political, social and economic challenges”). The MCA is not solely directed at SubSaharan Africa, but approximately half of its currently identified recipient countries
are located in this region. See Millennium Challenge Corporation: Eligible Countries,
available at http://www.mca.gov/countries/eligible/index.shtml (last visited Nov. 3,
2005).
20
The OECD is an international organization consisting of thirty member
countries, all of which are considered by the United States to be developed countries
with the nominal exception of South Korea, which the United States specifically
classifies as less developed even though all OECD countries are deemed to be
developed under the “developed country” listing. WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 1, at
628, 639, 641. It is perhaps worthy of note that other organizations, such as the IMF,
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taxation on cross-border trade and investment “are so well
known that it is scarcely necessary to stress the importance of
removing the obstacles that double taxation presents to the
development of economic relations between countries.” 21 The
U.S. government mirrors this sentiment, identifying the
eradication of “tax barriers” as a major component of its
dedication “to eliminating unnecessary barriers to cross-border
trade and investment.” 22
Yet, unlike other barriers to trade and investment,
double taxation has not been reconciled on a global scale.
Instead of a world tax organization to coordinate efforts and
resolve disputes, 23 relieving double taxation remains the
diverge from the views of the United States in some of these classifications. For
instance, the IMF classification of “developing countries,” while similar in most
respects to the United States’ classification of LDCs, diverges by including in its list
both Mexico and Turkey. Id. at 628. Mexico is not independently listed as a developed
country under the United States’ classification system, and the Czech Republic,
Hungary, and Slovakia are separately categorized as “former USSR/Eastern European”
countries, but the term developed countries is defined as including all of the OECD
member countries. See OECD, Ratification of the Convention on the OECD and OECD
Member Countries, http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,2340,en_2649_201185_1889402
_1_1_1_1,00.html; WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 1, at 628, 639, 641 (Appendix B
provides a listing of LDCs that includes the “Four Dragons,” a group that includes
South Korea. Country data on South Korea provides GDP and poverty statistics,
available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ks.html). The CIA still
considers South Korea an LDC despite its 2004 estimated per capita GDP of $19,200,
well over the typical $10,000 threshold separating developed from less-developed, and
despite the fact that just 4% of the population is considered to be living in poverty
conditions. WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 1, at 304, 628, 639. In contrast, the
inclusion of Mexico as a developed country is anomalous, given its per capita GDP of
$9,600. Id. at 365, 628. As discussed below, the OECD developed and continually
updates a model income tax convention that both encapsulates and sets international
tax standards.
21
OECD COMM. ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME
AND ON CAPITAL 7 (2005) [hereinafter OECD MODEL].
22
Treasury Press Release JS-1809, supra note 4 (“This new tax treaty
relationship will serve to eliminate tax barriers to cross-border trade and investment
between the two countries . . . [by providing] greater certainty to taxpayers with
respect to the tax treatment of their cross-border activities and [reducing] the potential
for double taxation of income from such activities.”); Press Release, U.S. Treasury
Dep’t, Remarks by Treasury Secretary John W. Snow at the Signing Ceremony for the
U.S.-Barbados
Income
Tax
Protocol
(July
14,
2004),
available
at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js1786.htm [hereinafter Treasury Press Rel. JS1786]; see also Treasury Press Release JS-1267, Treasury Welcomes Senate Approval of
New U.S.-Sri Lanka Tax Treaty (March 26, 2004), available at http://www.
treas.gov/press/releases/js1267.htm [hereinafter Treasury Press Rel. JS-1267] (stating
that the new treaty with Sri Lanka is “an important step in our ongoing efforts to
broaden the reach of our tax treaty network”).
23
See What is the WTO?, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/
whatis_e.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2005) (noting that the WTO is “the only international
organization dealing with the rules of trade between nations”).
The several
international organizations concerned with standardizing and coordinating global
taxation do not approach the level of member country participation in the WTO. For

648

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:2

purview of individual countries. 24 Nevertheless, a consensus
has emerged regarding the appropriate tax treatment of crossborder investment activity. 25 Under this consensus, double
taxation is addressed primarily by tax treaties, which allocate
tax revenue among jurisdictions based on concepts of residence
and source. 26
Thus, the U.S., along with the rest of the developed
world, has a network of tax treaties, spanning most of its major
trading partners across the globe. 27 Expanding the tax treaty
network has been termed by the Treasury Department as a
commitment, an ongoing effort, 28 and the “primary means” for
the elimination of tax barriers to international trade and

example, the OECD is one of the primary international organizations that concerns
itself with setting standards for international taxation, but it has only 30 members, few
new members are added (the latest addition was the Slovak Republic, in 2000), and
many countries with rapidly growing economies, such as Brazil, Russia, India, and
China, are not members. OECD, Ratification of the Convention on the OECD and
OECD Member Countries, http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,2340,en_2649_201185_
1889402_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2006).
24
The vast majority of international agreements that address the problem of
double taxation are bilateral. See, e.g., Reuven Avi-Yonah, International Tax as
International Law, 57 TAX L. REV. 483, 497 (2004) (noting that there are over 2,000
bilateral tax treaties). However, there are a few regional multilateral tax treaties
currently in force, including the Andean Pact Income Tax Convention between Bolivia,
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela (Nov. 16, 1971); the Arab Economic Unity
Council Tax Treaty between Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen
(Y.A.R.) (Dec. 3, 1973); the Agreement Among the Governments of the Member States
of the Caribbean Community for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention
of Fiscal Evasion With Respect to Taxes on Income, Profits, or Gains and Capital Gains
and for the Encouragement of Regional Trade and Investment between the Caribbean
Community (CARICOM) countries of Antigua, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana,
Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Christopher and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the
Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago (July 6, 1994); the Tax Convention Between the
Member States of the West African Economic Community (C.E.A.O.) between Burkina
Faso, Côte D’Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal (Oct. 29, 1984); the
Agreement on the Avoidance of Double Taxation on Personal Income and Property,
signed by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Germany (G.D.R.), Hungary, Mongolia, Poland,
Romania, and the Soviet Union (still in force with respect to various successor states)
(May 27, 1977); and the Convention Between the Nordic Countries for the Avoidance of
Double Taxation With Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, between Denmark,
the Faeroe Islands, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden (Sept. 23, 1996) (generally
based on the OECD Model).
25
See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International
Taxation: A Proposal For Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1301 (1996) (providing an
introduction to the evolution of international taxation from decisions and compromises
made by the U.S. and the League of Nations in the 1920s to the “flawed miracle” that
exists today).
26
See id. at 1306.
27
See discussion infra accompanying notes 96 and 97.
28
Treasury Press Release JS-1267, supra note 22.
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investment. 29
Officials from other countries echo these
sentiments. 30
From the perspective of LDCs, a major problem with
embodying international tax laws aimed at preventing double
taxation in tax treaties is that LDCs typically have few of these
treaties in place. But the tax treaty network, with its central
role in the evolution of international tax law, directly affects
these countries regardless of their level of inclusion. To
demonstrate the extent of this influence, the following Section
discusses why and how tax treaties became the source of
international tax law, and explores how this international tax
system has impacted tax treaties between the U.S. and the
LDCs of Sub-Saharan Africa.
B.

Origins of Tax Treaties as International Law

Every country establishes its jurisdiction to impose
income taxation under sovereign claim of right. In the U.S.,
the taxation of income from international transactions turns on
whether the income is earned by a resident 31 or a nonresident. 32
In the case of residents, the U.S. purports to tax “all income
from whatever source derived.” 33 In the case of nonresidents,
the U.S. taxing jurisdiction is generally limited to income
derived from investments and business activities carried out in
29

Treasury Press Release JS-1809, supra note 4; Treasury Press Release JS1786, supra note 22; see also Letter from Gregory F. Jenner thanking Sen. Susan M.
Collins for her Comments on a Possible Chile-U.S. Tax Treaty, U.S. Treasury Thanks
Senator for Comments on Possible Chile-U.S. Tax Treaty (Apr. 22, 2004), 2004 WTD 8316 (“Income tax treaties can serve the important purpose of addressing tax-related
barriers to cross-border trade and investment.”).
30
For example, Bangladeshi officials assert that when the new treaty
between the U.S. and Bangladesh enters into force, it “will encourage U.S. investment
in the education, highway, and communication sectors in Bangladesh.” U.S. Treaty
Update, PwC In & Out, 15 J. INT’L TAX’N 4-5 (Dec. 2004).
31
Whether individual or entity. See I.R.C. § 7701(a), (b) (2005).
32
Id.
33
I.R.C. § 61(a) (2005) (“gross income means all income from whatever source
derived”); see also I.R.C. §§ 1, 11(a) (2005) (imposing tax on incomes of individuals and
corporations, respectively); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1-1(b), 1.11-1(a). The authority to extend
its jurisdiction in this broad fashion is confirmed by Cook v. Tait. 265 U.S. 47, 56
(1924):
The basis of the power to tax was not and cannot be made dependent upon
the situs of the property in all cases, it being in or out of the United States,
nor was not and cannot be made dependent upon the domicile of the citizen,
that being in or out of the United States, but upon his relation as citizen to
the United States and the relation of the latter to him as citizen.
Id.
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the U.S. (known as source-based taxation). 34 Most developed
countries similarly impose worldwide, or residence-based,
income taxation on residents, and source-based taxation on
income earned within their borders. 35 As a result, ample
potential exists for double taxation of international
transactions involving two developed countries. 36 Therefore,
the U.S. and most of the other countries that impose worldwide
taxation provide a foreign tax credit, 37 which essentially
removes the residence-based layer of tax while preserving the
source-based layer. Thus, the U.S. and most other countries
imposing worldwide income taxation generally relieve double
taxation on a unilateral basis under statutory law.
The same result is attained under treaties. Tax treaties
are contracts, generally between two countries, 38 under which
the signatory countries agree to the taxation each will impose
on the activities carried out between their respective
Because the U.S. unilaterally provides a
jurisdictions. 39
34

I.R.C. §§ 871, 881-82 (2005).
OECD countries generally impose some form of worldwide taxation,
although a few (Australia, Austria, and Switzerland) provide certain statutory
exemptions, and many provide for exemption under treaty, as discussed below. See
Ernst & Young, WORLDWIDE CORPORATE TAX GUIDE 29-53, 894-910 (2005), available at
http://www.ey.com/global/download.nsf/Ireland/WorldWideCorporateTaxGuide/$file/
WW_Corporate_Tax_guide_2005_.pdf (describing the tax systems of, and treaty
benefits provided by Australia, Austria, and Switzerland, respectively). Some countries
such as France are generally source-based, or territorial systems, which generally
refrain from taxing the foreign income earned by their residents. See id. at 240-52.
However, these countries enforce worldwide taxation of certain kinds of income earned
in low-tax jurisdictions in order to prevent capital flight. Id. Thus, France imposes
worldwide taxation on certain low-taxed foreign income. See generally id. (providing
tax system features and rates).
36
The most common form of double taxation occurs when there is a
residence-source overlap, as a taxpayer’s country of residence (the home country)
imposes residence-based tax on income earned in a foreign (source, or host) country,
while the host country imposes source-based tax on the same item. Overlaps can also
occur when countries have overlapping or conflicting rules for determining the source
of an item of income or the residence of a taxpayer. For example, while the United
States assigns corporate residence according to country of incorporation, the U.K.
assigns corporate residence according to the seat of management and control. See
I.R.C. § 7701(a)(4), (5) (2005) (assigning corporate residence to country of
incorporation).
37
See generally Ernst & Young, supra note 35.
38
But see supra note 24 (noting that some treaties are multilateral).
39
In the U.S., treaties have the same effect as acts of Congress, and are
equivalent to any other U.S. law. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see Samann v. Comm’r, 313
F.2d 461, 463 (4th Cir. 1963); American Trust Co. v. Smyth, 247 F.2d 149, 152 (9th Cir.
1957). As such, they are subject to and may be overridden by subsequent revisions in
domestic law (“treaty override”) under the “last in time” rule of I.R.C. § 7852(d) (2005).
See Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 621 (1871) (“a treaty may supersede a
prior act of Congress, and an act of Congress may supersede a prior treaty.”); Edye v.
Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 597-600 (1884) (“A treaty, then, is a law of the land as an act
35
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mechanism to prevent U.S. taxation in the event foreign
taxation applies, treaties aimed at relieving double taxation
Treaties might seem
would appear to be duplicative. 40
unnecessary ab initio, since the U.S. provided the foreign tax
credit mechanism almost immediately following the inception
of the income tax itself, decades before any tax treaties were
ever negotiated. 41 Nevertheless, the U.S. began entering into
tax treaties in 1932 and the practice continues to the present. 42
One of the original reasons to enter into treaties was
that before they existed, there was no international standard
for relieving double taxation: the U.S. was alone in providing a
comprehensive foreign tax credit that unilaterally relieved

of Congress is . . . [so a] court resorts to the treaty for a rule of decision for the case
before it as it would to a statute.”); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (“a
treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of like obligation . . . . If the two are
inconsistent, the last one in date will control the other”); see also Philip F. Postlewaite
& David S. Makarski, The ALI Tax Treaty Study—A Critique and a Modest Proposal,
52 TAX LAW. 731, 740 (1999) (arguing that treaty override is seen as a “serious
problem” because it potentially places the U.S. in violation of existing international
obligations); Richard L. Doernberg, Overriding Tax Treaties: The U.S. Perspective, 9
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 71, 131 (1995) (discussing treaty override in the U.S. and
concluding that “these provisions embody an important contractual principle”: that
breach of an obligation is desirable when “what is gained from the party that breaches
exceeds what is lost by the party against whom the breach occurred,” thus a breach
might be appropriate as long as the United States compensates the aggrieved party).
40
See generally Elisabeth Owens, United States Income Tax Treaties: Their
Role in Relieving Double Taxation, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 428 (1963) (arguing that
treaties play a relatively small role in relieving double taxation, owing to the U.S.
foreign tax credit); see also Tsilly Dagan, The Tax Treaties Myth, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. &
POL. 939 (2000) (showing that tax treaties are not needed to relieve double taxation,
since each country would find it in its own best interest to unilaterally relieve double
taxation on its citizens and residents).
41
After a brief and limited stint during the Civil War, the income tax was reintroduced in 1913. See STEVEN R. WEISMAN, THE GREAT TAX WARS 5, 278 (2002). The
foreign tax credit was enacted quickly thereafter, in 1918. See Revenue Act of 1918, ch.
18, §§ 222(a)(1), 238(a), 240(c), Pub. L. No. 65-254, 40 Stat. 1057, 1073, 1080-82 (1919).
Section 222(a)(1) was applicable to individuals, 238(a) to corporations, and 240(c)
defined the taxes for which credit would be allowed.
42
The first U.S. tax treaty was signed with France in 1932 and entered into
force on April 9, 1935. Convention on Double Taxation, U.S.-Fr., Apr. 27, 1932 S.
EXEC. DOC. K, 72-1 (1935). Since then, the U.S. tax treaty network has grown by an
average of one treaty per year, based on the entry-in-force dates of all U.S. tax treaties
ever entered into force. The most recent treaty to enter into force is with Sri Lanka.
See U.S.-Sri Lanka Treaty, supra note 4 (entered into force June 13, 2004). The most
recently signed is with Bangladesh, which was signed on September 26, 2004, but as of
the time of publication has not yet entered into force. See Convention for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion With Respect to
Taxes On Income, U.S.-Bangl., Sept. 26, 2004, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 109-5; see also
Muhammad Kibria, Bangladesh, United States Sign Tax Treaty, 2004 WTD 188-3
(Sept. 28, 2004).
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residence-based taxation. 43 The provision of unilateral relief of
double taxation was seen as a “present of revenue to other
countries,” for which the possibility of source-based taxation
was preserved. 44 Other European nations, especially Italy and
France, relied heavily on source-based taxation and therefore
vigorously defended the U.S. position of ceding residence-based
taxation to that of source. 45 In stark contrast, Britain imposed
worldwide taxation and provided a foreign tax credit that was
extremely limited and generally preserved its residence-based
taxation. 46
The conflicting views of the U.S. and the U.K. regarding
the proper method for relieving double taxation prompted
several years of debate out of which a consensus emerged in
the early 1920s. 47 Under this consensus, “personal taxation”
was to be preserved for residence-based taxation, and
“impersonal taxation” was to be preserved for source. 48 How
these terms would be defined and implemented in the context
of the then vastly differing tax systems depended on long and
43
See Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O’Hear, The “Original Intent” of U.S.
International Taxation, 46 DUKE L. J. 1021, 1023 (1996); H. David Rosenbloom &
Stanley I. Langbein, United States Tax Treaty Policy: An Overview, 19 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L. L. 359 (1981).
44
EDWIN R. A. SELIGMAN, DOUBLE TAXATION AND INTERNATIONAL FISCAL
COOPERATION, 132, 135 (1928). Source-based taxation was even enhanced to the extent
the foreign country’s tax rates were lower than that of the U.S. In such cases, foreign
countries could raise their tax rates to the U.S. level with the assurance that these
taxes would be creditable in the U.S., leaving the investor indifferent as to the higher
foreign rate. See RICHARD E. CAVES, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 190 (1996) (“Neutrality depends on who pays what tax, not which
government collects it.”).
45
Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 43, at 1072.
46
Britain’s view was supported by the Netherlands. See Ernst & Young,
supra note 35, at 631-32. Both countries were primarily capital-exporting nations, and
thus the importance of preserving residence-based taxation was high. The U.S. was
also a capital-exporting nation at the time, but arguably regarded source-based
taxation as having the superior claim. Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 43, at 1046.
47
Discussions began in the newly formed International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC) in 1920. In 1921 the ICC adopted a resolution that taxing jurisdiction
turned on the nature of the tax, with distinctions being made between “super” and
“normal” taxes. However, the U.S. rejected this resolution and endorsed closer
adherence to the U.S. system, with exceptions made for particular kinds of income,
including that from international shipping (as to which residence-based taxation was to
be preserved) and that from sales of manufactured goods (to be apportioned under
formula). The ICC synthesized the views of the U.S. and fourteen other countries and
produced a new resolution in Rome, in 1923. The League of Nations began to take over
the discussions in 1923, using the Rome resolutions as a basis for discussion. The
compromise of the ICC as to “super” and “normal” taxes resurfaced in League of
Nations discussions. See id., at 1067-70; Mitchell B. Carroll, International Tax Law:
Benefits for American Investors and Enterprises Abroad, 2 INT’L LAW. 692, 696 (1968).
48
Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 43, at 1080.
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contentious negotiations, held under the auspices of the League
of Nations, in which the U.S. played a large part. 49
Ultimately, the League of Nations promulgated a model
tax treaty under which countries would reciprocally restrict
source-based taxation of passive income items, such as
dividends and interest, in favor of preserving residence
jurisdiction over these items, 50 and reciprocally relieve
residence-based taxation on foreign-source business income, as
had been done unilaterally by the U.S. through the foreign tax
credit. 51 By subsequently entering into tax treaties following
the League of Nations model, the U.S. retreated from its
position of unilaterally providing foreign tax credits. The tax
concessions thereby obtained from treaty partners reduced the
revenue cost of the foreign tax credit, which had been the main
goal of U.S. involvement in first negotiating these
instruments. 52
The concepts embodied in the League of Nations model
treaty evolved into a model treaty developed by the OECD in
1963, which has been updated periodically since then (the
OECD Model). 53 The OECD Model has become the standard
upon which most of the over 2,000 tax treaties currently in
force are based. 54 Following the League of Nations and OECD
standards, tax treaties minimize source-based taxation of
income derived from passive investment activity, such as
49
See Carroll, supra note 47, at 693, 698 (stating that in the early 1920s the
U.S. had been invited by the League of Nations to participate in forming tax treaty
policy, but the Department of State had not responded because of the Senate’s rejection
of membership in the League (by virtue of its failure to consent to ratification of the
Treaty of Versailles). Nevertheless, interest in tax treaties grew in the U.S. and the
League planned subsequent Committee meetings to “facilitate attendance by
Americans.”).
50
Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 43, at 1086-87 (citing Britain’s strong role in
producing this result); Avi-Yonah (1996), supra note 25, at 1306.
51
See Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 43, at 1023. The League of Nations first
produced a model treaty in 1927. See Carroll, supra note 47, at 698.
52
See Carroll, supra note 47, at 693-94 (interest in pursuing tax treaties
grew because these instruments “would reduce the amount of foreign taxes that could
be credited against the United States tax . . . and possibly leave something for the
Treasury to collect.”).
53
The OECD Model was itself based on a series of model treaties
promulgated by the League of Nations. It has since been updated several times to cope
with the changing nature of business, culminating with the most recent update on
February 1, 2005. Unless otherwise noted, references in this article to the OECD
Model refer to the 2005 version, which is available at http://www.oecd.org. See OECD
MODEL, supra note 21.
54
Compiled in February 2005 from Ernst & Young, supra note 35, and the
LexisNexis
Tax
Analysts
Worldwide
Tax
Treaties
database,
http://w3.nexis.com/sources/scripts/info.pl?250064 (last visited Nov. 11, 2005).
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dividends, interest and royalties, while preserving residencebased taxation of these items. Once activities increase to a
sufficiently significant level of engagement, however, sourcebased jurisdiction again takes precedence. 55
As a member of the OECD, the U.S. participated in the
development of the OECD model, but also developed its own
model to reflect specific policies (the U.S. Model). 56 First
published in 1977 and most recently updated in 1996, the U.S.
Model is based on the OECD Model in most respects. 57 One
notable difference between the models, however, is that the
OECD Model allows for the alleviation of double taxation either
via a foreign tax credit or by providing that the residence
country will exempt the income earned in the source country
(known as the exemption method). 58 The U.S. Model, in
keeping with its historical preference to impose worldwide
taxation and alleviate double taxation via the foreign tax credit
mechanism, allows only the credit method. 59 All modern U.S.
tax treaties are based on the U.S. Model, with modifications
made to reflect changes in law or policy since the release of the
latest model. 60 The consensus forged through the original
55

The required level of engagement is defined as a “permanent
establishment” as discussed infra Part II.C.2.
56
See U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF SEPT. 20, 1996, available at
http://www.treas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/model996.pdf [hereinafter U.S. MODEL];
U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF SEPT. 20, 1996: TECHNICAL EXPLANATION,
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irstrty/usmtech.pdf.
57
The Joint Committee on Taxation compares provisions of both the U.S. and
OECD models when analyzing and describing new tax treaties entered into by the U.S.
See, e.g., George Yin, Chief of Staff, Joint Comm. on Taxation, Testimony of the Staff of
the Joint Committee on Taxation before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations
Hearing on the Proposed Tax Treaties with Japan and Sri Lanka (Feb. 25, 2004)
(explaining the use of the U.S. and OECD models in treaty negotiations and describing
ways in which the new Japan-U.S. Treaty deviates from each model), available at
http://www.house.gov/jct/x-13-04.pdf.
58
OECD MODEL, supra note 21, arts. 23A (exemption method), 23B (credit
method).
For example, among OECD countries, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
Germany, and Poland have treaties in which they completely relinquish their residual
taxation of income derived by a permanent establishment. See generally Ernst &
Young, supra note 35. For a recent example, see the Convention for the Avoidance of
Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income
and on Capital, Belg.-Ecuador, Dec. 18, 1996, 2248 U.N.T.S. 676 (entered into force
Mar. 18, 2004).
59
See U.S. MODEL, supra note 56, art. 23.
60
A revised U.S. Model is apparently forthcoming from the Treasury
Department. It was originally scheduled for release in December 2004. See Kevin A.
Bell, New Model Treaty Won’t Provide for Zero Dividend Withholding, 2005 TNT 70-7
(Apr. 13, 2005); Lee A. Sheppard, Angus Talks Treaty Policy, 2004 TNT 232-3 (Dec. 2,
2004) (stating that Treasury will issue an updated model treaty to reflect clauses in
recently negotiated treaties).
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model treaties has remained constant: in general, residencebased, or worldwide taxation is accorded primary status in the
case of dueling tax jurisdictions, with treaties serving to set the
limited boundaries within which source-based taxation will
continue to take precedence.
Residence-based, or worldwide income taxation is
typically justified on the grounds that it promotes capital
export neutrality, an efficiency principle dictating that
taxpayers will not differentiate on tax grounds between
locating activities domestically or abroad on tax grounds, since
in either case the income generally will be subject to tax at the
same rate. 61 Thus, if taxation is imposed by a source country,
the U.S. as home country generally provides the foreign tax
credit against the U.S. tax imposed on the same item of income,
leaving the U.S. investor in the same tax position as if the
investment had been subject only to domestic tax. 62
However, most countries, including the U.S., do not
completely adhere to principles of capital export neutrality,
regardless of the existence of tax treaties. Because the U.S.
generally does not tax the foreign income of foreign companies,
it is a relatively simple matter to avoid U.S. tax on much
foreign income by placing the income stream in a foreign
61
See generally PEGGY MUSGRAVE, UNITED STATES TAXATION OF FOREIGN
INVESTMENT INCOME: ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS (1969). The concept of capital export
neutrality and its converse, capital import neutrality, were first developed by Peggy
Musgrave in 1969 and they have been vigorously analyzed and debated ever since. For
an overview of these norms, and an argument that capital export neutrality is
generally the best principle for international taxation of both portfolio and direct
investment, see Avi-Yonah, infra note 164, at 1604. See also STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON
TAXATION, 108TH CONG., BACKGROUND MATERIALS ON BUSINESS TAX ISSUES PREPARED
FOR THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS TAX POLICY DISCUSSION SERIES 5354 (JCX-23-02) (Comm. Print 2002) (arguing that a worldwide tax system promotes
economic efficiency, because investment location decisions will be governed by business
considerations rather than tax considerations, and equity, because domestic and
multinational activities are treated alike, and suggesting that worldwide taxation in
some form is requisite to preserve the tax base from erosion by flight of activities to tax
havens); CAVES, supra note 44, at 190 (stating that all relevant taxes taken together
are neutral if domestic and overseas investments that earn the same pre-tax return
also yield the same after-tax return).
62
If tax credits perfectly offset foreign taxes paid, the taxpayer is indifferent
to the allocation of the tax. See CAVES, supra note 44, at 190. Most foreign tax credit
systems are not perfectly offsetting but impose limitations as to creditability of taxes
based on type or source of income and amount paid relative to domestic tax otherwise
imposed. In the U.S., foreign taxes are currently segregated among several baskets
according to the type of income that gave rise to the tax for purposes of applying a limit
on the allowable tax credit. I.R.C. §§ 901-904 (2005). As a result, pooling of income
from low-tax countries may be advantageous to taxpayers who have paid foreign taxes
in excess of the allowable tax credit. See, e.g., David R. Tillinghast, Tax Treaty Issues,
50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 455, 477 (1996).
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entity. 63 In so doing, U.S. persons may defer U.S. taxation
until the foreign earnings are repatriated in the form of
dividends or capital gains. 64
Deferral of this kind is the equivalent of a statutorily
optional exemption of foreign income from U.S. taxation, as
U.S. tax can be suspended indefinitely, according to the needs
Thus, deferral allows
and desires of the shareholders. 65
taxpayers to convert U.S. residence-based taxation to sourcebased taxation when it suits their purposes. 66 To protect
revenues, the U.S. has responded with a series of anti-deferral
rules to prevent the easy escape of capital to foreign
jurisdictions. 67 To date, these anti-deferral measures have
63
See, e.g., Julie A. Roin, United They Stand, Divided They Fall: Public
Choice Theory and the Tax Code, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 62, 113 (1988) (discussing the
ease of avoiding U.S. tax through foreign entities); Avi-Yonah, supra note 25, at 132425 (arguing that as a result of the distinction between foreign and domestic companies
in I.R.C. § 7701(a)(4) and (5) (2005) and the ensuing difference in taxation under I.R.C.
§§ 11(d), 881, and 882 (2005), “taxpayers can easily choose between classification as
foreign or domestic according to the formal jurisdiction of their incorporation”).
64
Deferral is limited to some extent, as discussed infra Part III.B. However,
a U.S. person that earns active foreign income through a foreign corporation is
generally not subject to U.S. tax until profits are repatriated as a dividend or the stock
is sold, under the rules of Subpart F, I.R.C. §§ 951-964.
65
To allow deferral is therefore to provide incentives for active business
operations to be located outside of the U.S., in low-tax jurisdictions. See Robert J.
Peroni, Back to the Future: A Path to Progressive Reform of the U.S. International
Income Tax Rules, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 975, 987 (1997) (arguing that deferral
“undercuts the fairness and efficiency of the U.S. tax system” by allowing profits
earned overseas in low-tax jurisdictions to escape tax while equivalent domestic
activities would be subject to tax). As a tax expenditure that costs the U.S.
approximately $7.5 billion per year, deferral may be viewed as a subsidy, or tax
incentive, for foreign business activities. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR 2005, at 287, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
budget/fy2005/pdf/spec.pdf. Capital gains may be avoidable in the context of a
conversion or liquidation of a subsidiary. See Dover Corp. v. Comm’r, 122 T.C. 324,
338, 353 (2004) (allowing the conversion of a foreign corporate subsidiary to
disregarded entity status to avoid creation of subpart F income on its subsequent sale).
However, the IRS disagrees with this conclusion. See I.R.S. Chief Couns. Tech. Adv.
Mem. 199937038 (Sept. 17, 1999), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irswd/9937038.pdf (holding that proceeds from sale of subsidiary after change in
classification to disregarded entity did not escape subpart F); I.R.S. Chief Couns. Field
Serv. Adv. Mem. 200049002 (Dec. 8, 2000), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irswd/0049002.pdf; I.R.S. Chief Couns. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 200046008 (Aug. 4, 2000),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/0046008.pdf (same, with sale made to
related party).
66
See Peroni, supra note 65, at 987.
67
See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 99-313, at 363 (1986) (“[I]t is generally appropriate to
impose current U.S. tax on easily movable income earned through a controlled foreign
corporations since there is likely to be limited economic reason for the U.S. person’s use
of the foreign corporation . . . .”). In practice, current taxation applies to a significantly
lesser extent than is contemplated under the subpart F rules, as these rules are
apparently “not fully effective in meeting their objectives.” Harry Grubert, Tax
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largely been restricted to passive income items so that deferral
is still available for active income (residual taxation of which
the U.S. might forego, under the foreign tax credit, if foreign
taxes are in fact imposed).
Despite the significance of deferral in curtailing the
imposition of worldwide income taxation, the concept of
residence-based taxation is the default system of most
developed countries.
The protection of residence-based
taxation, by scaling back the need for foreign tax credits, was
(and is) given as a reason—perhaps the primary reason—for
entering into tax treaties. The OECD Model, as the baseline
for the majority of the world’s tax treaties, thus represents an
international consensus that the appropriate jurisdiction to tax
income arising from cross-border activity is primarily the
residence jurisdiction. 68 This consensus, however, has not
eliminated the limitations inherent in using tax treaties as the
primary mechanism for the international coordination of tax
matters.
C.

Limitations on the Use of Treaties as International Tax
Law

Treaties are the traditional mechanism used for
relieving double taxation on cross-border activity. However,
they have several significant limitations which render them an
inefficient and unsatisfactory means of achieving their goals.
This Section discusses some of these limitations, including the
incomplete coverage and restricted scope of tax treaties, their
lack of uniformity, and their reliance on the assumption of
reciprocal capital flows, and therefore reciprocal tax regimes,
among contracting states.

Planning by Companies and Tax Competition by Governments: Is There Evidence of
Changes in Behavior?, in INTERNATIONAL TAXATION & MULTINATIONAL ACTIVITY 113,
137 (James R. Hines, Jr., ed. 2001) (less than 50% of after-tax income of subsidiaries
located in three Caribbean tax havens was subject to current tax under subpart F); see
also Robert J. Peroni et al., Getting Serious About Curtailing Deferral of U.S. Tax on
Foreign Source Income, 52 SMU L. REV. 455, 464 (1999) (“[A]nti-deferral provisions can
be readily circumvented . . . .”). For a discussion of the deferral privilege and its
inconsistency with U.S. international tax principles including the norm of capital
export neutrality, see Peroni, supra note 65.
68
See Avi-Yonah, supra note 25, at 1303 (stating that a “coherent
international tax regime exists that enjoys nearly universal support”); Reuven S. AviYonah, International Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 52 TAX L. REV. 507, 509 (1999)
(arguing that the worldwide network of tax treaties constitutes an international tax
regime with definable, common principles).
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1. Limited Coverage, Scope, and Uniformity
Not all countries have tax treaties, and no country has
tax treaties with all the other countries of the world. The
average individual tax treaty network comprises just 17 treaty
partners, and over half of all countries have tax treaty
networks of five or fewer treaty partners. 69 In addition, the
benefits of treaties are typically limited to activities conducted
between the two signatory countries. 70 As a result, there would
have to be over 32,000 bilateral tax treaties to cover every
possible cross-border transaction. 71 The U.S. would have to
enter into new treaties with over 160 countries to ensure that
its coverage spanned the globe. 72 At its current average rate of
expansion of one new treaty per year since its first treaty was
concluded with France in 1935, the prospect of completing a
universal U.S. tax treaty network in a timely fashion appears
slight. 73
In addition, the OECD Model is aimed at only income
taxation, to the exclusion of other kinds of taxes. 74 Thus the
69
About 30% of countries have no tax treaties in force. For the 35 countries
considered by the U.S. to be developed, the average network is about 49 treaties; for
OECD countries, the average is 60. For less developed countries, the average is 8.
Compiled in February 2005 from Ernst & Young, WORLDWIDE CORPORATE TAX GUIDE
(2004) and the LexisNexis Tax Analysts Worldwide Tax Treaties database, supra note
55.
70
This is almost universally true when the U.S. is a party. See U.S. MODEL,
supra note 56, art. 22, at 31-33.
71
This figure is based on the assumption that there are approximately 255
independent nations in the world today—a figure that is an estimate because
sovereignty of nations is a matter of foreign policy that varies from nation to nation. A
currently prominent example is the case of Taiwan. See, e.g., Chen Redux: Inside the
Rhetoric, There are Hints of a Thaw All Round, THE ECONOMIST, May 22, 2004, at 37
(discussing China’s tight grip and world response). See also WORLD FACTBOOK, supra
note 1, at 610-13 (country data on Taiwan), available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/
publications/factbook/geos/tw.html.
72
The United States currently has 56 comprehensive income tax treaties in
force which cover 64 countries. See John Venuti et al., Current Status of U.S. Tax
Treaties and International Agreements, supra note 14 (listing all countries covered by
tax treaties). The United States formally recognizes a total of 233 nations. See World
Factbook at 628, 630, and 639 (acknowledging the existence of 34 developed countries,
27 former USSR/Eastern European countries, and 172 less developed countries).
73
Compiled by averaging the first entry-in-force dates of all comprehensive
U.S. income tax treaties ever in force (on file with author).
74
For reasons owing to historical distinctions that may be less clear today,
income taxes have generally been attended to in tax treaties, while trade taxes are
addressed in trade agreements. See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Joel Slemrod,
Treating Tax Issues Through Trade Regimes, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1683 (2001); Paul R.
McDaniel, Trade and Taxation, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1621 (2001); Alvin C. Warren,
Income Tax Discrimination Against International Commerce, 54 TAX L. REV. 131
(2001).
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term “double taxation” refers more particularly to double
income taxation, and the term “relief of double taxation” refers
particularly to the alleviation of circumstances in which two
countries assert income taxation on the same item of income. 75
Yet, there are a number of other taxes applied on businesses
and individuals. Increasingly prominent throughout the world
are consumption and trade taxes, and, primarily in developed
countries, social security and other payroll taxes. As these
taxes increase in application, tax treaties may cover a
shrinking portion of revenues collected by countries.
Finally, as contracts forged through negotiation,
individual treaties deviate to various degrees from the
standards set in the OECD Model. 76 Treaties among OECD
member countries generally adhere to the pattern and main
provisions of the OECD Model. 77 Treaties between developed

75

The OECD Model describes double taxation as “the imposition of
comparable taxes in two (or more) states on the same taxpayer in respect of the same
subject-matter and for identical periods.” OECD MODEL , supra note 21, at 7.
76
Even if their language is similar or identical, tax treaties may also vary
due to differing interpretations under the domestic law of each country, or, in the case
of U.S. treaties, pursuant to the agreement of the competent authorities. This is
authorized under art. 3, ¶ 2 of the OECD, US, and UN Models, which state that any
term not defined in the treaty is defined under the laws of each country as of the time
the treaty is applied—i.e., “internal law, as periodically amended.” Postlewaite &
Makarski, supra note 39, at 741 (adding that “[w]hen countries take different
approaches to treaty interpretation, serious consequences may result, such as double
taxation or the avoidance of any taxation.”). The U.S. Model adds, “or the competent
authorities agree to a common meaning pursuant to the provisions of Article 25 (the
Mutual Agreement Procedure).” U.S. MODEL, supra note 56, art. 3, ¶ 2. Variation
among treaties is also authorized under Article 25 of the OECD, US, and UN Models,
which states that the competent authorities “shall endeavor to resolve by mutual
agreement any difficulties or doubts arising as to the interpretation or application” of
the treaty, and that the competent authorities “may also consult together for the
elimination of double taxation in cases not provided for” in the treaty. U.S. MODEL,
supra note 56, art. 25, ¶ 3; OECD Model, supra note 21, art. 25, ¶ 3; UN Model, infra
note 78, art. 25, ¶ 3. The U.S. Model adds that “[t]he competent authorities also may
agree to increases in any specific dollar amounts . . . to reflect economic or monetary
developments.” U.S. MODEL, supra note 56, art. 25, ¶ 4. Finally, treaties may deviate
from the international consensus even if they closely follow the model treaties due to
periodic updates to the models and commentary thereto. For example, recent revisions
to the OECD Model commentary with respect to the definition of a permanent
establishment potentially broadens the scope of such provisions and may ultimately
lead to a revision of Article 5 of the OECD Model. See, e.g., Richard M. Hammer, The
Continuing Saga of the PE: Will the OECD Ever Get it Right?, 33 TAX MGMT. INT’L J.
472 (2004) (suggesting that the current commentary should be revised because it is
“murky and ambiguous,” and arguing for the incorporation of a clear de minimus rule
in the OECD Model itself).
77
See OECD MODEL, supra note 21, at 10. However, improvements and
advances in international business and tax practices contribute to increased deviation
even among OECD countries. Recently, so-called “double non-taxation” provisions
have been introduced in new treaties. These provisions directly contravene existing
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and less-developed countries, however, often contain nonstandard provisions. These provisions generally derive from a
third model tax convention, first promulgated by the United
Nations in 1980 (the UN Model). The UN Model was the
product of a series of discussions and meetings of an Ad Hoc
Group of Experts formed in 1967 78 to address concerns that the
OECD Model (and, by association, the U.S. Model) was not
appropriate for tax treaties involving non-reciprocal cross
border activity. 79
2. Assumption of Reciprocal Activity
The U.S. and OECD Models are directed at and work
most effectively between two nations that export capital and
transfer services in roughly reciprocal amounts. When treaty
countries export and import capital to each other, each acts as
a source country to investors from the other. Under these
circumstances, tax treaties coordinate taxation without
necessarily causing an imbalance in revenue allocation
between the two countries: revenues given up by countries in
their “source” role are recouped in their “residence” role. 80
Consequently, such treaties are expected to have little revenue
effect on either country. 81
OECD provisions. See, e.g., Michael Lang, General Report, in INT’L FISCAL ASSOC.,
DOUBLE NON-TAXATION, 89a CAHIERS DE DROIT FISCAL INTERNATIONAL 77 (2004).
78
The Group of Experts included members from Latin American, North
American, African, Asian, and European countries. The group also had observers from
the IMF, the International Fiscal Association, the OECD, the Organization of
American States, and the International Chamber of Commerce. See UNITED NATIONS,
COMMENTARY ON THE ARTICLES OF THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS MODEL DOUBLE
TAXATION CONVENTION BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 2 (Jan. 1,
1980); see also UNITED NATIONS DEP’T OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, UNITED
NATIONS MODEL DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTION BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES viii (2001) [hereinafter UN MODEL].
79
See Leif L. Mutén, Double Taxation Conventions Between Industrialised
and Developing Countries, in DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES BETWEEN INDUSTRIALISED
AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES; OECD AND UN MODELS, A COMPARISON 3 (Kluwer Law
and Tax’n Pubs. 1990).
80
For example, while the U.S. may give up revenue by refraining from taxing
dividends paid to foreign persons under a treaty, it recoups the loss by collecting the
full tax on dividends paid by the foreign country to U.S. residents (without reduction
under the foreign tax credit provisions, since under the treaty, the foreign country does
not tax the dividend). See I.R.C. §§ 61 (U.S. persons taxed on income from whatever
source derived) and 901 (foreign tax credit generally allowed only when foreign tax has
been paid or accrued).
81
See, e.g., STAFF OF THE S. COMM. ON FOREIGN REL., 105TH CONG., REPORT
ON THE TAX CONVENTION WITH IRELAND 17 (Comm. Print 1997) (“The proposed treaty is
estimated to cause a negligible change in . . . Federal budget receipts.”); STAFF OF THE
S. COMM. ON FOREIGN REL., 108TH CONG., REPORT ON THE TAX CONVENTION WITH THE
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If instead the flow of capital moves primarily from one
country to another, reciprocity is lost. One country becomes
primarily the source, or host country, while the other becomes
primarily the residence, or home country. Because LDCs are
typically capital importing countries, their primary role under
tax treaties is as a source country. 82 Residence jurisdiction will
therefore be minimally exercised by LDCs. 83 In such cases, a
tax treaty shifts tax revenues inversely to the flow of capital.
As a result, while the contraction of taxing jurisdictions is
technically reciprocal in the treaty document, the one-sided

UNITED KINGDOM 16, 17 (Comm. Print 2003) (same). The balance apparently holds
even in the case of complete exemption of source-country taxation. See, e.g., STAFF OF
THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED PROTOCOL
TO THE INCOME TAX TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIA 39 (Comm.
Print 2003) (suggesting that the new zero-rate for tax on direct dividends “would
provide immediate and direct benefits to the United States as both an importer and an
exporter of capital[,]” and that “[t]he overall revenue impact of this provision is
unclear, as the direct revenue loss to the United States as a source country would be
offset in whole or in part by a revenue gain as a residence country from reduced foreign
tax credit claims with respect to Australian withholding taxes”).
82
The flow of capital between the U.S. and an LDC typically originates from
the former and flows to the latter, although this is less true with respect to the
“advanced developing” countries: Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Brazil.
See, e.g., Yoram Margalioth, Tax Competition, Foreign Direct Investments and Growth:
Using The Tax System to Promote Developing Countries, 23 VA. TAX REV. 161, 198
(2003) (stating that LDCs are generally not typical destinations for portfolio
investment); see also Conventions and Protocols on Avoidance of Double Taxation and
the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital; Treaty
Doc. 103-29, Sweden; Treaty Doc 103-30, Ukraine; Treaty Doc. 103-31, Mexico; Treaty
Doc. 103-32, France; Treaty Doc. 103-33, Kazakhstan; Treaty Doc. 103-34, Portugal;
Treaty Doc. 104-4, Canada: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 104th
Cong. 18 (1995) (statement of Leslie B. Samuels, Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy,
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury) (capital flows are typically nonreciprocal between the U.S.
and LDCs). Most multinationals are residents of developed countries. Of the top 100
multinational companies (as measured by foreign assets), just five are residents in
LDCs (Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, and Venezuela). United Nations
Conference on Trade and Dev. [UNCTAD], World’s 100 Non-financial TNCs, Ranked
By Foreign Assets, 2000, http://www.unctad.org/templates/Download.asp?docid=3812
&lang=1&intItemID=2443 [hereinafter UNCTAD World 100 Non-Financial TNCs]
(last visited Nov. 11, 2005). Of the top fifty multinational companies from developing
economies, none are based in the LDCs of Sub-Saharan Africa. UNCTAD, The Top 50
TNCs
from
developing
economies,
ranked
by
foreign
assets,
2000,
http://www.unctad.org/templates/Download.asp?Docid=3811&lang=1 (last visited Nov.
11, 2005).
83
It may be minimally exercised even in the absence of treaties, since few
LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa assert worldwide taxation on their residents. Among the
exceptions are Angola, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania,
and Uganda. See generally Ernst & Young, supra note 35. Ghana, the subject of the
case study presented in Part III of this Article, generally exercises territorial taxation
but imposes tax on certain repatriated earnings. See Republic of Ghana, Internal
Revenue Act, 2000, Act 592, Part III, Div. I, § 6(1)(a) [hereinafter G.I.R.A.] (residents’
assessable income includes that “accruing in, derived from, brought into, or received in
Ghana”).
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flow of capital towards the LDC as source-country ensures that
only that country experiences a true contraction of its taxing
jurisdiction. The provider of the capital, namely the developed
country, preserves its rights as the country of residence just as
if the treaty had never been concluded.
Non-reciprocal contraction by the LDC occurs in the
context of portfolio investment as its role as the source country
requires it to reduce its tax rates on dividends, interest, and
royalties, while the residence country preserves the right to
impose full taxation on these items. Non-reciprocal contraction
also occurs in the context of active business income, as
threshold rules for taxing business income prevent sourcecountry taxation of certain activities, such as storing and
displaying goods or building and construction activities. 84
These threshold rules are embodied in the concept of the
“permanent establishment.”
The permanent establishment rules are found in Article
5 of each of the US, OECD, and UN model treaties. Under
these rules, the source country agrees to refrain from taxing
business income unless it is attributable to business activities
that meet physical presence requirements, and even then, in
some cases, only if the activities are conducted for a given
duration or rise to a substantial enough level. 85 Accordingly,
under the U.S. and OECD Models, a permanent establishment
is generally deemed to exist and therefore create taxing
jurisdiction in the source country if business activities are
conducted through a fixed place of business and consist of more
than “peripheral or ancillary activities.” Certain activities,
such as building and construction, however, must last more
than a year in order to be deemed “permanent
establishments.” 86
Responding
to
the
non-reciprocal
aspects
of
relationships between developed and less developed countries,
the UN Group of Experts sought to preserve source-country
taxation in tax treaties in its Model. Thus, the UN Model
provides for lower thresholds by shortening duration and
84

See U.S. MODEL, supra note 56, art. 5; OECD MODEL, supra note 21, art. 5;
UN MODEL, supra note 78, art. 5.
85
Id.
86
See U.S. MODEL, supra note 56, art. 5, ¶ 3. Peripheral and ancillary
activities include exploratory or preparatory functions such as research and
development, as well as activities considered incidental to the economic source of the
income, such as storage, display, or delivery of goods. The U.S. Model is virtually
identical to the OECD Model.
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presence requirements and including certain activities not
included in the OECD and U.S. Models. 87 For example, under
the UN Model, a permanent establishment may arise after a
duration of as low as six months for certain activities, 88 fewer
ancillary activities are excluded, 89 and more income is
attributed to permanent establishments via a force of
attraction rule. 90 Nevertheless the UN Model limits sourcecountry taxation simply by using the permanent establishment
concept at all. In the absence of the treaty, the source country
would typically provide little or no threshold to taxation. 91
In addition, the UN Group of Experts determined that
in treaties between developed and less developed countries,
87
It otherwise adheres in large part to the OECD Model, and the two have
become more similar. Indeed, the relevance of the UN Model has diminished
significantly and it may be seen as irrelevant to the extent developed countries agree to
higher source-based tax in their tax treaties, which they have done to a significant
extent. See, e.g., John F. Avery Jones, Are Tax Treaties Necessary?, 53 TAX L. REV. 1, 2
(1999) (“There seems [to be] little need for a separate model for developing countries.”).
88
UN MODEL, supra note 76, art. 5, ¶ 3. In paragraph 3(a), building and
construction activities and related supervisory activities are a permanent
establishment if they last more than six contiguous months; in paragraph 3(b),
consulting services are a permanent establishment if such services continue for a
cumulative (even if non-contiguous) six months. In the OECD model, building and
construction activities must continue for more than twelve months to constitute a
permanent establishment, related supervisory activities are not included, and there is
no parallel provision regarding consulting services. For a comparison of the OECD and
UN Model permanent establishment provisions, see Bart Kosters, The United Nations
Model Tax Convention and Its Recent Developments, ASIA-PACIFIC TAX BULLETIN,
January/February 2004, at 4, available at http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/
documents/other/unpan014878.pdf.
89
For example, in the OECD and U.S. Models, the use of facilities or
maintenance of a stock of goods for delivery is specifically excluded from the definition
of permanent establishment, while in the UN Model it is not. Compare U.S. MODEL,
supra note 56, art. 5, ¶ 4, and OECD MODEL, supra note 21, art. 5, ¶ 4, with UN
MODEL, supra note 78, art. 5, ¶ 4.
90
The OECD and U.S. Models provide source-country taxation only of profits
that are attributable to the permanent establishment. The UN Model includes profits
attributable to the sale of the same or similar goods or merchandise as those sold
through the permanent establishment and profits from the same or similar business
activities as those conducted through the permanent establishment. Compare U.S.
MODEL, supra note 56, art. 7, ¶ 1, and OECD MODEL, supra note 21, art. 7, ¶ 1, with
UN MODEL, supra note 78, art. 7, ¶ 1.
91
For an argument that thresholds are appropriate, should be used even in
the absence of a treaty, and should be made more uniform (in the current models, there
are different thresholds for different activities), see Brian J. Arnold, Threshold
Requirements for Taxing Business Profits Under Tax Treaties, in THE TAXATION OF
BUSINESS PROFITS UNDER TAX TREATIES 55 (Brian J. Arnold et al. eds., 2003). The
permanent establishment concept has been revised and updated to adapt to changes in
business and technology over the years, but generally remains consistent with the
original version introduced in the first OECD Model Tax Convention, which was
released in 1963. OECD, Income and Capital Draft Model Convention, Draft
Convention For the Avoidance of Double Taxation With Respect to Taxes on Income and
Capital, art. 5, ¶¶ 1-2 (July 30, 1963).
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higher source-based taxation of passive items is appropriate.
Just how high, however, has not been determined. While the
OECD Model provides recommended maximum source-country
tax rates for dividends (5% on “direct dividends” (those paid to
corporate shareholders holding at least 10% of the paying
company’s stock) and 15% on “regular dividends” (all other
shareholders)), interest (10%), and royalties (0%), 92 and the
U.S. Model is virtually identical (but provides zero sourcecountry taxation of interest), 93 the UN Model leaves the sourcecountry taxation of these items to be established through
bilateral negotiations. 94 Thus, the UN Model implies that
higher tax rates are appropriate in tax treaties with LDCs, but
declines to recommend exactly what rate is appropriate. 95
The U.S. has frequently used the provisions and
concepts of the UN Model in its tax treaties with developed as
well as less developed countries. 96 For example, the U.S.
income tax treaties with Barbados, Canada, China, Cyprus,
Egypt, Estonia, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Korea,
Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, Morocco, the Philippines, Thailand,
Tunisia, Turkey, the Ukraine, and Venezuela each provide for
lower permanent establishment duration requirements,
narrower definitions of ancillary and preparatory activities,
higher source-country tax rates on passive income items, or a
combination of these features. 97
92

See OECD MODEL, supra note 21, arts. 10, 11, 12.
U.S. MODEL, supra note 56, art. 11.
94
UN MODEL, supra note 78, art. 11 (including a blank line and a
parenthetical that states “the percentage is to be established through bilateral
negotiations”).
95
See generally U.S. MODEL, supra note 56, arts. 10, 11, 12; OECD MODEL,
supra note 21, arts. 10, 11, 12; UN MODEL, supra note 78, arts. 10, 11, 12.
96
Kosters, supra note 88, at 9.
97
See U.S.-Barbados Treaty, supra note 4, art. 5; Convention with Respect to
Taxes on Income and on Capital, U.S.-Can., art. 5, Sep. 26, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11087
[hereinafter, U.S.-Canada Treaty]; U.S.-China Treaty, supra note 4, art. 5; U.S.-Cyprus
Treaty, supra note 4, art. 9; U.S.-Cyprus Treaty, supra note 4, art. 5; U.S.-Egypt
Treaty, supra note 4, art. 5; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Est., art. 5, Jan.
15, 1998, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-55 (1999); U.S.-India Treaty, supra note 4, art. 5;
U.S.-Indonesia Treaty, supra note 4, art. 5; U.S.-Jamaica Treaty, supra note 4, art. 5;
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion
with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, U.S.-Kaz., art. 5, Oct. 24, 1993, S.
TREATY DOC. NO. 103-33 (1996); U.S.-Korea Treaty, supra note 4, art. 9; Convention for
the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to
Taxes on Income, U.S.-Lat., art. 5, Jan. 15, 1998, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-57 (1999);
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion
with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Lith., art. 5, Jan. 15, 1998, S. TREATY DOC. NO.
105-56 (1999); Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of
93
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The consequence of preserving source-country taxation
to overcome non-reciprocal capital flows, however, is that it
undermines the relief of double taxation ostensibly sought as
the primary purpose for entering into the treaty in the first
place. This has been a source of problems for drafters and
negotiators of tax treaties and treaty models, who appear to
have difficulty determining whether it is better for LDCs to
preserve source-country taxation so as to allow the source
country to collect the maximum amount of revenues, or to
relieve source-country taxation so as to attract the maximum
amount of foreign investment. 98 As discussed in Part IV, this
choice is one of the main reasons tax treaties have become
obsolete for many investors in LDCs. Yet new U.S. tax treaties
with LDCs continue to be sought, and when concluded, they
continue to provide for higher source-country taxes on passive
income items, even, on occasion, when the treaty rate exceeds
that of the internal laws of the LDC. 99
The importance of reciprocity as requisite to make a tax
treaty appropriate is demonstrated in the current composition
of the U.S. tax treaty network. Like all developed countries,
the U.S. has tax treaties in place with all of its major reciprocal
trading partners 100 and with the bulk of its foreign direct
investment sources and destinations. 101 Yet, with just 55
comprehensive tax treaties covering 62 countries, the U.S.
network is comparatively small relative to the other major
Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Mex., art. 5, Sep. 18, 1992, S.
TREATY DOC. NO. 103-7 (1993) [hereinafter U.S.-Mexico Treaty]; U.S.-Morocco Treaty,
supra note 4, art. 4; U.S.-Philippines Treaty, supra note 4, art. 5; U.S.-Thailand Treaty,
supra note 4, art. 5; U.S.-Tunisia Treaty, supra note 4, art. 5; Agreement for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to
Taxes on Income, U.S.-Turk., art. 5, Mar. 28, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 104-30 (1997);
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion
with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital, U.S.-Ukr., art. 5, Mar. 4, 1994, S.
TREATY DOC. NO. 104-30 (2000); U.S.-Venezuela Treaty, supra note 4, art. 5.
98
Tsilly Dagan eloquently illustrated the conundrum and presented a game
theory rationale that explains why many LDCs have opted for the latter. See generally
Dagan, supra note 40.
99
See discussion infra at note 139.
100
Major trade partners include Canada, China, Germany, Japan, Mexico,
and the U.K. WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 1, at 577 (entries listing major import and
export partners). The most glaring exception in the U.S. tax treaty network is probably
Brazil, with whom negotiations have been stalled since 1992. See infra note 307.
101
The tax treaty network currently covers approximately 78% of U.S. foreign
direct investment, as valued at historical cost (book value of U.S. direct investors’
equity in and net outstanding loans to foreign affiliates). See Maria Borga & Daniel R.
Yorgason, Direct Investment Positions for 2003: Country and Industry Detail, SURV. OF
CURRENT BUS., JULY 2004, at 40, 49 [hereinafter Borga & Yorgason],
http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/ARTICLES/2004/07July/0704dip.pdf.
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economies of the world, 102 and it excludes more than 20% of
U.S. foreign direct investment. 103 Moreover, just 16 U.S. tax
treaties are with LDCs, 104 as compared with an average of 22 in
other leading economies. 105 To the extent that tax treaties
influence the flow of trade and investment between the U.S.
and the rest of the world, they may impact U.S. foreign
investment, trade, and aid efforts to LDCs. The following Part
explores whether more complete U.S. tax treaty coverage could
impact these flows by considering a hypothetical tax treaty
with Ghana, an LDC in Sub-Saharan Africa.
III.

U.S. TAX TREATIES WITH LDCS: CASE STUDY OF GHANA

This Part presents as a case study a hypothetical tax
treaty between the U.S. and Ghana, based on current U.S. tax
treaty standards with respect to LDCs. The case study
demonstrates that the lack of tax treaties between the U.S. and
the LDCs of Sub-Saharan Africa may be explained in large part
by the fact that in today’s global tax climate, these agreements
would not significantly impact the global tax burden that
current or potential international investors are facing. As a
result, even if governments are committed to concluding them,
and even though they are supported by academics,
practitioners, and lawmakers, tax treaties between the U.S.
and the LDCs of Sub-Saharan Africa would nevertheless be
largely ineffective in stimulating cross-border investment and
trade.

102
In contrast, the U.K. and France each have tax treaties with over 100
countries; Canada and the Netherlands with over 80. See Ernst & Young, supra note
35, at 134-36, 263-65, 641-42, 984-85.
103
See supra note 69.
104
See supra note 4. When the tax treaty with Sri Lanka (signed in 1985)
entered into force in July of 2004, it was the first new country added to the tax treaty
network since the treaty with Slovenia entered into force in 2001, and the first new
LDC since Venezuela was added in 1999. Convention for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and
Capital, U.S.-Slovn., June 21, 1999, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 106-9 (2001); U.S.-Venezuela
Treaty, supra note 4; U.S.-Sri Lanka Treaty, supra note 4.
105
Seventeen of the thirty OECD countries have larger LDC tax treaty
networks. For example, the U.K. and France each have tax treaties with 60 LDCs,
Canada has 40, Germany has 36, Norway has 35, and Italy and Sweden each have 32.
Compiled from Ernst & Young, supra note 35, at 129-31, 250-52, 287-88, 426-28, 65253, 855-57, 938-39 and the LexisNexis Tax Analysts Worldwide Tax Treaties database,
http://w3.nexis.com/sources/scripts/info.pl?250064 (last visited Nov. 11, 2005).
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Ghana as Case Study Subject

The pursuit of a tax treaty with Ghana, a nation of 20
million people in West Africa, would support current U.S.
commercial and non-commercial interests in this country.
Non-commercial interests of the U.S. in Ghana include
longstanding diplomatic ties, 106 an interest in fostering
economic stability in this region of the world for humanitarian
reasons, and recognition that conditions of extreme poverty like
those found in Ghana are a potential breeding ground for
terrorism. 107
U.S. commercial interests in Ghana include both trade
and investment relationships.
Several large foreign
investments in Ghana are owned by U.S. companies, 108 and
U.S. companies continue to express interest in pursuing
business opportunities in this country. 109 U.S. investment in

106
See
U.S.
Department
of
State,
Background
Note:
Ghana,
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2860.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2005) (“The United
States has enjoyed good relations with Ghana at a nonofficial, personal level since
Ghana’s independence. Thousands of Ghanaians have been educated in the United
States. Close relations are maintained between educational and scientific institutions,
and cultural links, particularly between Ghanaians and African-Americans, are
strong.”).
107
Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, allegedly linked to the
international terrorist organization al-Qaeda, provide perhaps the most illustrative
reason for U.S. interests in brokering peace and stability in Sub-Saharan Africa. The
U.S. also has interests in Sub-Saharan Africa for social justice reasons, including the
extreme poverty faced by a majority of the population in this region. For a discussion
of the importance of pursuing tax treaties in response to these issues, see Brown, supra
note 7, at 48-51.
108
These include the Volta Aluminum Company, Ltd (Valco), a Ghanaian
aluminum manufacturing company that is jointly owned by Kaiser Aluminum Corp. (a
Texas corporation owning 90%) and Alcoa Inc., (a Pennsylvania corporation owning
10%); Regimanuel Gray, a construction company jointly owned by Regimanuel Ltd. (a
Ghanaian company) and Gray Construction (a Texas corporation); and Equatorial
Bottlers, a bottling company wholly owned by the Coca Cola Company (a Delaware
corporation). See the company websites of Valco at http://www.alcoa.com/ghana/en/
home.asp, Regimanuel Gray at http://www.regimanuelgray.com/about.asp, and
Equatorial Bottlers at http://www.ghana.coca-cola.com (each describing the respective
companies’ U.S. ownership and Ghanaian operations).
109
See, e.g., Newmont to Start up in Ghana, DAILY TELEGRAPH (Sydney,
Australia), Dec. 22, 2003, at 59 (discussing the purchase by Newmont Mining Corp., a
Delaware corporation, of the Ahafo gold mine in Ghana); Elinor Arbel, AMR, Pier 1
Imports, Sun Microsystems: U.S. Equity Movers Final, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Aug. 16,
2004 (discussing plans by Alcoa Inc., a Pennsylvania corporation, to buy and restart an
aluminum smelter in Ghana); G. Pascal Zachary, Searching for a Dial Tone in Africa,
N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2003, at C1 (quoting a former senior executive of Microsoft who
surveyed Ghana as a potential regional hub for an information-technology industry,
and stated that Ghana “has the potential to become for Africa what Bangalore became
for India;” and discussing Rising Data Solutions, a Maryland corporation that recently
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and trade with Ghana is generally facilitated by a number of
factors. For instance, as a former colony of the U.K., 110 Ghana’s
official language is English, 111 its laws are a blend of customary
law and English common law, and its regulatory state derives
much from the British system, thus providing a familiar
framework for commercial relations. 112
U.S. trade and aid initiatives specifically identify Ghana
as regionally significant to U.S. trade interests due to its
central location in an international business corridor that
stretches from Nigeria to Côte d’Ivoire. 113 As is the case for
many LDCs, 114 the U.S. is one of Ghana’s principal trading
partners, although U.S. goods comprise a small portion of

introduced a call center in Ghana, and Affiliated Computer Services, a Dallas company
that began doing business in Ghana in 2001 and is looking to expand its operations).
110
Seventeen LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa are former colonies of the U.K.:
Botswana, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Nigeria, Seychelles,
Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe;
all but Somalia and Sudan designate English as their official language; an additional
four countries list English among their official languages. See WORLD FACTBOOK,
supra note 1, at 73, 204, 214, 295, 318-19, 339-40, 359-60, 406, 487-90, 502, 515-16,
522-23, 536, 562-63, 605-06, 608-09.
111
The use of English may be an important factor for the foreign investment
location decisions of U.S. multinational firms. See Irving B. Kravis & Robert E. Lipsey,
The Location of Overseas Production and Production for Export by US Multinational
Firms 32 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 0482, 1982), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=262704 (stating that identity of language may significantly
reduce the costs of foreign investment activities).
112
U.S. multinational companies may prefer to invest in countries with which
they have economic, political, linguistic, or cultural ties. JOHN H. DUNNING, THE
GLOBALIZATION OF BUSINESS: THE CHALLENGE OF THE 1990S 37-43 (1993) (discussing
geographical clustering of multinational companies).
113
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, 2003 COMPREHENSIVE REPORT ON U.S.
TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICY TOWARD SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA AND IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE AFRICAN GROWTH AND OPPORTUNITY ACT 5 (2003), http://www.agoa.gov/
resources/annual_3.pdf. Ghana is also poised to be the financial hub of a West African
monetary zone (WAMZ) that was expected to be established in July 2005 but is now
targeted for implementation in 2009. See, e.g., HON. YAW OSAFO-MAAFO, M.P.,
MINISTER OF FINANCE AND ECONOMIC PLANNING, THE BUDGET STATEMENT AND
ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GHANA FOR THE 2004 FINANCIAL YEAR §
2(43) (2004); Peter J. Obaseki, The Future of the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ)
Programme, 5 W. AFR. J. OF MONETARY AND ECON. INTEGRATION 2, 4 (2005). When
established, the WAMZ will facilitate commerce in the region by introducing a single
currency (the ECO) in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),
which includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, the Gambia, Ghana,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.
For information on ECOWAS, see the ECOWAS Home Page, http://www.sec.ecowas.int
(last visited Nov. 11, 2005).
114
The U.S. is a principal export partner to 55% of LDCs, and a principal
import partner to 40%. Compiled from WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 1, at 16, 93, 99,
104, 109, 111, 126, 129, 131, 139, 156, 174, 176, 182, 203, 205, 215, 236, 296-97, 320,
322, 339, 341, 360, 382, 385, 404, 407, 491, 524, 564.
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Ghana’s total imports. 115 As a result, like most of the LDCs in
Sub-Saharan Africa, Ghana is a relatively untapped market for
U.S. exports. 116
Trends in U.S. trade and investment interests in Ghana
support the notion that increasing investment in this country is
a viable goal, which is being advanced by current efforts in
executing international agreements. For example, U.S. trade
with Ghana increased following the enactment and
implementation of AGOA. 117 Nevertheless, U.S. investment in
Ghana remains relatively slight by global standards. 118
Low levels of investment in Ghana may be explained by
a number of factors including several non-tax barriers to
investment. For instance, Ghana’s low level of infrastructure
has been blamed as a major impediment to increased
Examples of Ghana’s infrastructural
investment. 119
shortcomings include obvious physical burdens such as poorly

115
See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, GHANA COUNTRY COMMERCIAL GUIDE
FY2002, ch. 1, available at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/inimr-ri.nsf/en/gr80318e.html (stating that “[i]n the past, Ghana conducted most of its external trade
with Europe, but trade with the United States is becoming increasingly significant”).
Ghana’s import market is currently dominated by Nigeria, contributing 21.3% of all
imports, followed by China with 8.7% and the U.K. with 6.7%. WORLD FACTBOOK,
supra note 1, at 215. The U.S. is its fourth-largest partner, contributing 5.6% of total
imports. Id. In comparison, the U.S. is currently a principal exporter to 18 other LDCs
in Sub-Saharan Africa, contributing 50% of imports in Namibia, 42.3% in Eritrea, 31%
in Equatorial Guinea, and between 12% and 19% in Angola, Chad, and Ethiopia. Id. at
16, 111, 174, 176, 182, 385.
116
As a potential export market, Ghana and other LDCs in Sub-Saharan
Africa are also important to the U.S. labor market. See John Cochran, Not Out of
Africa: Bush Visits Africa—But Why Now?, ABC NEWS REPORT, July 8, 2003, available
at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/wnt/World/africa030708_bush.html (last visited June
11, 2003) (“Over 100,000 U.S. jobs depend on exports to Africa . . . .”).
117
Since 2000, when AGOA was first implemented, U.S. exports to Ghana
have grown steadily, but imports from Ghana have decreased. UNITED STATES
INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, U.S. TRADE AND INVESTMENT WITH SUB-SAHARAN
AFRICA (2000), http://www.usitc.gov/secretary/fed_reg_notices/332/I0516x3.htm.
118
UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 14 (2003), http://www.unctad.org/
en/docs/wir2003_en.pdf [hereinafter WIR 2003].
119
See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, GHANA COUNTRY COMMERCIAL GUIDE
FY2003, ch. 7, § A1, available at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/inimr-ri.nsf/
en/gr109073e.html (stating that infrastructure shortcomings have impeded domestic
productivity and discouraged foreign direct investment). Along with the rest of SubSaharan Africa, which experienced a large and continuing decline in foreign direct
investment (FDI) in tandem with the global financial crisis of the late 1990s, Ghana’s
share of global foreign investment has dropped significantly over the past few years,
and it is considered an underperformer with respect to its FDI potential. Id. Its 40%
decline in FDI from 2001 to 2002 mirrors the experience of the continent, to which FDI
declined as a whole from $19 billion in 2001 to $11 billion in 2002 (a 41% decline).
These declines are sharp when compared to that for global FDI, which declined as a
whole by 21% in the same period. See WIR 2003, supra note 118, at 3, 14.
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maintained roads, 120 interruptions in electricity, 121 a lack of
clean water, 122 and a paucity of institutions such as schools and
hospitals. 123
Equally problematic are Ghana’s excessive
administrative requirements and bottlenecks, as well as other
barriers to the entry and operation of businesses by foreign
persons. 124 For example, Ghana continues to struggle with land
and property protection, 125 restricts foreign ownership of real

120
As John Torgbenu, a taxi driver in Accra, describes the multitude of
certifications needed to obtain a cab license in Ghana: “Cars must be road-worthy, but
the roads need not be car-worthy.” Interview with John Torgbenu, Taxi Driver in
Accra, Ghana (2003) (on file with author). See also Memorandum of Economic and
Financial Policies of the Government of Ghana for 2003-05, ¶ 8 (March 31, 2003)
[hereinafter MEFP] (“Ghana’s basic infrastructure continues to remain in very poor
shape. The building of roads, ports, and communication networks . . . have been
driving forces behind the government’s efforts to secure a predictable flow of external
financing for infrastructure development.”).
121
Despite the presence of West Africa’s largest hydro-electric plants at Volta
Lake in northern Ghana, electricity outages are such a frequent phenomenon that
individuals, businesses and institutions that can afford generators have them, and put
them to use on a regular basis. Fueling the modernization process is one of the key
developments sought in connection with Ghana’s requests for IMF funding. See MEFP,
supra note 120.
122
Ghana is among the majority of LDCs in the world that have not developed
an improved water supply. See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WATER SUPPLY,
SANITATION AND HYGIENE DEVELOPMENT, http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/
hygiene/en/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2005).
123
Low levels of education, literacy, and health care issues are among the
institutional issues Ghana faces. See, e.g., GEORGE GYAN-BAFFOUR, THE GHANA
POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGY: POVERTY DIAGNOSTICS AND COMPONENTS OF THE
STRATEGY 4 (2003), http://www.casmsite.org/Documents/Elmina%202003%20-%20
Workshop%20-%20Poverty%20Reduction%20-%203.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2005).
124
Much of these administrative regimes are a lasting legacy of colonization,
under which the European nations imposed severe market controls to preserve the
resources of their colonies for their exclusive use. See, e.g., FRANCIS AGBODEKA, AN
ECONOMIC HISTORY OF GHANA 126-27 (1992). For an overview of ease of entry issues
for LDCs generally, see JEFFREY C. HOOKE, EMERGING MARKETS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE
FOR CORPORATIONS, LENDERS, AND INVESTORS (2001) (discussing the entrenched
obstacles to entry in LDCs); see also Leora Klapper et al., Business Environment and
Firm Entry: Evidence from International Data 16 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 10380, 2004), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/w10380.pdf
(finding that bureaucratic entry regulations are a significant burden that hampers the
entry of firms into foreign markets).
125
Courts in Ghana are overwhelmed with land disputes. See, e.g., Joseph
Coomson, Country Achieves Below 40 Percent Delivery, GHANAIAN CHRONICLE, Aug. 18,
2005 (discussing “many land disputes among traditional authorities” and stating that
there are currently “more than 62,000 land disputes . . . being heard at the courts”).

2005]

TAX TREATIES AND SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

671

property, 126 and has only recently dismantled regulations that
completely closed several industries to foreign investors. 127
As part of its approach to poverty reduction and
economic growth through the creation of a business-friendly
environment, Ghana’s current administration has pledged to
make significant improvements to its infrastructure. 128 The
reduction of administrative obstacles, combined with greater
certainty with regard to the legal and regulatory regime, is
credited with a recent surge in foreign investment from South
Africa to other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. 129 It is hoped
that this surge will be followed by increased investment from
other countries, including the U.S.
An increased share of foreign investment is also
expected to lead to spillover effects that would remedy some of
the current deficiencies in physical infrastructure. Limited
spillover effects have been achieved recently in connection with
Ghana’s gold mining operations, which have provided funding

126
The inability to own land translates to an inability to use land as collateral
for financial transactions, which is a key to economic growth. See Enrique Gelbard &
Sérgio Pereira Leite, Measuring Financial Development in Sub-Saharan Africa 18 (Int’l
Monetary
Fund,
Working
Paper
No.
99/105,
1999),
available
at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/1999/wp99105.pdf.
127
See WIR 2003, supra note 118, at 36.
128
HON. YAW OSAFO-MAAFO, M.P., MINISTER OF FINANCE AND ECONOMIC
PLANNING, THE BUDGET STATEMENT AND ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF
GHANA FOR THE 2003 FINANCIAL YEAR ¶ 22 (2003) (pledging the government’s
“commitment to deliver a macro-economic environment that underpins our strategy for
growth and poverty reduction”); HON. YAW OSAFO-MAAFO, M.P., supra note 113, at ¶ 4
(pledging to continue to “create an enabling environment for wealth creation”). See
also various documentation in connection with IMF lending, including the MEFP,
supra note 120.
129
Nicole Itano, South African Companies Fill a Void, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4,
2003, at W1 (“It’s safer to go in, it’s easier to get materials in and out, easier to
repatriate your profits,” according to Keith Campbell, a managing director of a South
African risk management firm and vice-chairman of the South Africa-Angola Chamber
of Commerce). The overhaul of economies has often been initiated by the international
lending organizations, which have faced much criticism and been the subject of much
debate in the face of the apparent failure of many of their reform efforts. However, the
extreme opposite approach, as unfortunately presented in the case of Zimbabwe,
illustrates the need for some fundamental certainty in dealing with foreign businesses
in order to attract foreign investment and maintain a stable economy. See, e.g., Michael
Wines, Around Ruined Zimbabwe, Neighbors Circle Wagons, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2005,
at A4 (describing the “fiscal and political collapse” of that country since it began seizing
white-owned farms in 2000); David White & John Reed, Showdown over Pariah State
Leaves the Commonwealth Divided and Frustrated, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2003
(discussing ramifications of Zimbabwe’s withdrawal from the British Commonwealth);
Tony Hawkins, Zimbabwe Dollars Cut 80% at Auction, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2004
(stating that massive currency devaluation is in line with market expectations for
Zimbabwe).

672

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:2

to improve transportation routes. 130 In Nigeria, one of Ghana’s
close neighbors, investors in the telecommunications industry
funded the installation of communication networks throughout
the country. 131 Ghana’s growing telecommunications industry
may draw like commitments from future investors. 132 However,
the components of infrastructure that are not produced by
spillover, such as the legal and regulatory framework that
protects businesses and creates an environment for growth,
generally must be directly supported and funded by the
government. 133
Despite the infrastructural obstacles present in Ghana,
U.S. investment in this country continues to grow, albeit
slowly. The following Section explores whether and how such a
tax treaty between the two countries might affect investment
in Ghana.

130
Ghana’s gold mines have recently sparked interest from foreign investors,
who will spend millions of dollars to upgrade and develop operations following years of
neglect and under-maintenance of these operations, because they expect productivity to
increase dramatically and produce significant profit as a result. See Mr. Jonah Goes to
Jo’burg, ECONOMIST, Jan. 17, 2004, at 56 (AngloGold (South Africa) expects to spend
between $220 and $500 million to upgrade its newly acquired Ghanaian gold mine
(Ashanti Goldfields)); Newmont to Go for Ghana Gold, ADVERTISER (S. Austl.), Dec. 22,
2003, Finance at 50 (Newmont (U.S.) plans to spend about $350 million to develop its
recently-acquired Ghanaian gold mine (Ahafo)).
See also Big-Game Hunting,
ECONOMIST, Aug. 16, 2003, at 57; Gargi Chakrabarty, Newmont OKs Project in Ghana;
Gold Producer Invests $350 Million in W. African Mine, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Dec.
19, 2003, at B2; and Gargi Chakrabarty, Latest Global Hot Spot for Gold Mining:
Ghana, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Oct. 30, 2003, at B1.
131
South Africa’s Vodacom recently spent $119 million building a cellular
network in the Congo, a critically impoverished country that has only recently emerged
from devastating civil war. South Africa’s MTN Group spent approximately $1.75
billion building cellular networks in five different Sub-Saharan Africa countries ($900
million in Nigeria alone), and experiences a 40% profit margin in these markets—
despite having to build power generators to overcome a lack of stable power sources
and a transmission network to connect cities and towns across the country—compared
to its 30% return at home in South Africa. Itano, supra note 129.
132
See Zachary, supra note 109.
133
Coercion of various forms may induce companies to provide such
infrastructure in the absence of voluntary action. For example, in 2003 foreign oil
workers were kidnapped in Nigeria in an effort to extract a promise from a foreign
company to build a school or a health center. See Nigeria’s Oil-Rich Area Mired in
Poverty, DAILY GRAPHIC (Ghana), Dec. 3, 2003, at 5. Clearly no government should be
encouraged to rely on these kinds of tactics to build adequate infrastructure, but the
fact that citizens of a nation are willing to engage in illegal acts to secure public goods
illustrates the tensions and pressures facing both international businesses and the
governments struggling to attract such businesses.
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Structure of a Tax Treaty Between Ghana and the U.S.

As discussed in Part I, the U.S. Model serves as the
template for all new tax treaties negotiated by the Treasury
Department, though the OECD Model and other recent treaties
are also consulted. Thus, in structure and overall content, a
tax treaty between the U.S. and Ghana would emulate the
model treaties, especially the U.S. Model, to a substantial
degree. However, in negotiations with LDCs, the Treasury
Department also consults the UN Model. 134 As a result, these
treaties usually contain several standard deviations from the
U.S. Model, described in reports and technical explanations as
They are called
“developing-country concessions.” 135
concessions because they typically concede U.S. residencebased taxing jurisdiction in favor of greater source-country
taxation. 136
An example of a U.S. treaty with an LDC, as compared
to the U.S. Model Treaty, demonstrates the operation of these

134
See, e.g., Department of the Treasury Technical Explanation of the
Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka for the Avoidance of
Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on
Income, Mar. 14, 1985, as Amended by a Protocol Signed at Washington on Sept. 20,
2002, http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/tesrlanka04.pdf (“Negotiations also
took into account the [OECD Model], the [UN Model], and recent tax treaties concluded
by both countries.”).
135
This designation has been consistently propounded throughout U.S. tax
treaty history, and continues virtually unchanged today. Compare, e.g., STAFF OF
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 101ST CONG., EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED INCOME TAX
TREATY (AND PROPOSED PROTOCOL) BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE
REPUBLIC OF INDIA 10-11 (Comm. Print 1990) (“The proposed treaty contains a number
of developing country concessions . . . providing for relatively broad source-basis
taxation.”), and STAFF OF S. FOREIGN RELATIONS COMM., 101ST CONG., REPORT ON THE
TAX CONVENTION WITH THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA 2-8 (Comm. Print 1990) , with STAFF OF
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED INCOME TAX
TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF
SRI LANKA 18, 64 (Comm. Print 2004) [hereinafter EXPLANATION OF SRI LANKA TREATY]
(describing these deviations as substantive, and outlining the major provisions).
136
EXPLANATION OF SRI LANKA TREATY, supra note 135, at 64. To the extent
that source-based taxing jurisdiction is theoretically more justifiable, the term
“concession” is something of a misnomer. See discussion in Part II.B. Nevertheless, as
much source-based jurisdiction has been ceded in favor of residence-based jurisdiction
in the evolution of the model treaties, a reversal of this norm, especially in the case of
non-reciprocal capital flows, can in theory shift greater tax revenue collection to the
country of source. By so doing, it requires the residence country to revert to the role of
relieving double taxation via the generosity of the foreign tax credit, discussed supra,
note 43 and accompanying text. However, the theory that revenues are conceded under
these provisions only holds if the source country actually imposes and collects the tax.
This is an assumption which cannot be relied upon in today’s global economy, as
discussed infra Part IV.B.2.
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concessions. At the time it was entered into, the U.S. tax
treaty with Jamaica was deemed to be the “precedent for
negotiations” with other LDCs. 137 At twenty-four years of age,
that treaty is substantially out of date, as many tax laws in the
U.S. (and presumably in Jamaica) have changed significantly
since it entered into force in 1981. 138 However, the principle of
enlarging source-country taxation found in the U.S.-Jamaica
treaty continues to appear in new tax treaties with other
LDCs. 139 Therefore, the following discussion uses the U.S.Jamaica treaty to model the terms that might be expected in a
U.S.-Ghana tax treaty, should one be concluded.
In the U.S. tax treaty with Jamaica, as in most U.S. tax
treaties with LDCs, the expectation that non-reciprocal capital
flows may negatively impact the LDC is addressed by
preserving source-country taxation.
This is mainly
accomplished through modifications to the articles dealing with
the determination of thresholds for taxing income from
business activities (the permanent establishment provision)
and those dealing with the taxation of passive-type income
(dividends, interest, and royalties provisions). 140
First, under the permanent establishment concept,
source-country taxation is enlarged by expanding the definition
to allow the LDC to impose taxation on more of the business
profits earned by foreign persons in the source country. Thus,
in the U.S.-Jamaica treaty, the permanent establishment
provision mirrors the structure of the U.S. and OECD Models,
but incorporates the UN Model approach, shortening the
threshold durational requirement from one year to six months
in the case of construction, dredging, drilling, and similar
activities. 141 It also provides that the furnishing of services can
create a permanent establishment if continued for more than
137
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., EXPLANATION OF
PROPOSED INCOME TAX TREATY (AND PROPOSED PROTOCOL) BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND JAMAICA 4 (Comm. Print 1981).
138
U.S.-Jamaica Treaty, supra note 4.
139
Evidently, in some cases this is done regardless of the pre-existing legal
framework in the LDC. See EXPLANATION OF SRI LANKA TREATY, supra note 135, at 62
(stating that “it is not clear that . . . Sri Lankan laws have been fully taken into
account” since “[s]everal of the articles of the proposed treaty contain provisions that
are less favorable to taxpayers than the corresponding rules of the internal Sri Lankan
tax laws”).
140
See supra Part II.C.
141
U.S.-Jamaica Treaty, supra note 4, art. 5, ¶ 2(i). The activity must
continue for “more than 183 days in any twelve-month period,” and at least 30 days in
any given taxable year to constitute a permanent establishment. Id.
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ninety days a year. 142 Finally, it provides that maintaining
substantial equipment or machinery in a country for four
months can constitute a permanent establishment. 143 One or
more of these deviations from the U.S. Model are found in most
Consequently, similar
U.S. tax treaties with LDCs. 144
provisions would likely be suggested, negotiated, and agreed to
in a U.S.-Ghana tax treaty.
Second, under the passive income provisions, sourcecountry taxation is enlarged by allowing the source country to
impose tax rates on these items of income in excess of the
maximum rates provided in the U.S. Model. The U.S. Model
allows source-country tax rates of no more than 5 and 15% on
direct and regular dividends, respectively, and 0% on interest
and royalties. 145 In contrast, the U.S.-Jamaica treaty provides
for source-country tax rates of 10% on direct dividends, 146 15%

142

Id. art. 5, ¶ 2(j). The services must continue for “more than 90 days in any
twelve-month period” and at least 30 days in any given taxable year to constitute a
permanent establishment. Id.
143
Id. art. 5, ¶ 2(k). The equipment or machinery must be maintained “for a
period of more than 120 consecutive days,” and at least 30 days in any given taxable
year to constitute a permanent establishment. Id.
144
See, e.g., U.S.-India Treaty, supra note 4, art. 5, ¶ 2(j)-(l) (providing for the
same concessions as in the U.S.-Jamaica Treaty, supra note 4). Similar deviations are
also in U.S. tax treaties with other developed countries. See, e.g., U.S.-Canada Treaty,
supra note 97, art. V, ¶ 4 (providing that the use of a drilling rig or ship for more than
three months in any twelve-month period constitutes a permanent establishment).
Since Canada is a developed country, the Senate Report does not mention the UN
Model as a source of consultation, and the Joint Committee does not identify the
deviation as a concession by the U.S., but rather explains that “[t]he shorter period was
included in the treaty at the insistence of Canada which felt that a one-year period was
unrealistic, given the adverse conditions of drilling in the Canadian offshore and the
fact that the drilling season there is very short.” See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS, 98TH CONG., REPORT ON THE TAX CONVENTION AND PROPOSED PROTOCOLS
WITH CANADA (Comm. Print 1984); STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 96TH
CONG., EXPLANATION OF TAX CONVENTION WITH CANADA (Comm. Print 1980). Narrow
thresholds continue to appear in newly-signed U.S. tax treaties, such as the one with
Bangladesh. See supra note 42, art. 5, ¶ 3, 6 (not yet in force).
145
See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text; U.S. MODEL, supra note 56,
arts. 10-12. The OECD Model differs from the U.S. Model in that it provides for
source-country tax rates of 5% in the case of dividends held by 25% or greater corporate
shareholders, 15% in the case of all other dividends, 10% in the case of interest, and
zero in the case of royalties. OECD MODEL, supra note 21, arts. 10-12. As discussed in
Part II.C, the UN Model leaves the maximum tax rate blank, implying that countries
should negotiate a higher rate in the case of treaties between developed and less
developed countries. UN MODEL, supra note 78, arts. 10-12.
146
U.S.-Jamaica Treaty, supra note 138, art. X, ¶ 2(a).
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on regular dividends, 147 12.5% on interest, 148 and 10% on
royalties. 149
Despite the general trend of higher source-country
taxation of passive income items in U.S. tax treaties with
LDCs, source-country taxation of certain items of passive
income have recently been lowered in a number of U.S. tax
treaties, including one with Mexico, arguably an LDC. 150 The
U.S. agreed to eliminate source-country taxation on direct
dividends paid with respect to stock held by foreign controlling
parent companies 151 in a recent protocol to the U.S.-Mexico tax
treaty. 152 A most-favored nation provision in the original
treaty 153 caused the elimination of source-country taxes on
these direct dividends when the U.S. negotiated the same
provision in recent treaties and protocols with Australia, 154
Japan, 155 and Britain. 156 According to Treasury officials, the
elimination of source-country tax on direct dividends earned by
foreign controlling companies reduces tax barriers and

147

Id. art. X, ¶ 2(b).
Id. art. XI.
149
Id. art. XII.
150
Second Additional Protocol that Modifies the Convention for the Avoidance
of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on
Income, U.S.-Mex., art II Nov. 26, 2002, T.I.A.S No. 108-4 (providing a zero-rate for
dividends in the case of certain controlled companies), available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/docs/mexico.pdf [hereinafter U.S.-Mex.]. Mexico
is not designated as an LDC in the World Factbook, but is included by reference to its
OECD membership within the definition of developed countries, even though its per
capita GDP of less than $10,000 would align it with other LDCs. See supra note 20.
151
Those owning at least 80% of the foreign subsidiary’s stock. Id. art. II,
§ 3(a).
152
See id. art. II. See also Report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
on the Additional Protocol Modifying the Income Tax Convention with Mexico, U.S.Mex., § VI(A), Mar. 13, 2003, S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 108-4 (2003) (protocols eliminate tax
on certain direct dividends).
153
See Protocol Amending the U.S.-Mexico Treaty, supra note 97, ¶ 8(b) (“If
the United States agrees in a treaty with another country to impose a lower rate on
dividends than the rate specified . . . both Contracting States shall apply that lower
rate instead of the rate specified . . . .”).
154
Protocol Amending the Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation
and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Austl., art.
VI, May 2003 [hereinafter Australia Protocol].
155
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of
Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Japan, art. XI, Nov. 6, 2003,
T.I.A.S. No. 108-14 (2004) [hereinafter U.S.-Japan Treaty].
156
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of
Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital Gains, U.S.-U.K., art.
X, July 24, 2001, available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/
uktreaty.pdf [hereinafter U.S.-U.K. Treaty].
148
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increases the economic ties between the partner countries. 157
Following the logic of this position, a U.S.-Ghana tax treaty
should involve a significant lowering, if not complete
elimination, of source-country taxation of dividends. The fact
that the U.S. tax treaty with Mexico very recently adopted this
position would seem to support the expectation of a similar
provision in a tax treaty with Ghana.
However, the more likely result is that in a U.S.-Ghana
tax treaty, source-country tax rates on dividends would be
closer to the rates found in the Jamaica treaty than those
found in the Mexico treaty. 158 No recent U.S. tax treaty with an
LDC has incorporated a zero rate for dividends paid to
controlling company shareholders, and all provide for
maximum source-country tax rates on passive income items
that are higher than those provided in the U.S. Model. 159
Thus, as in the case of the permanent establishment
provisions, the higher source-country rates that are typical in
U.S. tax treaties with LDCs would likely be suggested,
negotiated, and agreed to in a U.S.-Ghana tax treaty. 160 Using
157
See STAFF OF S. FOREIGN RELATIONS COMM., 108TH CONG., REPORT ON THE
CONVENTION WITH JAPAN (Comm. Print 2003) (noting that many bilateral tax treaties
to which the United States is not a party eliminate taxes on direct dividends, that the
EU’s Parent-Subsidiary Directive achieves the same result, and that the United States
has signed treaty documents with the U.K. and Australia that include provisions
similar to the one in the Mexico protocol); see also John W. Snow, U.S. Sec’y of the
Treasury, Remarks at the U.S.-Japan Income Tax Treaty Signing Ceremony (Nov. 6,
2003), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js975.htm (stating that the new
U.S.-Japan Treaty “will significantly reduce existing tax-related barriers to trade and
investment between Japan and the United States” and “will foster still-closer economic
ties” between the two countries).
158
The Mexico treaty now provides for a maximum of 5% source-country
taxation on direct dividends, 10% on regular dividends, and 0% on direct dividends
paid to foreign companies with a controlling interest in the paying company. See U.S.Mexico Treaty, supra note 97, art. 10.
159
See, e.g., U.S.-Sri Lanka Treaty, supra note 4, arts. X-XII (providing
maximum rates of 15% on all dividends and 10% on interest and royalties); U.S.Bangladesh Treaty, supra note 42 (same rates as in the U.S.-Sri Lanka Treaty). Other
than the lower rates on dividends, the U.S.-Mexico Treaty is consistent with other tax
treaties with LDCs in that it provides for maximum source-country tax rates of 15% on
interest and 10% on royalties. See U.S.-Mexico Treaty, supra note 97.
160
The U.S. tax treaties with Greece (a developed country), the former
countries of the U.S.S.R. (each a transition country), and Trinidad & Tobago (an LDC),
each provide for a maximum 30% source-country tax rate for dividends, and those with
Israel (a developed country), India, and the Philippines (each an LDC), provide a
maximum 25% rate. See Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Feb. 20, 1950, U.S.Greece, 5 U.S.T. 47, TIAS 2902; TIAS; Convention on Matters of Taxation, Jun. 20,
1973, U.S.-U.S.S.R., TIAS 8225, 27 U.S.T. 1; U.S.- Trin. & Tobago Treaty, supra note 4;
Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income, Nov. 20, 1975, U.S.-Isr.; U.S.-India
Treaty, supra note 4; U.S.-Philippines Treaty, supra note 4. The newest U.S. tax
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the U.S.-Jamaica treaty and other recent treaties with LDCs as
a guide, a U.S.-Ghana tax treaty could be expected to provide
maximum source-country tax rates of 10 to 15% on direct
dividends, 10 to 15% on regular dividends, 161 and 10% on
interest and royalties.
The narrower permanent establishment thresholds and
higher source-country tax rates are expected in a U.S.-Ghana
tax treaty because they continue to appear in other U.S. tax
treaties with LDCs. They appear in these treaties because it is
believed that they will provide some benefit to the governments
of the LDCs entering into these agreements.
Yet, the
overriding purpose of these treaties is the same as that for
treaties exclusively between developed countries: they are
supposed to relieve double taxation and therefore increase
cross-border investment between the partner countries. The
next Part explores the extent to which either of these goals are
achieved under this hypothetical tax treaty between Ghana
and the U.S.
IV.

THE EFFECT OF A U.S.-GHANA TAX TREATY ON
POTENTIAL U.S. INVESTORS

Assuming that Ghana is otherwise a viable destination
for U.S. investment as described above, a tax treaty between
these two countries would theoretically complement U.S.
investment interests as well as its trade and aid initiatives.
However, this Part demonstrates that in today’s global tax
climate, a tax treaty that follows the international standards
set forth in the model treaties will likely be ineffective in
achieving its goals as a result of several interrelated
phenomena.
First, the scope of tax treaties appears to be too narrow
in the context of these LDCs. Second, double taxation appears
to be disappearing in international transactions involving these
LDCs as a result of the widespread reduction in taxation
treaty, with Sri Lanka (an LDC), provides for a 15% tax rate on all dividends. See
Proposed Tax Treaties with Japan and Sri Lanka: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Foreign Relations 108th Cong. 6 (2004) (testimony of the Staff of the Joint Comm. on
Taxation). The Sri Lanka treaty was considered by the Senate in February, 2004
together with the U.S.-Japan Treaty, which provides for zero taxation on certain
dividends paid to controlling shareholders. See id. at 18, 20.
161
Forty-eight of the U.S. tax treaties currently in force provide a rate of 1015% on regular dividends. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
PUBL’N 901, U.S. TAX TREATIES 33-34 tbl. 1 (2004); U.S.-Sri Lanka Treaty, supra note
4, art. 10.
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caused by global tax competition and an ever-increasing
availability of opportunities to avoid and evade income
taxation. Third, there may be little differential between tax
treaties and statutory law in the LDCs of Sub-Saharan Africa.
Fourth, tax treaties may have little impact on multinational
investment behavior in the face of non-tax characteristics of
LDCs, such as inadequate infrastructure. Finally, tax treaties
may offer little more than perception about the commercial and
legal climate of a country for foreign investment. Because of
the impact of each of these factors on global commercial
activity, a tax treaty between Ghana and the U.S. would yield
an insignificant impact on investment and trade between these
two countries.
A.

Non-Comparable Taxation

The first phenomenon that tends to reduce the potential
benefit of a tax treaty between the U.S. and Ghana is the fact
that U.S. multinational companies are likely to face nonincome types of taxation in Ghana. 162 Like many LDCs, Ghana
relies on a broad range of taxes that are not relieved under tax
treaties, including consumption, excise, and trade taxes. 163 The
reliance on trade and excise taxes is historical, arising out of
practices that have since been abandoned in developed
countries in favor of personal income taxation and, outside of
the U.S., consumption taxation, typically in the form of the
value added tax (VAT). 164
VATs are relatively new to LDCs, having been
introduced in the 1970s and 1980s largely as part of tax
reforms initiated by international monetary organizations as a
condition of lending. 165 Prior to the introduction of the VAT,
162

That is, if they face any taxation at all. See infra Part IV.B.
See, e.g., Guttentag, supra note 4, at 452 (“[W]e have noted a trend where
developing countries question the desirability of maintaining high source based
taxation, but need to find alternative sources of revenue . . . many of them rely to a
lesser extent on OECD type tax systems . . . instead, there is a greater reliance on
value added taxes and asset taxes.”).
164
The shift from trade to income and consumption taxation in the U.S. and
other developed countries is discussed in WEISMAN, supra note 41, at 14, 42, 44;
William D. Samson, History of Taxation, in THE INTERNATIONAL TAXATION SYSTEM 3337 (Andrew Lymer & John Hasseldine eds., 2002); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization,
Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573,
1576 (2000).
165
From 1950, when the VAT emerged in its modern form, until 1980, many
countries shifted from consumption taxes to payroll (social security) taxes, and since
1980, many countries have begun to shift from personal income taxes to VAT. KEN
163

680

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:2

many LDCs, including those in Sub-Saharan Africa, followed
the customs of the developed world that were introduced under
colonization and relied heavily on trade taxes for revenue. 166
The increased focus on the VAT was part of an overall effort to
gradually reduce and, eventually, completely eliminate taxes
on international trade. 167
In Ghana, the government introduced a 20% VAT in
1995 but quickly repealed it in the face of violent protests. 168
After a lengthy educational campaign, the government
reinstated the VAT in 1998, this time at 10%. 169 Since then, the
VAT has not led to a decrease in any other taxes. A decrease in
international trade taxes (tariffs) and excise taxes was initially
realized soon after introduction of the VAT, but this trend has
since reversed itself, and tariffs are currently increasing as a
Moreover, a
percentage of total revenues collected. 170
temporary rise in corporate income taxation that accompanied
the introduction of the VAT appears to have leveled off and
corporate tax rates are currently decreasing. 171 As a result, the
introduction of the VAT in Ghana has lead to an overall
increase in taxes that are not addressed by treaties. 172
MESSERE ET AL., TAX POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN OECD COUNTRIES 28 (2003).
See also Malcolm Gillis, Tax Reform and the Value-Added Tax: Indonesia, in WORLD
TAX REFORM: CASE STUDIES OF DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 227, 227
(Michael J. Boskin & Charles E. McClure, Jr., eds., 1990); Stewart, supra note 11, at
169.
166
Vito Tanzi, Taxation in Developing Countries, in TAX SYSTEMS IN NORTH
AFRICA AND EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 1, 8-9 (Luigi Bernardi & Jeffrey Owens, eds., 1994)
(discussing revenue composition in LDCs). In Sub-Saharan Africa trade taxes
averaged about 27% of total revenues from 1994 to 1999. Percentages of revenues
collected attributable to trade taxes ranged from 5% in Angola, to 49% in Uganda.
Scott Riswold, IMF VAT Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa, WTD, Sep. 1, 2003, at 8. For a
discussion of the impact of colonization on tax systems in LDCs, see Stewart, supra
note 11, at 145.
167
Such efforts have been encouraged by international monetary
organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank as
part of an overall tax reform package introduced in various forms as a condition to
ongoing lending arrangements. Stewart, supra note 11, at 170.
168
Ghana, Despite Its Successes, Is Swept by Anti-Tax Protests, N.Y. TIMES,
May 23, 1995, at A6 (describing VAT-related riot that led to five deaths).
169
Miranda Stewart & Sunita Jogarajan, The International Monetary Fund
and Tax Reform, 2 BRIT. TAX REV. 146, 155 (2004).
170
The remainder of Ghana’s tax revenue derives from excise taxes, mainly on
petroleum. INSTITUTE OF STATISTICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RESEARCH, THE STATE
OF THE GHANAIAN ECONOMY IN 2002, at 26, 28-29 tbl.2.4 (2003) [hereinafter STATE OF
THE GHANAIAN ECONOMY].
171
Id.
172
See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, From Income to Consumption Tax: Some
International Implications, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1329, 1350 (1996) (theorizing the
obsolescence of the U.S. tax treaty network in the event the U.S. adopts a consumption
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Finally, investors are likely to encounter noncomparable taxation in Ghana as a result of government stakeholding in many formerly state-owned enterprises.
For
example, cocoa produced in Ghana is not subject to income
taxation, 173 but is subject to levy by the Ghana Cocoa Board, a
monopsony for the international sale of Ghanaian cocoa
products. 174 Similarly, the government extracts mining profits
by owning shares in all mining operations and requiring the
payment of dividends on such shares. 175 Thus, a focus on the
VAT, income, international trade, and excise taxes in Ghana
provides only an incomplete picture of the full burden of
taxation imposed in this country. As treaties focus only on
income taxation, they address taxation in LDCs to a very
limited degree.
B.

Decreasing Global Tax Burdens

As non-comparable taxation increases, income taxation
is decreasing throughout the world. As a result, multinationals
investing in LDCs may face little or no income taxation on
their foreign earnings. First, taxation may be reduced or
eliminated by residence countries pursuant to rules that
provide assets in offshore companies an indefinite suspension
(deferral) of residence-based taxation. Second, taxation may be
reduced or eliminated by source countries pursuant to tax
incentives that eliminate taxation for specified durations or
perpetually. Third, taxation by both countries may be reduced
tax and repeals the income tax, since “[f]undamentally, income tax conventions apply
to taxes on ‘income and capital’”). There are some tax treaties that address
consumption taxes, specifically VAT. However, in most countries, the VAT employed is
destination-based, meaning that exports are exempt from VAT and imports are subject
to VAT. As a result, double VAT is avoided to a certain extent without need for
international agreement (some double taxation will continue to occur to the extent
there are varying definitions of exempted and included items). The inconsistency
occurs to various degrees in every country that employs a VAT. Developed countries,
however, continue to rely more heavily than LDCs on income taxation, which is
relieved by, and therefore necessitates the continued existence of, tax treaties.
173
G.I.R.A., supra note 83, § 11(7) (“income from cocoa of a cocoa farmer is
exempt from tax”).
174
Acting as the intermediary between farmers and the global market, the
Ghana Cocoa Board has the “sole responsibility for the sale and export of Ghana cocoa
beans,” and delivers only a fraction of realized proceeds to farmers, thus imposing a
gross basis tax that currently approximates some 33%. See Ghana Cocoa Beans
Production, Export And Prices, available at http://www.cocobod.gh/corp_div.cfm
?BrandsID=13. See also STATE OF THE GHANAIAN ECONOMY, supra note 170, at 26.
175
See Thomas C. Wexler, Introduction to Mining in Ghana, THE MINING
JOURNAL, Nov. 10, 1995, at 353 (discussing strict government controls over and rights
in Ghanaian mining operations).
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or eliminated through strategies of tax avoidance and evasion.
Finally, taxation by both countries may be reduced or
eliminated pursuant to express efforts to do so by both taxing
jurisdictions, usually through a tax treaty. The combination of
reduction or elimination of taxation in both countries, whether
express or not, leads to complete non-taxation 176 of
multinational activities. As discussed more fully below, the
resulting lack of taxation obviates the need to pursue tax relief
under treaty.
1. Reduced Taxation Through Deferral
As discussed above, most developed countries impose
taxation on a worldwide basis, yet most protect this right only
with respect to certain items of income, allowing suspension of
taxation on other items to continue indefinitely at the will of
the shareholders. 177 Thus, despite the support for the primacy
of residence-based taxation that originally served as a major
reason for entering into tax treaties, 178 much residence-based
taxation is undermined by the persistent allowance of deferral.
Deferral is antithetical to residence-based taxation. By
allowing it, nominally residence-based jurisdictions like the
U.S. mirror source-based (or territorial) systems by effectively
Deferral is
providing tax exemptions for foreign income. 179
defended on grounds of neutrality: it is argued that companies
from residence-based countries like the U.S. face heavier global
tax burdens than companies from territorial countries, when
both operate in third countries that impose little or no sourcebased taxation. For example, it is suggested that U.S.-based
multinational companies operating abroad may be subject to
little source-based taxation as foreign countries compete to
attract their investment by offering low tax burdens, but
because of the U.S. system of worldwide taxation, the U.S.based company is still subject to the higher U.S. domestic tax
rates. In contrast, it is supposed that multinationals from
territorial systems will have a tax advantage in the minimally-

176
Sometimes called double non-taxation to indicate the coordinative effort
that produces it.
177
See supra text accompanying note 35.
178
See supra text accompanying note 68.
179
See Peroni, supra note 65, at 987. Passive income items such as dividends,
interest, and royalties are generally not eligible for deferral and are therefore subject to
current tax in the U.S.
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taxing foreign country because these companies can combine
low taxation abroad with exemption at home. 180
Based on this argument, deferral continues to be
vigorously defended under principles of capital import
neutrality, 181 as requisite to allow U.S. companies to compete in
low-tax countries against the multinational companies of
territorial jurisdictions. 182 That few multinational companies
are actually residents of purely territorial systems, 183 and that
deferral provides the equivalent of exemption for much of the
foreign income earned by U.S. multinationals while
simultaneously providing them with a competitive advantage
over their domestic counterparts, 184 appears to have little effect
180
See Roin, supra note 63, at 114 (citing deferral proponents who argue that
“[a]ny businesses that Americans can successfully operate in low tax
jurisdictions . . . foreign investors can carry on equally well [and that if deferral was
ended] foreign investors would use their now unique tax advantage to overwhelm their
American competitors, wherever located.”).
181
See discussion of neutrality supra note 61 and accompanying text.
182
See, e.g., Mark Warren, Democrats Would Increase Taxes on Companies’
Income Earned Abroad Repealing the Deferral Rule: The Wrong Answer to U.S. Job
Losses, 2004 WTD 88-16 (May 3, 2004) (arguing that some countries exempt the foreign
earnings of their multinationals, U.S. companies would face a higher overall tax
burden when operating in low-tax jurisdictions in the absence of deferral, and that U.S.
companies “cannot be expected to succeed if they are handicapped by a 35-percent
corporate-tax rate on their worldwide income”); National Foreign Trade Council, Inc.,
The NFTC Foreign Income Project: International Tax Policy for the 21st Century, 1999
WTD 58-37 (Mar. 25, 1999); Impact of U.S. Tax Rules on International Competitiveness:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. 64 (1999) (statement of
Fred F. Murray, Vice President for Tax Policy National Foreign Trade Council, Inc.),
available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106_house_
hearings&docid=f:66775.pdf (arguing that “[i]f the local tax rate in the company of
operation is less than the U.S. rate, . . . competitors will be more lightly taxed than
their U.S.-based competition,” whether they are locally based or foreign, “unless their
home countries impose a regime that is as broad as subpart F, and none have to date
done so”). The argument is perhaps as old as U.S. taxation itself. In the newly
independent United States, import duties were favored over export duties or other
forms of taxation, because the imposition of either export duties or property taxes on
farmers would equally increase the price of goods destined for export, thus serving to
“enable others to undersell us abroad.” See UNITED STATES IN CONG. ASSEMBLED,
REPLY TO THE RHODE ISLAND OBJECTIONS, TOUCHING IMPORT DUTIES (1782), reprinted
in 1 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 100, 105 (Jonathon Elliot, ed. 1996).
183
For example, of the top 100 multinationals, eighteen are from generally
territorial systems (one from Hong Kong, three from Switzerland, one from Malaysia,
and thirteen from France). Since France imposes a form of world-wide taxation on lowtaxed earnings of controlled foreign companies, even this number is an exaggeration.
Other countries may impose worldwide income generally, but exempt the foreign
income of their multinationals under treaty. See UNCTAD World 100 Non-Financial
TNCs, supra note 82.
184
Domestic companies are subject to worldwide taxation and cannot
generally opt to suspend the taxation of their profits. See generally Clifton Fleming Jr.
et al., An Alternative View of Deferral: Considering a Proposal to Curtail, Not Expand,
Deferral, 2000 WTD 20-15 (Jan. 31, 2000) (arguing that deferral is a subsidy for
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on the efforts of U.S. multinationals to preserve the deferral
privilege. 185
The effect of deferral is to increase the sensitivity of
U.S. taxpayers to foreign tax rates, thus forcing source
countries to continually lower their internal tax burdens so as
to attract the ever more demanding foreign capital. Deferral
thus causes tax competition, as any income taxation imposed
by a source country, such as Ghana, subjects a potential foreign
investor to a burden it could otherwise avoid. 186 Elimination of
competition and tax sensitivity could be achieved if all
countries adhered to principles of capital export neutrality.
However, this would require international coordination and
cooperation to a degree that appears overwhelmingly
unattainable. 187
The consequence is that U.S. multinationals may
generally avoid U.S. taxation on their foreign income by
operating through subsidiary companies in source countries, 188
As suspension and effective
which they generally do. 189
operating business abroad and that proponents of deferral “have not candidly
acknowledged the broad nature of the scope of the existing deferral privilege”).
185
See supra text accompanying note 182.
186
Deferral removes the existing (residual) tax burden, thereby ensuring that
any tax imposed by a foreign country is a tax wedge. In the absence of deferral, the tax
wedge is created by the home country and, outside of limitations on foreign tax credits,
taxes imposed by the source country do not increase the wedge. For a discussion of the
interaction of deferral and the subsequent efforts of source countries to eliminate tax
wedges, see Dagan, supra note 40, at 952-56.
187
See Victor Thuronyi, International Tax Cooperation and a Multilateral
Treaty, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1641, 1642 n.8 (2001) (an internationally harmonized
system is “too utopian to merit discussion”); Charles E. McLure, Jr., Tax Policies for the
XXIst Century, in VISIONS OF THE TAX SYSTEMS OF THE XXIST CENTURY 9, 28-29 (1997).
But see Yariv Brauner, An International Tax Regime in Crystallization, 56 TAX L. REV.
259, 260 (2003) (arguing that there has been a “modelization” of the international tax
rules that could be built upon to achieve some measure of rule harmonization). Recent
developments in the EU indicate that less, rather than more, cooperation is likely. See
Joann M. Weiner, EU Governments Fear Increased Tax Competition in Wake of
Accession, 2004 WTD 81-1 (Apr. 6, 2004); Joe Kirwin, International Taxes European
Commission Rejects Effort For Harmonized Corporate Tax Rates, DAILY TAX REP., June
1, 2004, at G-8.
188
Stephen E. Shay, Exploring Alternatives to Subpart F, 82 TAXES 3-29, 31
(2004) (multinationals are free to choose to operate through a branch or subsidiary, and
they will generally choose subsidiary form unless the foreign effective tax rate is
greater than the U.S. rate or if they benefit from pooling high- and low-taxed earnings).
189
For example, several of the largest foreign investments in Ghana are U.S.
controlled foreign corporations (CFCs), including the Valco, Regimanuel Gray, and
Equatorial Bottlers, discussed supra note 108.
Operating through a domestic
subsidiary is also more advantageous from a Ghanaian perspective, since foreign
companies are subject to strict scrutiny from the taxing and regulatory authorities to
an extent exceeding that paid to domestic companies. The differential treatment is
especially acute in the case of mining and other extractive operations, which are
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elimination of taxation on foreign income becomes the norm in
the developed world, LDCs respond accordingly, by
increasingly offering corresponding tax relief in the form of tax
incentives. These incentives have become a standard tool for
capturing a share of the global flow of foreign investment. 190
2. Reduced Taxation Through Tax Incentives
Most countries use various forms of tax incentives to
encourage particular behavior in taxpayers, and neither the
U.S. nor Ghana is an exception. The U.S. employs numerous
tax incentives to attract foreign investment and encourage
domestic investment. These provisions are generally embedded
in the tax base, rather than being reflected in the tax rates. 191
For example, along with the privilege of deferral, tax credits for
research and development (R&D) and accelerated depreciation
deductions are among the major tax incentives the U.S.
offers. 192
strictly regulated and limited as to foreign ownership by the Government of Ghana.
Interview with Bernard Ahafor, Attorney, in Ghana (Dec. 2, 2003). See also Shay,
supra note 188, at 31.
190
The evidence is perhaps most obvious in regards to the number of countries
offering tax holidays—over one hundred in 1998 and increasing—and the share of
foreign investment directed at tax havens that are decried by the OECD for their
harmful tax practices. While these countries command a fraction of the world’s
population and its GDP, they attract a disproportionately large amount of U.S. foreign
investment capital. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 164, at 1577, 1589, 1643.
191
Since the 1960s, an awareness of the danger of the hidden costs of such
incentives has led to expenditure budgeting, which quantifies the cost of embedded
provisions. For an example, see Analytical Perspectives, supra note 65, at 285
(explaining the concept of expenditures and providing a selected list). Incentives
currently provided in the U.S. tax base include accelerated depreciation and exclusions
from taxation for certain forms of income such as tax-exempt interest. Tax incentives
include any exclusions or exemptions that reduce or defer the tax base. See generally
Alex Easson & Eric M. Zolt, Tax Incentives, 2002 WORLD BANK INST. 3 (“[t]ax
incentives can take the form of tax holidays for a limited duration, current deductibility
for certain types of expenditures, or reduced import tariffs or customs”). Ireland and
Belgium, which offer low rates for foreign investors, are exceptions (and a source of
consternation to their OECD counterparts) to the general rule of tax base rather than
tax rate concessions in developed countries. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 164, at
1601.
192
Congress first provided a deduction for research and experimental
expenditures in 1981, because it saw a decline in research activities it attributed to
inadequacies in the I.R.C. § 174 deduction, which at that time only applied to
investment in machinery and equipment employed in research or experimental
activities. Congress concluded that “[i]n order to reverse this decline in research
spending . . . a substantial tax credit for incremental research and experimental
expenditures was needed.” STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAX’N, 97TH CONG., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981, reprinted in INTERNAL
REVENUE ACTS, 1980-1981, at 1369, 1494 (1982). In the same act, Congress provided
for accelerated depreciation deduction allowances because the existing depreciation
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Ghana also offers accelerated depreciation deductions
and R&D credits similar to—but perhaps not as generous as—
those of the U.S. 193 However, most LDCs, including Ghana,
also offer significantly more generous incentives in the form of
low corporate tax rates and myriad tax exemptions. 194 Ghana
imposes only an 8% tax on income from the export of most
goods, rates ranging from 16 to 25% for certain industries and
businesses conducted in certain geographic areas, and complete
exemption from taxation (tax holidays) for periods ranging
from three to ten years for new activities conducted in certain
industries or geographic areas. 195 Many LDCs, including
Ghana, have also set aside geographic areas as havens from
the normal tax and regulatory regimes (free zones), specifically
to host manufacturing and processing plants. In Ghana’s free
zone, established in 1995, companies enjoy a ten-year tax
holiday followed by tax rates never to exceed 8%. 196
International organizations such as the World Bank and
the IMF currently decry the harm that tax holidays cause in

deduction allowances “did not provide the investment stimulus that was felt to be
essential for economic expansion.” Id. at 1449. Enhanced bonus depreciation
provisions were enacted in 2001 under the theory that “allowing additional first-year
depreciation will accelerate purchases of equipment, promote capital investment,
modernization, and growth, and will help to spur an economic recovery.” H.R. REP. NO.
107-251, pt. 2, at 20 (2001). Bonus depreciation was expanded in 2003 for the same
reason. H.R. REP. NO. 108-94, pt. 2, at 23 (2003) (“increasing and extending the
additional first-year depreciation will accelerate purchases of equipment, promote
capital investment, modernization, and growth, . . . help to spur an economic
recovery, . . . [and] increase employment opportunities in the years ahead). See also
Richard E. Andersen, IRS Relaxes Rules for Research Credit; Opportunities for R&DIntensive Multinationals?, 4 J. TAX’N. GLOBAL TRANSACTIONS 17 (CCH) (Spring, 2004)
(discussing structures with which foreign and domestic multinationals can use R&D
credits to generate tax-free profits in the U.S., and citing a 2003 study by Bain & Co.,
entitled Addressing the Innovation Divide, in which it was found that in the past
decade, European drug makers placed their R&D in the United States versus in local
expansion by a two-to-one margin).
193
G.I.R.A., supra note 83, Third Schedule (depreciation allowance), § 19
(deductions for research and development expenditures).
194
For example, by 1998, over 100 countries had tax holidays. Avi-Yonah,
supra note 164, at 1577. See, e.g., ZMARAK SHALIZI, LESSONS OF TAX REFORM 23 (1991).
195
G.I.R.A., supra note 83, §11 (Industry Concessions) & First Schedule, Part
II (Rates of Income Tax Upon Companies). Although tax holidays are limited in
duration, insufficient enforcement prevents the IRS from curbing instances in which
companies facing expiring tax holidays simply dissolve and reincorporate under a
different name to restart the clock. Interview with Kweku Ackaah-Boafo, Esq. (Feb. 6,
2004) (Discussing Canadian Bogosu Resources, a mining company operating in Ghana
which reincorporated as Billington Bogusu Gold Limited and again five years later as
Bogusu Gold Limited, in order to avail itself of tax benefits that otherwise would have
expired).
196
G.I.R.A., supra note 83, First Schedule.
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depriving LDCs of much-needed revenue. 197 The elimination of
income taxation on corporate taxpayers, coupled with the
pressure to reduce taxes on international trade, has created
critical revenue shortfalls in many countries. 198 Nevertheless,
new tax incentives continue to be introduced in both developed
and less developed countries around the world, 199 often in
response to private sector lobbying. 200 Some recent examples
include the introduction of a free zone in the United Arab
Emirates, 201 a five-year exemption period for audit, accounting,
and law firms in Singapore, 202 and a ten-year corporate tax
holiday for income from investments of at least €150 million in
Turkey. 203
As a result of these kinds of initiatives, U.S.
multinationals may face little or no income taxation on income
197
See, e.g., Janet Stotsky, Summary of IMF Tax Policy Advice, in TAX POLICY
HANDBOOK 279, 282 (Parthasarathi Shome, ed., International Monetary Fund 1995)
(stating that tax incentives “have proved to be largely ineffective, while causing serious
distortions and inequities in corporate taxation.”); SHALIZI, supra note 194, at 60 (“The
use of so-called tax expenditures (tax preferences and exemptions to promote specific
economic and social objectives) should, in general, be deemphasized.”). This is a
reversal of position for the World Bank, which at one point encouraged LDCs to offer
tax incentives to attract foreign investment and was concerned with the effect
elimination of tax incentives might have on its assistance projects. Stewart, supra note
11 at 169; SHALIZI, supra note 194, at 68-69. The World Bank has since “recommended
the removal or tightening of incentives in Argentina (1989), Bangladesh (1989), Brazil
(1989), Ghana (1989), and Turkey (1987), among others.” SHALIZI, supra note 195, at
69. Tax incentives are also contrary to WTO rules prohibiting tax subsidies. See WTO
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 14, 1994, Annex 1A, Art.
1, ¶ 1.1. However, these provisions are rarely enforced with respect to LDCs. See
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Martin B. Tittle, Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America:
Overview and Current Status 26-28 (2002), available at http://www.iadb.org/INT/Trade/
1_english/2_WhatWeDo/Documents/d_TaxDocs/2002-2003/a_Foreign%20Direct%20
Investment%20in%20Latin%20America.pdf.
198
Cordia Scott & Sirena J. Scales, Tax Competition Harms Developing
Countries, IMF Official Says, 2003 WTD 238-9 (Dec. 10, 2003).
199
See, e.g., Kwang-Yeol Yoo, Corporate Taxation of Foreign Direct Investment
Income 1991-2001 (Econ. Dep’t, Working Paper No. 365, 2003), available at
http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2003doc.nsf/43bb6130e5e86e5fc12569fa005d004c/48ae491
b8e2db4a9c1256d8e003b567f/$FILE/JT00148239.PDF.
200
See, e.g., David Roberto R. Soares da Silva, Tech Companies in Brazil Seek
Tax Incentives to Promote R&D, 2004 WTD 138-6 (Jul. 19, 2004) (domestic and
multinational technology companies are currently lobbying for a three-year exemption
from federal taxes for income from sales of “all new products that contain significant
technological innovation”).
201
Under this new initiative, free-zone companies in Dubai will be exempt
from income tax. See Cordia Scott, Dubai Woos Europe With Tax-Free Outsourcing
Zone, 2004 WTD 118-12 (June 17, 2004).
202
Lisa J. Bender, Singapore Launches Tax Incentives for Audit, Accounting,
Law Firms, 2004 WTD 66-5 (Apr. 5, 2004).
203
Mustafa Çamlica, Turkey Plans Tax Holidays for Large Investments, 2004
WTD 82-8 (Apr. 28, 2004).
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derived in LDCs. The impact of tax treaties on activities giving
rise to such income is therefore minimized, as double taxation,
and even single taxation, is avoided through unilateral tax
rules. However, even if home or source countries nominally
impose taxation on multinationals, widespread tax avoidance
and evasion neutralizes these taxes. Tax treaties appear to
have little effect in these circumstances.
3. Reduced Taxation Through Tax Avoidance and
Evasion
In the event that deferral or tax incentives are not
available, multinational companies manage their worldwide
tax exposure by using tax planning techniques to shift income
to low- or no-tax jurisdictions through earnings stripping,
transfer pricing, thin capitalization, and similar means of tax
avoidance and, in the extreme, tax evasion. 204 For example,
U.S. multinationals typically use over- and under-invoicing to
assign foreign profits to subsidiaries in tax havens. 205 As a
result, firms can increasingly make physical location decisions
that are largely independent of tax-related business decisions,
204
See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Rise and Fall of Arm’s Length: A Study in
the Evolution of U.S. International Taxation, 15 VA. TAX REV. 89, 95 (1995) (“Transfer
pricing manipulation is one of the simplest ways to avoid taxation.”); David Harris,
Randall Morck, Joel Slemrod & Bernard Yeung, Income Shifting in U.S. Multinational
Corporations, in STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 277, 301 (Giovannini et al. eds.,
1993); James R. Hines, Jr., Tax Policy and the Activities of Multinational Corporations,
in FISCAL POLICY: LESSONS FROM ECONOMIC RESEARCH 401, 414-15 (Alan J. Auerbach
ed., 1997). The line between tax avoidance and tax evasion is murky. Tax avoidance
generally refers to lawful attempts to minimize taxation, as Judge Learned Hand
famously noted in Comm’r v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850-51 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J.,
dissenting) (“Over and over again courts have said that there is nothing sinister in so
arranging one’s affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible. Everybody does so, rich or
poor; and all do right, for nobody owes any public duty to pay more than the law
demands . . . .”). Tax evasion generally encompasses the unlawful and fraudulent
avoidance of tax accomplished by hiding taxable income and assets from taxing
authorities.
205
See Council of the European Union, Final Draft Report of the Ad hoc
Working Party on Tax Fraud 16-17 (Brussels, April 27, 2000). Direct tax fraud is
typically committed through false invoicing, under- and over-invoicing, non-declaration
of income earned in foreign jurisdictions, and “use by taxpayers of a fictitious tax
domicile, with the purpose to evade fulfilling their tax obligations in their country of
domicile for tax purposes.” Id. at 4-5. See also Martin A. Sullivan, U.S. Multinationals
Move More Profits to Tax Havens, 2004 WTD 31-4 (Feb. 9, 2004) (although they
comprise just 13% of productive capacity and 9% of employment, subsidiaries of U.S.
multinationals located in the top eleven tax havens were assigned 46.3% of foreign
profits in 2001); HOOKE, supra note 124, at 86-87 (suggesting that to control costs, it is
“sound operating procedure” for a foreign investor of an export platform in a LDC to
interpose an offshore bank, and overcharge the foreign company for imported supplies
and management fees to reduce income in the source country).
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shifting profits to the most advantageous tax destination. 206
Efforts by governments to curb such practices are abundant 207
but largely ineffective 208 in the face of efforts by taxpayers to
engage in them. 209
In LDCs such as Ghana, where enforcement of the tax
law has been relatively less of a focus than reform of the tax
law, tax authorities are all but helpless against these
practices. 210 It is popularly said that Ghanaian companies keep
three sets of books: one for the banks, showing large profits so
as to secure financing; one for the Ghanaian Internal Revenue
Service (IRS), showing large losses so as to avoid paying taxes;
and one set, very closely-guarded by the owners, that contains
the most accurate information. 211 There is no official data
available regarding whether, and to what extent, U.S.

206
See Christoph Spengel & Anne Schäfer, International Tax Planning in the
Age of ICT, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 04-27 (2004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=552061 (arguing that information and commercial technology
makes geographic distance “less relevant” and allows companies to choose location and
form of investment on the basis of international tax differentials).
207
Transfer pricing rules are a common feature in the tax systems of most
countries, as are rules denying deductions for interest and royalties in certain cases
and rules requiring a certain combination of debt and equity (thin capitalization rules).
See HUGH J. AULT AND BRIAN J. ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A
STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 420-28 (1997).
208
In the U.S., the transfer pricing rules are long and complicated and
constantly evolving, but still considered inadequate in preventing profit-shifting, as are
U.S. earnings- and interest-stripping rules. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 163(j) (2005). These rules
are essentially thin capitalization rules, each of which are similarly limited in their
success in curbing avoidance of U.S. taxation. For an overview of U.S. efforts to control
transfer pricing, see generally Avi-Yonah, supra note 204. For a recent example of the
failure of interest stripping rules, consider the growing use of Canadian Income Funds
to avoid the application of I.R.C. § 163(j) (2000). See, e.g., Jack Bernstein & Barbara
Worndl, Canadian-U.S. Cross-Border Income Trusts: New Variations, 34 TAX NOTES
INT’L 281, 283 (April 19, 2004).
209
See, e.g., Shay, Exploring Alternatives, supra note 188, at 36 (“The drive on
the part of taxpayers, multinational and others, to push down effective tax rates has
accelerated in recent years.”).
210
See Stewart, supra note 11, at 181.
211
Interview with Margaret K. Insaidoo, Justice, High Court of Ghana, in
Ghana (Dec. 9, 2003) (on file with author); Interview with Bernard Ahafor, Attorney,
Private Practice, in Ghana (Dec. 2, 2003) (on file with author); Interview with Sefah
Ayebeng, Chief Inspector of Taxes, Internal Revenue Service, in Ghana (Dec. 11, 2003)
(on file with author). The implication is that firms keep separate books in an attempt
to defraud the government, rather than in the ordinary course of keeping separate tax
and cost accounting books, for which there is generally no statutory proscription. See,
e.g., CHARLES E. HYDE & CHONGWOO CHOE, KEEPING TWO SETS OF BOOKS: THE
RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN
TAX
&
INCENTIVE
TRANSFER
PRICES,
http://ssrn.com/abstract=522623 (arguing that keeping two sets of books with respect to
transfer pricing is “not only legal but also typically desirable” for many MNEs).
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multinationals take advantage of enforcement weaknesses. 212
Ghana recently introduced a Large Taxpayers Unit to curtail
tax evasion, but the Ghanaian IRS relies on the good faith of
company officials and their independent auditors because the
resources are lacking to perform audits on all but a few
companies. 213 Given that the overall tax compliance rate is
estimated to be less than 20% in Ghana, good faith appears to
be rather elusive. 214
As a consequence of tax avoidance and evasion
strategies, income is often exempt from taxation even if tax
nominally applies in the residence country, the source country,
or both. In such a taxing environment there is little taxation,
let alone double taxation, to be relieved by treaty.
Governments are not unaware of the problem. Tax avoidance
and evasion has typically been addressed in treaties through
information sharing provisions, in which the respective taxing
jurisdictions agree to assist each other in collecting revenues. 215
212
Anecdotal evidence that multinationals are thought to evade taxation
where possible is not lacking, however. See, e.g., Sirena J. Scales, Venezuela
Temporarily Closes McDonald’s Nationwide, 2005 WTD 26-11 (Feb. 9, 2005)
(“Venezuela’s Tax Agency (SENIAT) has temporarily closed all 80 McDonald’s
restaurants in the nation, citing failure to comply with tax rules . . . .”).
213
Seth E. Terkper, Ghana Establishes Long-Awaited Large Taxpayer Unit,
2004 WTD 64-10 (Apr. 2, 2004). A mid-size taxpayers unit is also in the planning
stages. Ayebeng, supra note 211. A more effective audit process may not be sufficient
to induce increased compliance, however. A recent empirical study about Australian
investors that were accused of engaging in abusive tax transactions argues that
taxpayers’ level of trust regarding the fairness, neutrality, and respect accorded to
them by the revenue authorities was correlated to their level of voluntary compliance,
and that although trust alone should not be relied upon in enforcing a tax system, “a
regulatory strategy that combines a preference for trust with an ability to switch to a
policy of distrust is therefore likely to be the most effective.” Kristina Murphy, The
Role of Trust in Nurturing Compliance: A Study of Accused Tax Avoiders, 28 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 2, 187, 203 (2004). In an interesting twist, South Korea recently
announced that domestic and foreign companies meeting target job creation goals will
be free from audits in 2004 and 2005 under a new tax incentive program. James Lim,
South Korea Offering Companies that Create Jobs Shield from Audits, 34 Daily Tax
Rep. (BNA) G-3 (Feb. 23, 2004).
214
The compliance rate is an estimate of Ghanaian IRS officials and not an
official government statistic. Ayebeng, supra note 211 (estimating compliance at less
than 20%); Interview with Fred Ajyarkwa, Official, Internal Revenue Service, in Ghana
(Dec. 11, 2003) (estimating it at 17%).
215
The U.S. Model requires contracting states to exchange all relevant
information to carry out the provisions of the tax treaty or the domestic laws of the
states concerning taxes covered by the treaty, including assessment, collection,
enforcement, and prosecution regarding taxes covered by the Convention. See U.S.
MODEL, supra note 56, art. 26, ¶ 1. It also calls for treaty override of domestic bank
secrecy or privacy laws. The OECD Model does not include the assessment/collection
language but extends the scope of taxes to “every kind and description imposed on
behalf of the contracting states.” See OECD MODEL, supra note 21, art. 26, ¶1. It does
not include an equivalent to the U.S. Model’s secrecy law override. The UN Model
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These provisions have a perhaps unintended consequence,
however.
Introduction of a tax treaty may decrease
investment, as investors seek to avoid the implementation of
the information sharing provisions that have become standard
in tax agreements. 216
The intersection of the taxation of portfolio interest and
U.S. interest reporting rules illustrates this tension. The U.S.
is a potential tax haven for foreign investors because of its zero
tax on portfolio interest and rules under which banks are
generally not required to report interest payments made to
nonresident aliens. 217 Efforts to require interest payment
reporting have consistently met strong resistance by the
private sector, which argues that such rules would “hinder tax
competition between nations” and “undermine [the] global shift
to lower tax rates and international tax reform.” 218 Several
members of Congress echo these sentiments, arguing that
expanded reporting rules “would likely result in the flight of
hundreds of billions of dollars from U.S. financial institutions”
and could cause “serious, irreparable harm to the U.S.
economy.” 219 The implication is that while the U.S. does not

limits assistance to taxes covered by the Convention as in the U.S. Model, and
explicitly adds that information exchange is intended to prevent fraud or evasion of
taxes. See UN MODEL, supra note 78, art. 26, ¶ 1.
216
Bruce A. Blonigen & Ronald B. Davies, The Effects of Bilateral Tax
Treaties on U.S. FDI Activity (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
8834, 2002), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8834 (showing a decrease in
foreign investment upon the introduction of a tax treaty and suggesting that such
decrease may be the result of the dampening effect tax treaties may have on tax
evasion due to information sharing provisions); Ronald B. Davies, Tax Treaties,
Renegotiations, and Foreign Direct Investment (University of Oregon Economics,
Working Paper No. 2003-14, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=436502 (“[t]reaties have either a zero or even a negative effect on FDI”
because they dampen the ability of businesses to engage in tax evasion activities,
especially through transfer pricing).
217
I.R.C. §§ 871(h), 882(a), (c) (2005); Treas. Reg. § 1.6049-5 (1983). Canadian
residents are a current exception to the interest reporting rules, Treas. Reg. § 1.60498(a) (1996), and proposed regulations would extend the reporting requirements to
include all interest over $10 paid to any nonresident alien individual. Prop. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.6049-8(a), 67 Fed. Reg. 50389 (Aug. 2, 2002).
218
Katherine M. Stimmel, Free Market Interest Groups Urge Treasury to
Withdraw Alien Interest Reporting Rules, 16 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) G-2 (Jan. 27, 2004).
219
Alison Bennett, House Lawmakers Ask Bush to Withdraw IRS Interest
Reporting Rules for Aliens, 69 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) G-8 (Apr. 10, 2002). See also Sen.
Gordon Smith (R-Ore.), Letter on Proposed Nonresident Alien Interest Reporting Rules
(REG-133254-02) to Treasury Secretary John Snow, TaxCore (BNA) (Feb. 20, 2003)
(urging Treasury not to move forward with interest reporting rules because it “would
drive the savings of foreigners out of bank accounts in the United States and into bank
accounts in other nations,” and expressing the Senator’s failure to understand “why we
put the enforcement of other nations’ tax laws as a priority at Treasury”).
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condone tax evasion, there has emerged no political will strong
enough to counter the private interests benefiting from the
rules as they currently exist. 220
Similar sentiments may exist in the context of tax
treaties, especially when the partner country, as in the case of
Ghana, has a very limited ability to enforce the tax laws prior
to the introduction of a treaty. If foreign investors are able to
avoid taxation in Ghana, for instance through aggressive tax
planning, a tax treaty that requires or permits Ghana to
provide tax information to the U.S. taxing authority may not be
welcome. 221
4. Reduced Taxation Through Tax Sparing
The proliferation of tax incentives and tax holidays in
LDCs, coupled with deferral in the U.S. and tax avoidance
opportunities in both countries, limits the need for tax treaties
to relieve double taxation. Since the 1950s, tax sparing has
been promoted as a way to use tax treaties to increase
investment to targeted LDCs, even in the absence of double
taxation. 222 Tax sparing prevents residence-country taxation of
income exempted from tax by source countries, 223 by providing

220

Perhaps recent efforts to create a multinational task force to combat
abusive tax-avoidance can provide the pressure needed to reform this long standing
impasse. See Sirena J. Scales, Multination Task Force Created to Combat Abusive Tax
Avoidance, 2004 TNT 81-4 (Apr. 26, 2004).
221
Moreover, to the extent that a U.S. tax treaty coordinates transfer pricing
rules, a treaty might increase the taxation of a multinational that could otherwise
benefit from conflicting domestic standards.
222
See generally OECD, TAX SPARING: A RECONSIDERATION (1998)
[hereinafter TAX SPARING]. Recent literature on tax sparing includes Brown, supra
note 7; Damian Laurey, Reexamining U.S. Tax Sparing Policy with Developing
Countries: The Merits of Falling in Line with International Norms, 20 VA. TAX REV.
467, 483 (2000) (arguing that LDCs “need tax holidays to attract foreign investment,”
and therefore tax sparing is requisite to counter the effect of residual home country
taxation under tax treaties). Tax sparing is also defended as justifiable on grounds of
capital import neutrality, on the basis that it allows American multinationals to
compete with companies from other exemption-providing countries in the global
marketplace. See discussion infra notes 225-26 and accompanying text. However, tax
sparing violates the concept of capital export neutrality, and has been consistently
rejected by the Treasury Department on the grounds that tax treaties are supposed to
relieve double taxation, not eliminate taxation altogether, and that tax treaties are not
meant to provide benefits to U.S. persons.
223
Tax sparing was first introduced in the U.K. by the British Royal
Commission, which prepared a report in 1953 recommending tax sparing as a means of
“aiding British investment abroad.” TAX SPARING, supra note 222, at 15. Rejected by
the U.K. in 1957 after several years of debate, tax sparing was enabled in U.K. tax
treaties as a result of legislative action in 1961. Id. The purpose of the legislation was
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that if a source country refrains from taxing income derived in
its jurisdiction (usually pursuant to a tax holiday), the
residence country nevertheless grants a tax credit for the
nominally imposed tax. 224
Thus, under tax sparing, two taxing jurisdictions
cooperate to exempt multinational companies from income
taxation in both countries. Although similar effects could be
accomplished unilaterally by residence countries, 225 tax sparing
is generally seen as a mechanism that should be offered in the
context of a tax treaty, as a measure to encourage foreign
investment to selected LDCs. 226 Tax sparing has particularly
been promoted as a vehicle for investment and aid to the
nations of Sub-Saharan Africa. 227
There is little evidence, however, that tax sparing
increases foreign investment. 228 On the contrary, tax sparing
could potentially decrease investment in LDCs, since it enables
foreign investors to repatriate earnings that they would
otherwise leave abroad under the protection of deferral. 229 As
“enabling the UK to give relief to developing countries for taxes spared under foreign
incentive programmes.” Id.
224
Many examples and explanations of tax sparing exist. For an overview of
tax sparing, see generally Richard D. Kuhn, United States Tax Policy with Respect to
Less Developed Countries, 32 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 261 (1963).
225
For example, the U.S. could expand the definition of a creditable tax to
include certain nominally-imposed taxes. See, e.g., Paul R. McDaniel, The U.S. Tax
Treatment of Foreign Source Income Earned in Developing Countries: A Policy
Analysis, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 265, 268-69 (2003).
226
See, e.g., Brown, supra note 7; Laurey, supra note 222 (suggesting
proposals regarding the use of tax treaties to implement foreign aid initiatives by
encouraging foreign investment through tax sparing). See also J. Clifton Fleming, Jr.,
Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Fairness in International Taxation: The Ability-toPay Case for Taxing Worldwide Income, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 299, 347 (2001) (suggesting
that limiting tax sparing to its use in tax treaties “would allow appropriate distinctions
to be made among nations and would assist the United States in negotiating
appropriate reciprocal tax concessions for its residents”).
227
Brown, supra note 7, at 83 (arguing for tax sparing in tax treaties
specifically with Sub-Saharan Africa).
228
See McDaniel, supra note 225, at 284 (providing an overview of the
conflicting economic literature regarding the interaction of tax sparing and FDI).
229
See, e.g., Peroni, supra note 67, at 469 (deferral encourages “[r]etention
and reinvestment of earnings by [foreign companies]”); see also Laurey, supra note 222,
at 484-85 (tax sparing would “allow U.S. multinationals to repatriate earnings based
on business needs instead of on adverse tax consequences”). In a 2003 study of the
annual filings of the companies in the S&P 500, it was found that such companies had
accumulated over $500 billion in un-repatriated foreign earnings. ANNE SWOPE, BRUCE
KASMAN & ROBERT MELLMAN, BRINGING IT ALL BACK HOME: REPATRIATION
LEGISLATION’S FINAL LAP (2004), http://www.morganmarkets.com.
This figure
represents a trend of ever-increasing “trapped” foreign profits. Conversely, by acting
as an incentive to repatriate capital, tax sparing may be advantageous to the U.S.
economy even though it has long been rejected for policy reasons. For example, in the
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such, tax sparing appears fundamentally inconsistent with the
goal of using tax treaties to increase investment flows from
developed to less developed countries.
Moreover, tax sparing increases tax competition by
creating an additional disadvantage for countries that do not
have tax holidays, while leaving countries that have a tax
holiday in effect in the same or worse position as they were
when only deferral was available. 230 The OECD has initiated
efforts to combat what it terms “harmful tax practices”—in
essence, any tax regime that undermines residence-based
taxation by providing tax breaks and refusing to cooperate in
information sharing. 231 Persisting in the allowance of deferral
and tax holidays while promoting tax sparing seems equally
inconsistent with the treaty-related goal of protecting
residence-based tax bases.
Foreseeing that the ratification of any treaty with tax
sparing would prompt a surge of lobbying by U.S.
multinationals seeking the expansion of such provisions to
other countries, the U.S. has been unequivocal in its rejection
of these provisions. 232 While the potentially negative impact on
investment in LDCs is one valid reason why tax sparing should
continue to be rejected, the primary position of the U.S. has
been that tax sparing inappropriately allows the reduction of
U.S. taxation of U.S. persons, a result specifically precluded by
all U.S. treaties currently in force. 233
context of the repeal of I.R.C. § 114 (a tax exemption for certain foreign earnings that
was found to be in violation of WTO standards), legislators enacted a temporary
reduction in the rate of tax imposed on repatriated profits, citing in support the need to
direct capital back to the U.S. in the quest to create jobs and boost the economy. See
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, P.L. 108-357, H.R. 4250, Sec. 101(a) (repealing
I.R.C. § 114) and Sec. 965 (enacting temporary dividends-received deduction). See also
STAFF OF THE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 108th CONG., Short Summary of
Conference
Report
108-755
2
(October
7,
2004),
available
at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/legis.asp?formmode=read&id=2117 (last visited Nov.
26, 2005) (Section 956 “[e]ncourages companies to reinvest foreign earnings in the
United States”).
230
See, e.g., Margalioth, supra note 82, at 198.
231
See generally STAFF OF THE OECD FISCAL AFFAIRS COMM., THE OECD’S
PROJECT ON HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES: THE 2004 PROGRESS REPORT (2004).
232
Tax sparing was contemplated but ultimately rejected in tax treaties with
Egypt, India, and Israel, largely due to the efforts of Stanley Surrey, who argued
vigorously against the provision. See Laurey, supra note 222, at 475-76. Tax sparing
was also introduced in a tax treaty with Pakistan, but a subsequent change in Pakistan
law rendered the provision obsolete and the treaty entered into force without it. STAFF
OF S. FOREIGN RELATIONS COMM., 85th CONG., REPORT ON DOUBLE TAX CONVENTIONS,
S. Exec. Rpt.. No. 1, 85-2, ¶ 3 (1958).
233
This rule is enforced under the “saving clause” found in all U.S. tax
treaties. See, e.g., U.S. MODEL, supra note 56, art. 1, ¶ 4.
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Some LDCs, notably those in Latin America, have
terminated tax treaty negotiations with the U.S. over the issue
of tax sparing. 234 However, the U.S. position on tax sparing is
only “one of several obstacles in the way of U.S.-developing
In fact, tax sparing is largely
country tax treaties.” 235
unnecessary in the quest for complete non-taxation.
As
discussed above, tax holidays granted by LDCs to investors
from deferral-granting countries, such as the U.S., are effective
in providing double non-taxation so long as capital is
reinvested rather than repatriated. 236
C.

Domestic Tax Rates Equal to or Better Than Treaty
Rates

In treaties between developed countries, domestic tax
regimes are often significantly different than treaty-based tax
regimes. 237 This is especially the case with respect to tax rates
on passive income paid to foreign persons, which are typically
much higher under domestic statutes than under tax
treaties. 238 LDCs, however, increasingly impose tax rates that
are much closer to, and in some cases are less than, the typical
rates provided in treaties.
For example, dividends paid to foreign shareholders
would normally be subject to a 10% tax in Ghana, unless the
company paying the dividend operates in a free zone, in which
case the tax rate may be zero. 239 Thus, Ghana’s statutory tax
rate is the same as or less than what would be expected under
234

Laurey, supra note 222, at 471, 493 (many LDCs have “refused to sign U.S.
tax treaties that do not contain tax sparing clauses,” especially those in Latin America
because this region “resents the U.S. [residence-based] tax policy”).
235
McDaniel, supra note 225, at 292.
236
Tillinghast, supra note 62, at 477.
237
Some countries have incorporated treaty concepts into their domestic laws.
For example, permanent establishment thresholds that parallel or closely follow the
OECD model treaty definition have long been the domestic rule in Japan, the
Netherlands, Sweden, Germany, and France. AULT & ARNOLD, supra note 207, at 43234 (1997).
238
OECD Model rates do not exceed 15% for dividends, 10% for interest, and
0% for royalties. OECD MODEL, supra note 21, arts. 10-12. In contrast, maximum
statutory tax rates in OECD countries average 18%, 14%, and 16% on dividends,
interest, and royalties, respectively. See generally Ernst & Young, supra note 35
(calculations on file with author).
239
Ghana currently imposes a 10% tax on most dividends paid to
nonresidents, but provides tax incentives, including exemptions of taxation on passive
income paid by domestic companies to foreign investors, as described above. See
G.I.R.A., supra note 83, § 2, Schedule I, Part V (2000); see also supra, text
accompanying notes 195-97.
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In
the hypothetical U.S.-Ghana treaty outlined above. 240
addition, Ghana’s internal rate is lower than the 15%
maximum provided in the U.S. Model for regular dividends. 241
Nevertheless, it is higher with respect to direct dividends than
the maximum 5% provided in the U.S. Model and the zero rate
for dividends paid to foreign controlling company shareholders
found in new treaties.
Because most dividends paid out of Ghana would likely
constitute direct dividends, many of which would be paid to
controlling shareholders, 242 a treaty rate that followed the U.S.
Model or recent U.S. treaty practice would reduce taxation on
U.S. investors in Ghana from the internal rate of 10% (or
zero) 243 to 5% or zero. However, as discussed above, if U.S. tax
treaty precedent is followed, it is unlikely that a U.S.-Ghana
tax treaty would provide for these lower rates. In fact, if,
pursuant to the U.S. Model, a U.S.-Ghana tax treaty provided
for regular dividend taxation lower than 10%, direct dividend
taxation at 5%, and no source-country taxation of interest and
royalties, it would be the first and only U.S. tax treaty to do so
with any country, developed or less developed. 244
If, as a “concession” to Ghana, the U.S. provided that
instead of a maximum 5% rate for direct dividends, the
maximum source-country rate would be 10%, the only result
would be that Ghana’s statutory 10% rate would be
maintained. 245 No benefit in the form of reduced taxation
would be realized under this agreement. In fact, if the recently
concluded U.S.-Sri Lanka treaty serves as a model, a U.S.240

See supra Part III.B.
U.S. MODEL, supra note 56, art. 10.
242
See supra, text at note 189.
243
The rate depends on whether the payment derives from sources protected
by a free zone or tax holiday regime.
244
The closest rates to these are found in the treaty with Russia, which
provides for source-country tax rates of 10% on regular dividends, 5% on direct
dividends, and 0% on interest and royalties. Convention for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and
Capital, U.S.-Russ., arts. 10-12, June 17, 1992, K.A.V. 3315 [hereinafter U.S.-Russia
Treaty]. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUBL’N NO.
901, U.S. TAX TREATIES 33-34 (Rev. May, 2004) [hereinafter U.S. TAX TREATIES]
(providing rate information in other treaties). Note that although the IRS published
this document in May, 2004, it has no information regarding the U.S. tax treaty with
Sri Lanka, which was signed on March 14, 1985, because it did not enter into force
until June 13, 2004. See generally id. See also U.S.-Sri Lanka Treaty, supra note 4.
245
The treaty with Ghana would be one of six U.S. treaties with a top 10%
rate for dividends. See U.S. TAX TREATIES, supra note 244, at 33-34 (providing 10% as
the maximum tax rate on dividends in U.S. tax treaties with China, Japan, Mexico,
Romania, and Russia).
241
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Ghana treaty could even provide for maximum rates that are
higher than Ghana’s internal rates, though again this could
hardly benefit current or potential investors. 246
Similarly, Ghana’s statutory rates of 5 to 10% on
interest and 15% on rents and royalties 247 comport with the
average respective rates offered under other U.S. treaties,
although the U.S. Model contemplates zero source taxation of
both. 248 Just as in the case of direct dividends, preserving a
higher rate of tax would be likely under UN Model standards,
but would generally be a neutral factor for investors.
Concessions that allow for higher source-country
taxation of passive income items reflect the concerns addressed
by the UN Model regarding the worldwide allocation of tax
revenues. These concessions are meant to protect the taxing
jurisdiction of capital importing nations like Ghana against the
effects of the U.S. and OECD Model treaties, which allocate
income away from source and towards residence countries. 249
As the case of Ghana illustrates, however, preserving higher
source-country taxation is a neutral measure at best. It is also
contradictory to the notion otherwise promoted by U.S. policy
makers that reducing tax rates will reduce tax barriers to
direct investment and thereby increase capital flows between
countries.

246
In the U.S. treaty with Sri Lanka, the Joint Committee queries whether
this result is intended, and supposes that Sri Lanka could raise its rates up to the
maximum 15% provided, thereby increasing its revenues from foreign investment. See
EXPLANATION OF SRI LANKA TREATY, supra note 135, at 62-63. Yet in the same
document, the Committee proclaims that the treaty will be good for the U.S. because it
reduces Sri Lankan tax on U.S. investors and provides a clearer framework. Id. These
two positions are difficult to reconcile, as the Joint Committee appears to recognize.
247
Ghana currently imposes a 10% tax on most interest payments, and a 15%
tax on rents and royalties, with alternate rates ranging from 5 to 15% for certain
payments, depending on the residence of the recipient and the payor. G.I.R.A., supra
note 83, ch. I, Part I, §§ 2, 84; First Schedule, Part IV-VIII.
248
With respect to interest, see U.S. MODEL, supra note 56, art. 11. Thirtyone existing U.S. treaties, including several of the most recently signed treaties and
protocols, reflect the goal of zero source-based taxation of interest, rents, and royalties.
See, e.g., U.S.-Japan Treaty, supra note 155, art. 11; Australia Protocol, supra note 154,
art. 7; U.S.-U.K. Treaty, supra note 156, art. 11. Interest tax rates range from 5 to 30%
in the remaining treaties. U.S. TAX TREATIES, supra note 244. With respect to
royalties, see U.S. MODEL, supra note 56, art. 12. Twenty-six existing U.S. treaties,
including several of the most recently signed treaties and protocols, provide zero
source-country tax on most royalties. See, e.g., U.S.-Japan Treaty, supra note 155, art.
12; U.S.-U.K. Treaty, supra note 156, art. 12. As in the case of interest, royalty tax
rates range from 5 to 30% in the remaining treaties. U.S. TAX TREATIES, supra note
244, at 33-34.
249
See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
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To date there is no consensus regarding the appropriate
balance of attracting investment through lower tax rates and
preserving the allocation of revenue to source countries. 250
Preserving source-country revenues has been prioritized on the
grounds that low taxation has a deleterious effect on
infrastructure. In LDCs, providing adequate infrastructure to
attract multinationals has been a continuous challenge that is
further complicated by tax competition, a phenomenon that is
not alleviated by tax treaties.
D.

Inadequate Infrastructure and Non-Tax Barriers

U.S. investors may be significantly influenced in their
investment location decisions by broad infrastructure-related
criteria such as the rule of law and the protection of property,
as well as the immediate need for a suitable workforce and
adequate physical infrastructure. 251 The need for a suitable
workforce in turn necessitates basic infrastructure including
institutions such as schools and health care systems. In direct
tension with these needs is the diminishing ability of LDCs to
finance infrastructural development as they decrease taxes on
business profits.
Many countries, including Ghana, offer tax incentives
such as tax holidays and tax-free zones because attracting
investment to sustain economic development is deemed of
greater importance than protecting tax revenues. 252 However,
there is little consensus regarding the effectiveness of tax
incentives and tax holidays in actually attracting foreign
investment.
Anecdotal evidence from various countries
suggests that providing tax incentives to attract foreign
investment has failed to deliver the promised benefits. 253
Despite a plethora of tax holidays and other tax incentives, few
250

See, e.g., UN MODEL, supra note 78, art. X-XII (illustrating the lack of
consensus through the omission of standard rates).
251
HOOKE, supra note 124, at 47-49. For example, a stable macroeconomic
environment and a well-educated workforce are two factors that correlate with greater
foreign investment flowing into LDCs. UNCTAD, supra note 2, at 23.
252
Brian J. Arnold & Patrick Dibout, General Report, 55 Cahiers De Droit
Fiscal International 25, 28 (2001) (“Certain countries . . . are more concerned with
attracting activity and investment of the multinationals in order to sustain their
economic development.”).
253
See, e.g., Tamas Revesz, EU, Companies Urge Reform of Hungary’s Local
Industry Tax, 2004 WTD 97-10 (May 14, 2004) (“Although Slovakia offered big
investment subsidies and tax relief for foreign investors, its budget is in ruins, and the
resulting forced cuts in government spending (especially transfers to households) have
triggered serious hunger riots among the most seriously hit Roma population.”).
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permanent employment opportunities have been created, and
exports have failed to increase in the many free zones located
throughout West Africa, including Ghana. 254 According to John
Atta-Mills, former Commissioner of the Ghanaian IRS,
“experience shows that tax holidays and tax reductions are
ranked very low in the priority of investors in their choice of
location for their business,” and that product demand, a skilled
workforce, and infrastructure are more important to
businesses. 255
Economic evidence regarding the connection between
taxation and foreign investment provides little additional
certainty.
A number of economic studies indicate that
multinationals are very sensitive to tax considerations, and
therefore corporate location decisions may be heavily
influenced by tax regimes in source countries. 256 However,
conflicting studies indicate that taxation is not a significant
factor in the location decisions of U.S. multinationals. 257
Instead, these studies argue that “market size, labor cost,
infrastructure quality . . . and stable international relations,”
among other considerations, are the most important factors for
location decisions. 258 Studies focused particularly on foreign
investment in Sub-Saharan Africa come to the same
conclusion. 259
254
Papa Demba Thiam, Market Access and Trade Development: Key Actors, in
TOWARDS A BETTER REGIONAL APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT IN WEST AFRICA 97, 101
(John Igue & Sunhilt Schumacher eds., 1999). See also supra note 117 (stating that
trade data indicates imports from Ghana to the U.S. are currently declining.).
255
Seth E. Terkper, Tax Measures in Ghana’s 2004 Budget Inadequate,
Opposition Party’s Presidential Candidate Says, 2004 WTD 63-12 (Apr. 1, 2004).
256
For an overview of this economic literature, see Avi-Yonah (2000), supra
note 164, at 1590-92; James R. Hines, Jr., Tax Policy and the Activities of
Multinational Corporations, in FISCAL POLICY: LESSONS FROM ECONOMIC RESEARCH
401, 401-45 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1997); James R. Hines, Jr., Lessons from Behavioral
Responses to International Taxation, 52 NAT’L TAX J. 305, 305-22 (1999).
257
See McDaniel, supra note 225, at 280 (providing an overview of some of
this literature); see also G. Peter Wilson, The Role of Taxes in Location and Sourcing
Decisions, in STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL TAXATION, supra note 204, at 196-97, 229
(arguing that taxes are more influential in location decisions for administrative and
distribution centers, but they “rarely dominate the decision process” in the case of
manufacturing locations).
258
McDaniel, supra note 225, at 280.
259
See, e.g., Elizabeth Asiedu, On the Determinants of Foreign Direct
Investment to Developing Countries: Is Africa Different? 1, 6 (2001), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=280062 (arguing that location-specific factors such as natural
resource availability may make infrastructure and stability of particular importance in
the context of investment to Sub-Saharan Africa); World Bank, WORLD BUSINESS
ENVIRONMENT
SURVEY
2000,
available
at
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/economics.nsf/Content/ic-wbes (finding as a result of a survey
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In contrast, recent literature suggests that past studies
present an incomplete picture of the role of taxation because
they have focused on source-country corporate income taxes,
the burdens of which are relatively insignificant as compared
to the burdens of non-income taxation in source countries. 260 As
a result, these past studies may have obscured the more
significant influence of non-income taxation on foreign
investment decisions. 261 Since foreign non-income tax burdens
significantly exceed income tax burdens, these taxes may
strongly influence the behavior of U.S. multinationals. 262 The
main explanation given for this influence is that non-income
taxation cannot be credited against U.S. residual taxation. 263
The findings of this literature are consistent with
earlier studies that suggest the relative importance of taxation
in a particular country may be increasing with the availability
of opportunities for avoiding taxation elsewhere. 264 However,
these findings conflict with other studies demonstrating that
multinationals can use debt financing and transfer pricing
manipulation to achieve tax neutrality in investment location
decisions, 265 and that despite earlier studies showing a
connection between tax and foreign direct investment, non-tax

of business including Ghana and fifteen other Sub-Saharan African countries that
firms investing in these regions indicate less sensitivity to taxation than to corruption,
infrastructure, crime, inflation, financing, and political stability).
260
Mihir A. Desai, C. Fritz Foley & James R. Hines Jr., Foreign direct
investment in a world of multiple taxes, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 2727, 2728 (2004) (“Foreign
indirect tax obligations of American multinational firms are more than one and a half
times their direct tax obligations.”). In previous studies, James Hines found a “small
but significant” link between lower source-country taxes and foreign investment levels.
See McDaniel, supra note 225, at 281; see also Avi-Yonah, supra note 164, at 1644.
261
See Desai, supra note 260, at 2728.
262
See id. at 2729.
263
Id. at 2728 (“The role of non-income taxes may be particularly important
for FDI, since governments of many countries (including the United States) permit
multinational firms to claim foreign tax credits for corporate income taxes paid to
foreign governments but do not extend this privilege to taxes other than income taxes.
As a result, taxes for which firms are ineligible to claim credits may well have greater
impact on decision-making than do (creditable) income taxes.”). For an argument that
the definition of creditable taxes should be broadened to encompass many non-income
taxes, see generally Glenn E. Coven, International Comity and the Foreign Tax Credit:
Crediting Nonconforming Taxes, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 83 (1999).
264
See Grubert, supra note 67, at 22, 28 (suggesting that tax rates are
extremely important to U.S. multinationals in allocating their foreign direct
investment, especially in the case of manufacturing, and that the relative importance
of taxes may be increasing).
265
See Avi-Yonah, supra note 25, at 1315; GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER, U.S.
TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL INCOME: BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM 134 (1992).
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factors dominate the location decisions of multinational
firms. 266
Given the possibility that taxation may not be an
overriding factor in foreign investment location decisions, the
influence of infrastructure cannot be ignored. To the extent
infrastructure is important to potential investors, efforts to
reduce taxation to attract foreign investment may be
counterproductive, since raising sufficient revenues is integral
to the level of infrastructure a country can offer. 267 As tax
competition ensures less taxation of multinationals, the ability
of LDCs to fund sufficient infrastructure to attract and sustain
foreign investment relies more heavily on the ability to tax
resident individuals, whether directly or indirectly.
Historically, this has been a great challenge for LDCs. 268
Compliance rates for income and non-income taxation
are typically very low in Ghana. It is estimated that 80% of
business is conducted on the informal market—that is, not
subject to regulation or taxation because it is conducted in the
form of cash or barter. 269 Thus, only those who work for the
government or for the few companies that comply with wage

266
See Haroldene Wunder, The Effect of International Tax Policy on Business
Location Decisions, TAX NOTES INT’L, Dec. 24, 2001, at 1331-48.
267
See Nicholas Kaldor, Will Underdeveloped Countries Learn to Tax?, 41
FOREIGN AFF. 410, 410 (1963) (stating that “[t]he importance of public revenue to the
underdeveloped countries can hardly be exaggerated if they are to achieve their hopes
of accelerated economic progress.”). See also H. David Rosenbloom, Response to: “U.S.
Tax Treatment of Foreign Source Income Earned in Developing Countries:
Administration and Tax Treaty Issues,” 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L. L. REV. 401, 406 (2003)
(stating that “taxes are, by definition, involuntary exactions”). Thailand has recently
taken a slightly different approach. In June, 2004, the Prime Minister, the Ministry of
Education, and the Social and Human Development Services Ministry unveiled tax
incentives for individuals and companies that make charitable donations to social
development programs including education, museums, libraries, art galleries,
recreational facilities, children’s playgrounds, public parks, and sports arenas. The
government hopes that “[these incentives] will raise funds from the private sector to
alleviate the poverty crisis in Thailand.” Sirena J. Scales, Thai Government Announces
Tax Incentives for Charitable Contributions, 2004 WTD 129-10 (July 6, 2004).
268
Kaldor, supra note 267, at 410.
269
The agricultural industry contributes significantly to this number, since
over 60% of Ghana’s population is employed in agriculture (a slightly lower percentage
than the average of approximately 75% for LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa). These
percentages were compiled by averaging the stated percentage for each LDC in SubSaharan Africa from the World Factbook. (Spreadsheet containing data on file with
author.)
WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 1, available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/
publications/factbook/fields/2048.html. The informal economy also includes most
professionals such as doctors and lawyers, other service providers, and shopkeepers
and sellers of goods in local markets. Interview with Justice Insaidoo, supra note 211;
Interview with Sheila Minta, Solicitor/Barrister, Addae & Twum Company, in Accra,
Ghana (Dec. 9, 2003) (on file with author).
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An
withholding obligations pay their income taxes. 270
appearance that the laws are not applied uniformly may in
turn lead to increased tax avoidance and evasion. 271 The
situation is exasperated in an environment in which corruption
or mismanagement of public funds also exists. While Ghana’s
corruption factor is relatively modest in comparison to many of
its neighbors in Sub-Saharan Africa, 272 the notion persists that
wealth can be acquired by becoming a government official. 273
These perceptions plague the revenue collection efforts of tax
agencies in LDCs such as Ghana. 274
The ability of LDCs to collect sufficient revenue to fund
infrastructure is also challenged by international pressure to
270

Interview with Justice Insaidoo, supra note 211.
Murphy, supra note 213, at 201 (“perceptions of unfair treatment” appear
to affect trust, and “taxpayer resistance could be sufficiently predicated by decreased
levels of trust”).
272
See Transparency International, Global Corruption Report 2003, 215, 220,
225, 264, available at http://www.globalcorruptionreport.org/gcr2003.html (suggesting
that although the government faces much criticism in failing to address corruption
within the civil service, prompting President Kufuor to promise an increase in
accountability, Ghana’s perceived corruption is much lower than that of many of its
neighbors in Sub-Saharan Africa). In extreme comparison stand countries like the
Congo, where corruption and bribery at all levels are openly acknowledged as requisite
for survival. See Davan Maharaj, When the Push for Survival is a Full-Time Job, L.A.
TIMES, July 11, 2004, at A1 [hereinafter Maharaj, Push] (explaining that while
government employees are not paid a salary, they still show up for work every day to
collect bribes ranging from “about $5 for a birth certificate to about $100 for an import
license”). In Benin, a close neighbor to Ghana, bribes collected from traders trying to
import illegal goods into Nigeria provide some 15% of the nation’s revenues. Davan
Maharaj, For Sale—Cheap: ‘Dead White Men’s Clothing,’ L.A. TIMES, July 14, 2004, at
A1.
273
The phenomenon appears to exist throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. See
Transparency International, supra note 272, at 215. In the Congo, people say that
“[t]he only ones who have ever gotten rich are the leaders and those with connections.”
Maharaj, Push, supra note 272.
274
The perceptions of a few individuals cannot represent national sentiment,
nor can such sentiment, even if widespread, indicate the accuracy of the charge.
However, a perception of unfairness and corruption may undermine the efficacy of a
tax regime. A study to quantify the effect of corruption on tax compliance is underway
in Tanzania, but more research is needed in this area. A further issue that may be
significant to the tax collection efforts of LDCs is the perceived misuse of funds by the
government, whether as a result of corruption or the ineptitude of officials. Informally,
this author heard many expressions of dissatisfaction with the ability of the
government to provide necessary services to the citizenry. Since that is a common
complaint in developed countries as well, I do not deal with it here, but only note its
existence as an additional potential difficulty in raising sufficient revenues from
individuals. Finally, the extent to which local conditions and attitudes regarding
taxation affect the behavior of multinationals is not conclusively established. It may be
that multinationals generally conduct their business operations fundamentally in
compliance with the laws in force, regardless of the degree to which their compliance is
monitored or enforced, simply because their global operations may be subject to
scrutiny by other governments or the public.
However, evidence proving (or
disproving) this theory appears to be lacking in the economic literature.
271
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open markets and reduce trade barriers. 275 To the extent that
Ghana continues to rely heavily on trade taxes for its revenue,
recent developments in tariff reduction at the WTO may cause
additional revenue shortfalls in the future. Ghana also faces
difficulty in finding consistent resources to fund infrastructure
because success in collecting revenues from excise taxes,
royalties, dividends, and similar payments may depend on
fluctuating global market prices for exported commodities.
Finally, Ghana’s ability to fund infrastructure is subject
to uncertainty due to its reliance on assistance from foreign
donors. 276 In 2002, Ghana received large amounts of foreign
aid, much of which was connected to the peaceful transition of
power through the democratic process. But the amount of aid
has fallen recently, and it is expected to continue to decline as
finances are directed to other countries or fall off as a result of
The consequence is consistent budget
donor fatigue. 277
shortfalls in Ghana. 278 An increase in the overall level of
funding by donor countries might alleviate the shortfall. 279
275

The transition of the U.S. from an agrarian society “rich in resources but
lacking in capital investment” to an industrial one is credited in part to tariffs, without
which the transition would have been much slower. See WEISMAN, supra note 41, at
14; see also WILLIAM A. LOVETT, ALFRED E. ECKES JR. & RICHARD L. BRINKMAN, U.S.
TRADE POLICY: HISTORY, THEORY, AND THE WTO 45 (2004) (finding the current
association of free trade with rapid economic growth “incompatible with American
economic history,” which shows that “[t]he most rapid growth occurred during periods
of high protectionism”).
276
In Ghana, 17% of total revenue derives from non-tax sources. STATE OF
THE GHANAIAN ECONOMY, supra note 170, at 26-31. Of this amount 86% (or just under
15% of total revenues) derives from grants. The other 14% derives from receipts from
various fees charged by the government for particular services, and from amounts
received in divestiture of state-owned enterprises. In this respect, Ghana is somewhat
better off than many of the other LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa, which rely heavily on
foreign aid to subsidize their expenditures. For example, 53% of Uganda’s budget
comes from external loans and grants. See Gumisai Mutume, A New Anti-poverty
Remedy for Africa?, 16 AFRICA RECOVERY 12 (2003), available at http://www.un.org/
ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol16no4/164povty.htm.
277
See STATE OF THE GHANAIAN ECONOMY, supra note 170, at 30, 34.
278
Ghana’s 2002 budget provided for an expected budget deficit of 4.4%. YAW
OSAFO-MAAFO, THE BUDGET STATEMENT AND ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT
OF GHANA, 2002 at 11. Citing “substantial shortfalls in expected foreign inflows,” the
2003 budget nevertheless projected a smaller deficit of 3.1% of GDP. YAW OSAFOMAAFO, THE BUDGET STATEMENT AND ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF
GHANA, 2003 at 8, 16, 24, 96. The 2004 budget, acknowledging that actual receipts
were significantly lower than projections in 2003 due to shortfalls in grants and other
non-tax revenues, which resulted in an actual deficit in 2003 of 3.4% rather than the
anticipated 3.1%, projected a budget surplus for 2004 of 1.67%. YAW OSAFO-MAAFO,
THE BUDGET STATEMENT AND ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF GHANA, 2004
at 16, 19, 42.
279
For example, if developed countries follow through on their recent pledges
to relieve existing debt and double aid efforts in Africa. See, e.g., A First Step on
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However, a subsequent change of policies by the aid donor
countries could cripple expectant aid recipients like Ghana, as
foreign
aid
typically
substitutes
for—rather
than
supplements—domestic revenue raising efforts. 280
Multinational companies may be expected to increase
the government’s ability to collect revenues by creating a larger
wage base for personal income tax. Wages in LDCs such as
Ghana, however, average $1 per day, producing little for the
government to share. 281 If wages are raised through regulatory
action, many multinationals may disengage to seek low wages
elsewhere, since the low cost of labor is often a primary reason
multinationals set up in LDCs. 282 Although workers may
benefit individually from employment created by foreign
investment, even if wages are only minimally higher than that
offered by other local employment, they are not necessarily
placed in a better position with respect to paying taxes. 283
Investment protection or insurance—whether made
available through private or public institutions—may promote
foreign investment despite a country’s infrastructural
deficiencies. In the U.S., investment protection is provided to
African Aid, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2005, at A22 (describing Bush’s pledge to “ease the
burden of debt in Africa”); Celia W. Dugger, U.S. Challenged to Increase Aid to Africa,
N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2005, at A10 (describing building consensus for doubling of aid to
Africa); Paul Blustein, After G-8 Aid Pledges, Doubts on ‘Doing It,’ WASH. POST, July
10, 2005, at A14 (describing pledges of the G-8 countries to double their aid to Africa,
but noting that “[t]he amounts actually spent have a history of falling far short of the
amounts pledged”).
280
Kaldor, supra note 267, at 410.
281
Nearly 45% of the population of Ghana lives on less than $1 per day.
United Nations
Development Programme, Human Development Report, 2005, at 228, available at
http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2005. In all of Sub-Saharan Africa, the figure is
close to 46%. See Patricia Kowsmann, World Bank Finds Global Poverty Down By Half
Since 1981, U.N. WIRE, April 23, 2004, available at http://www.un.org/specialrep/ohrlls/News_flash2004/23%20Apr%20World%20Bank%20Finds%20Global.htm.
Globally, it is estimated that about half of the earth’s population lives on under $2 per
day, a fact that has been central to the most recent efforts of the U.S. to combat poverty
with new foreign aid strategies aimed at economic growth. See, e.g., Colin L. Powell,
Give Our Foreign Aid to Enterprising Nations, NEWSDAY (New York), June 11, 2003, at
A34 (discussing the role of the Millennium Challenge Account in a new strategy of
directing foreign aid to “support for sustainable development” in the face of the ongoing
challenge of widespread global poverty).
282
HOOKE, supra note 124, at 18-19.
283
See Nicholas D. Kristof, Inviting All Democrats, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2004,
at A19 (arguing that “the fundamental problem in the poor countries of Africa and Asia
is not that sweatshops exploit too many workers; it’s that they don’t exploit enough,” as
illustrated by the example of a young Cambodian woman who averages seventy-five
cents a day from picking through a garbage dump and for whom “the idea of being
exploited in a garment factory—working only six days a week, inside instead of in the
broiling sun, for up to $2 a day—is a dream”).
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U.S. investors through the United States Export-Import Bank
(“Ex-Im Bank”), an independent federal government agency
that “assume[s] credit and country risks the private sector is
unable or unwilling to accept,” through export credit insurance,
loan guarantees, and direct loans to U.S. businesses investing
in foreign countries. 284 For example, Ex-Im Bank insurance
covers the risk of foreign buyers not paying bills owed to U.S.
investors, the risk that a foreign government might restrict the
U.S. company from converting foreign currency to U.S.
currency, and even the risk of loss due to war. 285 In effect, this
kind of investment protection substitutes U.S. infrastructure
for that existing in LDCs. 286
The Ex-Im Bank has a Sub-Saharan Africa Advisory
Committee devoted specifically to supporting U.S. investment
activity in this region. 287 With investment protection available
as a substitute for prohibitive infrastructural shortcomings,
investment in LDCs like Ghana may not be economically
prohibitive.
Yet, the persistently low level of foreign
investment in Ghana and Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole
suggests that investment protection is not enough to overcome
the barriers perceived by potential investors.
E.

Entrenched Investor Perception

As tax treaties with LDCs may provide little commercial
benefit to investors when little or no income tax is imposed in
these countries, it is perhaps not surprising that they are
correspondingly low on the list of U.S. treaty priorities. 288
284
See Mission of Export-Import Bank of the United States,
http://www.exim.gov/about/mission.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2006).
285
See, e.g., Multi-Buyer Export Credit Insurance, http://www.exim.gov/
products/insurance/multi_buyer.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2006).
286
The subsidy is not without controversy. See, e.g., Heather Bennett, House
OKs Measure to Block Loans to Companies Relocating in Tax Havens, 2004 WTD 139-4
(reporting that as part of a foreign aid bill, U.S. Export-Import Bank loans would no
longer be made to corporate entities chartered in one of several listed tax havens
because, according to Representative Sanders, who offered the bill, “[c]ompanies that
dodge U.S. taxes should not be rewarded with taxpayer handouts,” but should “go to
the government” of the applicable tax haven for such privileges).
287
See Export-Import Bank of the United States, Sub-Saharan Africa
Advisory Committee, http://www.exim.gov/about/leadership/africa.htm (last visited
Dec. 6, 2005).
288
See Statement of Barbara Angus, supra note 5, at 10, stating that the
United States generally does not:

conclude tax treaties with jurisdictions that do not impose significant income
taxes, because there is little possibility of the double taxation of income in the
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Nevertheless, tax treaties continue to be promoted for their
ability to increase investment between developed and lessdeveloped countries. One theory for their promotion is that
increased investment can be expected due to the signaling
effects of tax treaties. 289 For example, it has been suggested
that tax treaties may signal a stable investment and business
climate in which treaty partners express their dedication to
protecting and fostering foreign investment. 290
Proponents of this argument suggest that in the process
of negotiating a tax treaty, governments of LDCs may subject
their operations to increased transparency and accountability,
thus providing additional benefits to potential investors (as
well as domestic taxpayers) in the form of assurances regarding
the proper management of public goods. 291 Thus, bilateral tax
treaties may
cross-border context that tax treaties are designed to address: with such
jurisdictions, an agreement focused on the exchange of tax information can be
very valuable in furthering the goal of reducing U.S. tax evasion.
289

Mutén, supra note 79, at 5.
The Secretary of the Treasury proclaimed the importance of signing a tax
treaty with Honduras in 1956, stating that as the first treaty with any Latin American
country,
290

[t]he agreement may . . . have a value far beyond its immediate impact on the
economic relations between the United States and Honduras. It may
generate among smaller countries an increased awareness of the need to
create an economic atmosphere that will lend itself to increased private
American investment and trade.
Dulles, supra note 5, at 1444. Similar sentiment has been expressed in the context of
many treaties, especially those with LDCs, over the years. See, e.g., STAFF OF S.
FOREIGN RELATIONS COMM., 108TH CONG., TAXATION CONVENTION AND PROTOCOL
WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF SRI LANKA 4 (S. Exec. Rpt. 108-11, Mar. 18, 2004) (“in
countries where an unstable political climate may result in rapid and unforeseen
changes in economic and fiscal policy, a tax treaty can be especially valuable to U.S.
companies, as the tax treaty may restrain the government from taking actions that
would adversely impact U.S. firms”); STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH
CONG., EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED INCOME TAX TREATY AND PROPOSED PROTOCOL
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA 61 (Comm. Print
1999) (“the proposed treaty would provide benefits (as well as certainty) to taxpayers”).
These concepts are also reflected in commentary. See, e.g., ANDERSEN & BLESSING,
supra note 10, at ¶ 1.02[3][b] (“[in the context of LDCs,] tax treaties provide foreign
investors enhanced certainty about the taxation of the income from their
investments.”); see also Davies, supra note 216, at 3 (“even a treaty that merely codifies
the current practice reduces uncertainty for investors by lowering the likelihood that a
government will unilaterally change its tax policy”).
291
See, e.g., U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, The Significance of Bilateral
Tax Treaties Between Developed and Developing Countries, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc.
ST/SG/2001/L.9 (Apr. 2, 2001) (prepared by Mayer Gabay), available at
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan000550.pdf
(suggesting that the first advantage to a LDC of entering into a bilateral tax treaty is
the negotiation process itself, because that process creates a degree of transparency,
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serve largely to “signal that a country is willing to adopt the
international norms” regarding trade and investment, and hence,
that the country is a safe place to invest, especially “in light of the
historical antipathy that many developing and transition countries
have in the past exhibited to inward investment.” 292

Signaling is a slippery concept because it is difficult to
measure whether signaling is occurring and, if so, whether and
to what extent it is impacting investors. The potential for
signaling a stable investment climate through tax treaties with
LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa is especially hampered by the
persistence of negative perceptions about this region’s
investment climate. 293 Foreign investors in LDCs often take a
regional, rather than national, approach to investment,
attributing the negative aspects of one country to others in the
vicinity. 294 Since few Sub-Saharan African countries have tax
treaties, and many countries in the region suffer from civil
unrest and economic failure, Ghana’s ability to demonstrate
stability and certainty may garner little individual attention
from foreign investors unfamiliar with its particular
situation. 295
In addition, the signaling effect is tied to a country’s
reputation in upholding its international compacts. Short of
terminating a treaty, there is no formal enforcement
mechanism should a country proceed to ignore its treaty
obligations. 296 For example, it is difficult to imagine that a tax
which in turn promotes “greater rationality in decision making[,]” which “can be of
great economic benefit to the developing country”)
292
Stewart, supra note 11, at 148 (citing Richard J. Vann, International
Aspects of Income Tax, in 2 TAX LAW DESIGN AND DRAFTING 726 (Victor Thuronyi ed.,
2000)).
293
See UNCTAD, supra note 2, at 1.
294
UNCTAD, supra note 2, at iv, (“[L]ittle attempt is often made to
differentiate between the individual situations of more than 50 countries of the
continent.”); Laura Hildebrandt, Senegal Attracts Investors, But Slowly, 17 AFRICA
RECOVERY 2-15 (2003), available at http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/
vol17no2/172inv3.htm (“[F]oreign investors tend to lump countries together in regions,
without making much distinction among individual countries,” which might explain
Senegal’s limited success in attracting foreign investment despite “relatively good
infrastructure . . . a history of political stability and secular democracy, with decidedly
pro-market leanings.”).
295
See, e.g., Hildebrandt, supra note 294, at 15 (“Senegal’s reputation for
stability may be offset by conflicts elsewhere in the region, such as Côte d’Ivoire.”);
Thabo Mbeki: A Man of Two Faces, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 22, 2005, at 27
(“[A]ny . . . plan for Africa’s redemption, will work only if functioning states with
reasonably good leaders (South Africa, Botswana, Senegal, Ghana, Mozambique) can
be set apart from the awful ones . . . .”).
296
In the case of a treaty violation, a taxpayer would request the Competent
Authority of its home country to negotiate with the Competent Authority in the treaty
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treaty could independently create a sense of stability in a
country that would otherwise be unattractive due to historical
failure to protect property rights.
Finally, treaty proponents point to the certainty
achieved in establishing rules consistent with international
norms so that investors will know what to expect regarding the
taxation of their investments in foreign countries. However,
signaling certainty and stability is achieved more directly
through agreements designed to provide these specific benefits.
For example, delivering certainty and stability is the primary
purpose of investment protection provisions in global and
These goals are also
regional trade agreements. 297
encompassed in a global network of over 2,100 bilateral
investment protection treaties (BITs). 298 Ghana has seventeen
such treaties currently in force. 299 The U.S. has forty-seven in
force and relies on these agreements to protect investment in
source countries. 300
Investment protection provisions and treaties outline
the applicable legal structure and regulatory framework of the
signatory countries and provide settlement provisions in the
partner country. For this reason, investors may desire a tax treaty to be in place so
that assistance in negotiating disputes with a foreign country could be sought from the
U.S. Competent Authority. However, treaties provide little recourse in the event the
Competent Authorities fail to reach a resolution. See U.S. MODEL, supra note 56, art.
25.
297
See Stephen S. Golub, Measures of Restrictions on Inward Foreign Direct
Investment for OECD Countries 6 (OECD Econ. Dep’t, Working Paper No. 357, 2003).
Most of the LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa, including Ghana, have signed multilateral
agreements dealing with the protection of foreign investment, such as the Convention
establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency and the Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States. See
UNCTAD, supra note 2, at 7-8.
298
WIR 2003, supra note 118, at 89-91 (stating that BITs signal a country’s
attitude towards and climate for foreign investment, and that investors “appear to
regard BITs as part of a good investment framework”). Worldwide, there are 2,181
BITs currently in force, encompassing 176 countries. Id. at 89. As in the case of tax
treaties, significantly more BITs would be required to achieve global coverage. See
supra note 71 and accompanying text.
299
These treaties include agreements with Benin, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso,
China, Cuba, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Guinea, India, Malaysia, Mauritius,
Netherlands, Romania, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. See UNCTAD Bilateral
Investment Treaty Database, http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/DocSearch.aspx?
id=779 (last visited Jan. 14, 2006).
300
Hearing Before the S. Foreign Relations Comm. on Economic Treaties,
108th Cong. 9-10 (2004) (statement of Shaun Donnelly, Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, State Dep’t) (“BITs have afforded
important protections to U.S. investors”). The U.S. currently has four BITs with LDCs
in Sub-Saharan Africa: Cameroon, Mozambique, Senegal, and the Democratic Republic
of the Congo. For a list of U.S. BITs currently in force, see UNCTAD Bilateral
Investment Treaty Database, supra note 299.
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event of disputes between investors and source-country
governments.
Common features include guarantees of
compensation in the event of expropriation, guarantees of free
transfers of funds and repatriations of capital and profits, and
dispute settlement provisions. 301 The goal of these agreements
is to promote transparency, stability, and predictability for
regulatory frameworks in source countries, and therefore to
reduce obstacles to the flow of foreign investment. 302 BITs are
further bolstered through subsidized loans, loan guarantees,
and other financial assistance made available to foreign
investors. 303
Even if the stability and certainty signaled by tax
treaties could make a source country that has such agreements
more attractive than one that does not, U.S. investors are
unlikely to lobby for tax treaties if they do not have a direct
financial interest at stake, namely, an exposure to taxation
that could be alleviated by treaty. 304
The foreign investment patterns of U.S. businesses also
imply that tax treaties may be an insufficient signal to
investors. 305 First, U.S. investors will pursue investments in a
country with a sufficiently attractive business environment,
even in the absence of a tax treaty. 306 For example, although
the U.S. has no treaty with Brazil, 307 U.S. foreign direct
Second, the mere
investment in Brazil is significant. 308
301

WIR 2003, supra note 118, at 89.
Id. at 91.
303
See supra note 284 and accompanying text (discussing the role of the ExIm Bank in subsidizing U.S. investors to LDCs).
304
The lobbying efforts of U.S. businesses may not be the most appropriate
means of establishing a list of priorities for new treaties, however, it is one of the
primary factors considered by the office of International Tax Counsel in making such
decisions. See Testimony of Barbara Angus, supra note 5, at 10.
305
See Mutén, supra note 79, at 4.
306
See, e.g., Jones, supra note 87, at 4-5 (arguing that tax treaties “make less
difference to domestic taxpayers investing abroad,” especially if taxes are low in source
countries).
307
Brazil is one of the South American countries that refuses to negotiate
with the U.S. due to the tax sparing controversy. See Laurey, supra note 222, at 491
n.155 (noting that due to the tax sparing controversy, Mexico was the first Latin
American nation to sign a tax treaty with the U.S.); Mitchell, supra note 11, at 213;
Guttentag, supra note 4, at 451-52. The latest U.S. discussions with Brazil were held
in 1992. See Venuti et al., supra note 14. As Brazil continued to insist on tax sparing
and the U.S. refuses to negotiate with countries that insist on including such a
provision, no further meetings are planned. See id.
308
As valued at historical cost (book value of U.S. direct investors’ equity in
and net outstanding loans to Brazilian affiliates), U.S. foreign direct investment in
Brazil is currently valued at almost $30 billion. Borga & Yorgason, supra note 101, at
49. At 1.7% of total U.S. foreign direct investment, Brazil’s market for U.S. foreign
302
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presence of a tax treaty will generally overcome neither an
otherwise poor business climate, nor one that deteriorates after
a treaty is in place. For example, the U.S. entered into a treaty
with Venezuela in 1999, but the amount of U.S. capital flowing
to Venezuela subsequently dropped sharply due to “concerns
over regulations and political instability in the country.” 309
Finally, some investors may not necessarily want a tax
treaty because such agreements usually include measures that
prevent tax evasion, as discussed above. 310 Thus while tax
treaties may send positive signals to investors, they may as
likely send negative signals to the extent they lead the way to
stronger enforcement of tax laws. Supporting tax evasion is
clearly indefensible as a policy for encouraging investment in
LDCs, but the benefits of such opportunities to existing
investors, and the cost of eliminating such opportunities,
cannot be ignored. 311
Nevertheless, easing enforcement and administration of
the tax laws of potential LDC treaty partners may be an
alternative reason to continue expanding the U.S. tax treaty
network. 312 For example, the information-exchange provisions
direct investment is not far behind that of some developed countries, including Spain
(with 2.1% of U.S. foreign direct investment) and Australia (with 2.3%). Id. at 42.
309
UNCTAD,
FDI
in
Brief:
Venezuela
(2004),
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_fdistat/docs/wid_ib_ve_en.pdf.
310
In the past, tax treaties may have contributed to tax evasion by creating
opportunities for “treaty shopping” through the use of multi-country tiered structures
such as the one shut down in Aiken Indus., Inc. v. Comm’r, 56 TC 925 (1971). In that
case, the U.S.-Honduras treaty then in force was used to channel interest payments
free of tax from the U.S. to the Bahamas. Id. at 929-31. The U.S.-Honduras treaty was
terminated in 1966, before the case was decided but in connection with these kinds of
structures, deemed to be void of any “economic or business purpose” by the Tax Court.
Id. at 929, 934. Treaty shopping has since been curtailed in newer treaties and
protocols by means of stronger limitation of benefits provisions. See Arnold & Dibout,
supra note 252, at 73-74.
311
Just as in the cases of deferral and bank secrecy, the private sector can be
expected to protect tax advantages regardless of whether they comport with a coherent
tax policy.
312
Obtaining cooperation in tax enforcement through information sharing
provisions is a major factor in the completion of treaties from the perspective of the
U.S. For example, the newly-ratified tax treaty with Sri Lanka was originally
negotiated almost twenty years ago but only entered into force this year. U.S.-Sri
Lanka Treaty, supra note 4; Treasury Press Rel. JS-1809, supra note 4. Ten years of
the delay were due to Sri Lanka’s reluctance in accepting U.S. requests regarding
information exchange. See Letter of Submittal from Colin L. Powell, U.S. Department
of State, to the President (Aug. 26, 2003), reprinted in Protocol Amending Tax
Convention with Sri Lanka, U.S-Sri Lanka, Sept. 20, 2002, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 108-9
(2003). The fact that, as in the case of Ghana, Sri Lanka’s statutory rates and tax
incentive regimes indicate that the domestic tax regime is as or more favorable than
that provided under the treaty, suggests that prevention of double taxation plays a
much less significant role than prevention of tax evasion.
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might enable Ghana to extend its current, basically territorial,
regime to a worldwide regime. 313 The benefit of such a regime
would depend on the amount of savings shifted to the U.S. by
Ghanaian persons before and after the treaty.
This is
presumably a relatively tiny amount by global standards, 314 but
it might be significant to the overall revenue picture in Ghana.
However, Ghana’s limited tax treaty network significantly
restricts its ability to enlarge its taxing jurisdiction, since
Ghanaians could simply choose a location other than the U.S.
for their offshore activities, avoiding Ghanaian tax even under
a worldwide system. 315
Moreover, as in the case of investment protection, the
benefits of information exchange are as readily—and more
broadly—achieved through agreements specifically addressing
this issue. Information exchange is comprehensively addressed
in Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs), which are
generally bilateral, and through multilateral agreements such
as the OECD TIEA. 316 Under U.S. TIEAs, assistance in tax
enforcement and collection is extended not only to income taxes
but to other taxes as well, making such agreements potentially
more effective than tax treaties in fulfilling the goal of
improved tax administration and enforcement. 317

313
See U.S. MODEL, supra note 56, art. 26. For example, when Venezuela
entered into a tax treaty with the United States, its tax regime was territorial:
Venezuela imposed no tax on the foreign income of its residents. Its tax treaty with the
U.S. included the typical exchange-of-information provision, which would theoretically
allow Venezuela to pursue its residents who engaged in activities outside of the
country, and Venezuela subsequently expanded its jurisdiction to encompass residencebased taxes. U.S.-Venezuela Treaty, supra note 4, art. 27.
314
The U.S. Bureau of Economic Affairs compiles data regarding direct
investment in the U.S., but Ghana is included only collectively with the rest of Africa,
excluding South Africa. Borga & Yorgason, supra note 101, at 51. Inbound direct
investment from this region is valued at $1.8 billion, which represents less than 0.2%
of that from Europe. Id.
315
Ghana would not generally benefit from the larger U.S. tax treaty network
since the exchange of information is only limited to that which is relevant to the two
contracting states. U.S. MODEL, supra note 56, art. 26.
316
The OECD Agreement has been signed by the U.S. and Canada, among
others. OECD MODEL, supra note 21, at 2.
317
The U.S. entered into tax treaties with many countries in Sub-Saharan
Africa and the Caribbean simultaneously by territorial extension with their various
colonial powers (from 1957-1958) and terminated most of these treaties simultaneously
three decades later (in 1983-1984). See supra note 6. The U.S. subsequently entered
into TIEAs only with the Caribbean nations. See, e.g., Bruce Zagaris, OECD Report on
Harmful Tax Competition: Strategic Implications for Caribbean Offshore Jurisdictions,
17 TAX NOTES INT’L 1507, 1510 (1998). The U.S. has trade agreements with countries
in both the Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa, sends foreign aid to both regions, and
has expressed a desire to increase investment, trade, and aid to both regions. See
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Absent reduction of double taxation, the non-commercial
benefits of tax treaties appear incapable of independently
exerting a significant influence on U.S. foreign investment, and
some of the aspects of tax treaties may tend to discourage such
investment. Ultimately, the value of continued expansion of
the U.S. tax treaty network to LDCs may therefore be
extremely limited in the context of a global tax climate that
reflects the circumstances illustrated in this case study.
V.

CONCLUSION

The investment and aid goals of tax treaties are
undermined by competing tax regimes, including domestic U.S.
rules that provide relief of current U.S. tax burdens on foreign
income earned by multinational companies. To the extent
multinationals can escape U.S. taxation simply by investing
abroad, the U.S. fosters tax competition throughout the world
as foreign countries compete to attract the U.S. capital fleeing
taxation at home. As a result of this international tax
competition and a corresponding divergence in tax mix between
developed and less developed countries, much of the tax
ostensibly relieved under tax treaties no longer exists to a
significant extent with respect to investment in many LDCs.
As a result, traditional tax treaties with these countries
may offer few commercial benefits to investors. Tax treaties
may provide non-commercial benefits to partner countries and
investors by signaling stability or suitability or by providing
certainty.
However, these incidental benefits are likely
insufficient to significantly impact investment in many LDCs,
particularly those in Sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, as this case
study of Ghana demonstrates, much of the conventional
wisdom about the impact of tax treaties on the global flow of
investment does not apply in the context of many of the LDCs
most in need of realizing the benefits attributed to these
agreements.
Tax treaties represent a significant opportunity cost for
LDCs, diverting attention and resources away from the
exploration of more direct ways to increase cross-border
investment. Thus, every potential tax treaty relationship with
LDCs should be approached critically. If a tax treaty cannot be
expected to provide sufficient benefits to investors, it should
supra notes 2-3. Yet there is no agreement on tax matters with respect to the LDCs in
Sub-Saharan Africa. See discussion supra Part I.
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not be pursued simply to include the target country in the
network of treaty countries in a myopic adherence to
traditional notions about the international tax and business
community. After decades of faithfulness to the promise of tax
treaties, their inability to deliver in situations involving LDCs
must be acknowledged. If the U.S. is truly committed to
increasing trade and investment to the LDCs of Sub-Saharan
Africa, it must pursue alternative means of achieving these
goals.

